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TOWARD A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF 
ALLOCATION OF POW ERS: LEGISLATORS AND 
LEGISLATIVE APPOINTEES PERFORMING 
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS 
John Devlin* 
The three-part division of sovereign authority among largely independent 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and the competing principle of 
"checks and balances" among those branches, have been and remain corner­
stones of the American system of government, both state and federal. As any 
graduate of a junior high school civics class can attest, few propositions are re­
garded as so basic. But, as any constitutional lawyer can also attest, few pro­
positions are so difficult to define or apply consistently to actual issues of 
governmental organization. 
It is n o  novel insight to note that the burgeoning administrative bureau­
cracy, both federal and state, poses special and perhaps ultimately insoluble 
problems for traditional "distribution of powers" analysis. 1 In exercising the 
powers delegated to them, administrative agencies and officials typically exercise 
all three types of powers, and are responsive to some degree of control by each of 
the constitutional branches. 2 Thus administrative agencies and officials fit 
poorly, if at all, into the three-part conceptual framework underlying the federal 
and state constitutions. 3 These conceptual problems have been exacerbated by 
• Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center of the Louisiana State University. 
Thanks to my colleagues at L.S.U. for their helpful comments at a roundtable discussion of some of 
the ideas presented herein, to Kevin Sneesby, Christina Fletcher, and David Hilburn for their re­
search assistance, and to Lisa, sine quam non. 
I. With apologies for what may seem like unnecessary jargon, this article will use the descrip­
tive phrase "separation of powers" solely for so much of the American theory of governance as 
posits that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches ought be kept distinct and independent. 
Where the theory is meant in its broader sense-incorporating "checks and balances" as well as pure 
"separation" principles-the phrases "allocation of powers" or "distribution of powers" will be 
used. 
2. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 574-95 (1984) (discussing both legal theories and 
practical politics of joint presidential and congressional influence on federal agencies); Frank R. 
Anderson et  al., A Symposium on Administrative Law: The Uneasy Constitutional Status of Adminis­
trative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1987) (addressing various aspects of issue). 
3. The doctrinal difficulties posed by the growth of multi-function federal administrative agen­
cies have been repeatedly noted by Justices and commentators, usually with dismay. See, for exam­
ple, the often cited lament of Justice Jackson: 
[Federal administrative agencies] have become a veritable fourth branch of Government, 
which has deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a fourth dimen· 
sion unsettles our three dimensional thinking . .. 
Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi· 
judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions within the separation-
1205 
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the massive growth of administrative agencies, in both numbers and power, on 
both the state and federal levels. 
The bulk of scholarly discussion on the distribution of powers in the admin­
istrative context has focused on conflicts between Congress and the President 
over control of federal agencies, where cases such as Buckley v. Valeo,4 INS v. 
Chadha/' Bowsher v. Synar,6 and Morrison v. Olson 7 have engendered a large 
body of commentary.s However, as the federal g overnment has shifted responsi-
of-powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the qualifying phrase "quasi"' is 
implicit with confession that all recognized classifications have broken down, and "quasi"' 
is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to 
cover a disordered bed. 
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Par­
ticular government functions may be very difficult to assign to a particular Montesquieuian category. 
See infra note 91. Instead, c hameleon-like, they may appear in different guises, depending on which 
official is performing that function. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2655 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714, 749 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
Some state court judges have likewise noted the impossibility of applying pure separation of 
powers theory to the real world of the state administrative bureaucracy: 
[S]trict application of the separation of powers doctrine is inappropriate today in a complex 
state government where administrative agencies exercise many types of power including 
legislative, executive and judicial powers often blended together in the same administrative 
agency. The courts today have come to recognize that the political philosophers who de­
veloped the theory of separation of powers did not have any concept of the complexities of 
government as it exists today. 
State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 547 P.2d 786, 791 (1976); see also Opinion of the Justices, 309 
N.E.2d 476, 478 (Mass. 1974) (noting growth of administrative agencies "has sometimes tended to 
obscure admittedly indistinct boundary lines between the three branches" and administrative activi­
ties cannot always be readily classified as executive, legislative, or judicial in nature). 
Other state courts and judges have, however, steadfastly resisted the emergence of what they see 
as an extra-constitutional "fourth branch" of government,  and have insisted that administrative 
officials and actions be clearly located in one or another o f  the traditional branches. See, e.g., Legis­
lative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 916-17 (Ky. 1984) (declaring unconstitutional 
attempt to designate legislatively dominated LRC as "independent"' agency with executive powers, 
on grounds that "[t]here is, simply put, no fourth branch of government" and that s uch legislative 
organ can exercise only legislative powers); Herman Bros., Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 
564 So: 2d 294, 298 (La. 1990) (Cole, J., concurring) (noting "absurdity of the Commission's plenary 
authonty argument, the continued pursuit of which exhibits constitutional illusions of being a fourth 
branch of government"'). 
4. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
5. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
6. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
7. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
8· The commentary is far too numerous to catalogue. For a partial and somewhat eclectic 
sample, see generally Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers & Ordered Liberty 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1513 1515 -16 (1991) (ag 
· th . 
' 
· h ' reemg at courts should address separation of powers issues only w en 
bra�ches of government pose threat to integrity of institutional process); Stephen L. Carter, Consti· tut1ona/ Improprieties· ReRections M' · u C I  "'' on 1stretta, Morrison, & Administrative Government, 51 · H · L. REV. 357: 391-98 (1990) (criticizing courts' reliance on original intent); E. Donald Elliott, Why Ou� �� ration of P�we
.rs Jurisprudence is So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 530-31 (1989) (cnttclZlng current Junsprudence fi � ·1· · · · · l' )· 
R. h . 
or ia1 mg to d1stmgu1sh between interpretation and htera ism • 1c ard J. Pierce, Jr Morrison 01 s · 1988 ., v. son, eparation of Powers & the Structure of Government, 
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bilities and discretion to the states, state administrative agencies have come to 
approach their federal counterparts in size and power. 9 Thus, the issues posed 
by these battles for influence on the machinery of government have become sali­
ent on the state level as well. 
The institutional arrangements by which state legislatures may attempt to 
assert effective influence over the process of administering state government are 
many and v aried. Legislatures may attempt to draft statutes "tightly" so as to 
leave little room for administrative discretion, 10 or may assert authority to re-
SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 9-20 (reviewing current theories on separation of powers); Thomas 0. Sargentich, 
The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
430, 475-79 (1987) (arguing that courts should review separation of powers issues by considering 
ideals of administrative process); Robert L. Stern, The Separation of Powers Cases: Not Really a 
Mess, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 461 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Formal & Functional Approaches to Separation­
of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 490-96 (1987) (advocat­
ing functional analysis); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law & the Idea of Inde­
pendence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 305-07 (1989) (advocating rule of law analysis). 
9. See generally ALAN ROSENTHAL, GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATORS: CONTENDING POWERS 
I, 167-213 (1990) (describing both expansion of state regulatory activity and resulting struggles be­
tween governors and legislatures over effective control of this expanding government). 
10. At one time, the so-called "nondelegation" doctrine required both Congress and state legis­
latures to draft statutes in precisely this fashion. That doctrine was ultimately rooted in separation 
of powers concerns, in that it was intended to prevent Congress from transferring its core lawmaking 
functions to executive or quasi-executive bodies. The doctrine purported to require legislative bod­
ies, state or federal, to determine conclusively in advance all significant issues of policy, and allowed 
administrative officials only very limited discretion to "fill up the details" or apply clear statutory 
standards to particular cases. See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) (holding 
statutes granting authority to make administrative rules not improper delegations of legislative 
power); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1904)(requiring Congress to legislate as far as 
is "reasonably practical," and to leave duty of carrying out statutory result to executive); King v. 
Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 103 N.W. 616, 620 (Mich. 1905) (holding that statute allowing insurance 
commission to choose policy form was paramount to allowing agency to make law and was therefore 
unconstitutional). 
However, it eventually became apparent, at  least to the federal courts, that these formulations 
were too restrictive, and that a generalist Congress was simply unable to make all of the substantive 
decisions required by the growing federal government. In J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), Justice Taft reformulated the responsibility of Congress to provide only 
some "intelligible principle" sufficient to guide administrators who exercise discretion and reviewing 
courts who review that exercise. Id. at 406-09. Modem federal courts have interpreted this require­
ment very leniently, permitting very broad delegations of power with only the most minimal of 
statutory guidelines. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, Il l S. Ct. 1752, 1756 (1991) (upholding 
delegation to Attorney General of authority to add drugs temporarily to schedules of controlled 
substances); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-74 (1989) (upholding Congress's delega­
tion of sentencing guidelines to independent sentencing commission). 
Many state courts have come to conclusions broadly similar to those of the federal authorities. 
Though the formulation most frequently used by the state courts-that the legislature provide suffi­
cient "standards" for administrative action-is perhaps more susceptible to restrictive interpreta­
tions than is the federal "intelligible principle" language, state courts have, on many occasions, 
permitted broad delegations of authority to state administrative agencies and officials. See, e.g., 
Warren v. Boucher, 543 P.2d 731, 734 (Alaska 1975) (permitting state officials to determine similar­
ity of proposal and existing act not unconstitutional delegation of judicial power); State v. Arizona 
Mines Supply Co., 484 P.2d 619, 624-26 (Ariz. 1971) (upholding statute that "reasonably inferred" 
executive enforcement standards under state's police power); Department of Transp. v. City of At-
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view particular agency actions, 11 either through a "legislative veto" annulling 
that action12 or through other, less coercive mechanisms of legislative re-
lanta, 398 S.E.2d 567, 571 (Ga. 1990) (upholding statute creating state commission comprised of 
executive members to approve taking of municipal property); Johnson v. Odom, 470 So. 2d 988, 991-
92 (La. Ct. App.) (upholding state advisory committee's enforcement of pesticide regulations on 
grounds that they involved no agency discretion), cert. denied, 4 76 So. 2d 355 (La. 1985); Sullivan 
County Harness Racing Ass'n v. Glasser, 283 N.E.2d 603, 606-07 (N.Y. 1972) (upholding "broad" 
regulatory powers conferred on state commission to regulate harness racing industry); Bauer v. 
South Carolina State Hous. Auth., 246 S.E.2d 869, 876-77 (S.C. 1978) (holding statute allowing 
state housing authority to set maximum interest rates and issue notes and bonds, did not vest "unbri­
dled" discretion in agency); Lobelville Special Sch. Dist. v. McCanless, 381 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tenn. 
1964) (upholding agency determinations where statutory guidelines followed in reaching decision); 
see generally Mark N. Mathias, Note, A Comparison of the Federal and Michigan Approaches to 
Administrative Rulemaking, 3 COOLEY L. REV. 135, 139-42 (1985) (tracing development of 
nondelegation doctrine in Michigan). This lenient approach is not u niversal, however. Unlike fed­
eral courts, which have not struck down a federal statute on nondelegation grounds for almost 60 
years, state courts have proven quite willing to declare state delegations unconstitutional for failure 
to provide sufficient restraints upon administrative discretion. See, e.g., D.P. v. Florida, 597 So. 2d 
952, 955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (prohibiting state agency from "criminalizing" escapes from 
juvenile residential facilities); Commissioner of Agric. v. Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council, 439 
So. 2d 348, 350 (La. 1983) (holding statute lacking sufficient guidelines gave agency "unfettered" 
discretion to regulate pesticides); Missouri v. Raccagno, 530 S.W.2d 699, 704 (Mo. 1975) (voiding 
agency's determination that failure to collect cigarette taxes was unlawful); Chapel v. Common­
wealth, 89 S.E.2d 337, 343 (Va. 1955) (holding legislature may not confer broad powers to regulate 
dry cleaning industry without statutory guidelines); Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 
409, 418-19 (Wyo. 1962) (striking down State Fair Trade Act which left legislative duty of enforce­
ment to judiciary via private parties). 
Regardless of the nuances of state nondelegation Jaw, however, statutory draftsmanship is un­
likely to prove an effective mechanism for asserting legislative control over administrators. The 
practical impediments are simply too great. While state legislatures may not be required to deal with 
quite the same range of issues as Congress, their responsibilities are still far too broad to permit 
detailed consideration of every issue of state governance. Similarly, it is not possible for statutory 
drafters to anticipate all of the circumstances that may arise in the future. Thus, delegation of 
substantial discretion cannot be completely avoided, and the best that a legislature can hope for is  to 
retain some measure of influence on how that discretion is exercised. 
11. Mechanisms for legislative review of administrative rulemaking were popular in the states. 
By the middle of the 1980s, more than two-thirds of the states had some kind of provision for such 
legislative review. See Barbara L. Borden, Comment, Legislative Review of Agency Rules in Arizona: 
A Constitutional Analysis, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 493, 526 n.275 (1985) (listing 37 state legislative 
oversight provisions of various types); see generally L. Howard Levinson, Legislative & Executive 
Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARYL. REV. 79, 96-
105 ( 1982) (discussing models other than one or two house vetoes). 
. .
12. While some arguments for the viability of state legislative vetoes have been made, see, e.g., 
Wilham J. Pohlman, Comment, The Continued Viability of Ohio's Procedure for Legislative Review of 
Agency Rules in the Post-Chadha Era, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 251, 268-72 (1988), state courts have uni­�orml
_
y struck down mechanisms that purport to give the legislature broad power to overrule admin-
1s
_
trauve regulations �ithout presentment to the governor, on grounds that such arrangements 
violate state constitutional mandates regarding the mechanics of law making, separation of powers, 
or both. Courts have so held re�ardless of whether the veto was to be exercised by particular legisla-
tive committees, see, e.g., Opm1on of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783 786-89 (NH 1981) ( 
· 
· · h 1 · 1 · 
, . . expressing 
opm1on t at eg1s alive veto not unconstitutional per se but Id b ·f ·t II JI 
· 
. cou e 1 1 a ows sma groups m House or Senate to exercise control over executive functions); State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d622,630-36(W.Va 198l)(voiding veto f l 2 · · · 
· 
. 
· power o -person leg1slat1ve committee regulating mme safety), or by the legislature as a whole. See, e.g., State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 
t993JAPPOINTEES PERFORMING ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS1209 
view.13 Alternatively, or in addition, legislatures may use their powers of appro­
priation 14 or various non-statutory means15 to pressure administrators to reach 
775-79 (Alaska 1980) (voiding statutory provision by which vote of both Houses could annul agency 
regulation of lotteries); Opinion of the Justices, 429 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Mass. 1981); General As­
sembly of N.J. v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438, 443-47 (N.J. 1982) (voiding legislative veto provisions in 
Legislative Oversight Act on grounds it impeded executive enforcement of law); Commonwealth v. 
Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 778-82 (Pa. 1987) (distinguishing Chadha on ground that agency at issue not 
charged with execution of laws, but nevertheless concluding legislative disapprovals must be 
presented to governor). However, more limited legislative vetoes have sometimes been upheld. See, 
e.g., Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth., 448 A.2d 449, 451 (N.J. 1982) (holding legislature's au­
thority to veto narrowly-defined class of building projects sufficiently within scope of legislative over­
sight of executive action); Opinion of the Justices, 266 A.2d 823, 826 (N.H. 1970) (approving 
proposed amendment requiring committee authorization of certain state personnel salary changes); 
see generally Scott Welman, Comment, Joint Committee on Administrative Rules: The Missouri Leg­
islature's Disregard for the Missouri Constitution, 58 UMKC L. REV. 113, 113-16 (1989) (criticizing 
use of legislative veto in Missouri); Richard Lee Slater, Note, Oklahoma's Legislative Veto: Combat 
Casualty in Separation of Powers War, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 129, 147-59 (1987) (examining 
historical uses of legislative veto in Oklahoma). 
At least two states, Connecticut and Iowa, have enacted constitutional amendments authorizing 
legislative vetoes passed by both houses of the legislature. ROSENTHAL, supra note 9, at 184. 
13. Actual and proposed mechanisms usually involve some form of legislative committee gener­
ally charged with the responsibility of reviewing proposed administrative rules and regulations. 
They differ, however, as to the consequences of legislative disagreement. Committees may have the 
power to suspend rules temporarily pending possible modification by ordinary statute; to require the 
agency to reopen the rulemaking process in order to consider proposed changes; to publish an "ob­
jection" that has the effect of reversing the ordinary presumption of validity if the rule is challenged 
in court; or simply to make recommendations for legislative action to the legislature as a whole, 
which again must be accomplished by ordinary statute. See generally ROSENTHAL, supra note 9, at 
184 - 9 3  (describing various methods of legislative control); Ran Coble, Executive-Legislative Rela­
tions in North Carolina: Where We Are & Where We Are Headed, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 673, 
690-93 (1990) (discussing various incarnations of North Carolina Administrative Rules Review 
Committee); Philip P. Frickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative Committee Suspension of Admin­
istrative R ules: The C ase of Minnesota, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1237, 1259-67 (1986) (arguing legislative 
suspension of administrative rules violates separation of powers); Levinson, supra note 11, at 79-105 
(comparing federal and state models for legislative veto powers); David S. Neslin, Comment, Quis 
Custodiet Ipsos C ustodes?: Gubernatorial & Legislative Review of Agency Rulemaking Under the 1981 
Model Act, 57 WASH. L. REV. 669, 680-82, 686 - 96 (1982) (critiquing various mechanisms of legisla­
tive review included in 1981 Model State A dministrative Procedure Act). 
At least two states have agreed with P rofessor Frickey that a mechanism that allows a legisla­
tive committee unilaterally to suspend an administrative rule violates separation of powers princi­
ples. See Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 917-19 (Ky. 1984) (striking 
down statute requiring committee approval of agency regulations); State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas 
House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622, 634. 38 (Kan. 1984) (striking down statute allowing legisla­
ture to adopt, modify, or revoke administrative rules and regulations without governor's approval). 
In contrast, South Dakota's State Constitutio n  specifically permits a suspensive legislative veto. S.D. 
CONST. art. Ill, § 30. 
14. This power of appropriation is significant because all state constitutions require legislative 
appropriation as a precondition to spending money. While the process of setting the budget is, in 
most cases, dominated by the governors, see generally ROSENTHAL, supra note 9, at 131-62, the need 
for administrators to appeal to legislative appropriations committees for actual funding of those 
budget requests, and the ever-present threat to use that power to retaliate against administrators who 
displease the legislature, are powerful tools. ROSENTHAL, supra note 9, at 175, 181. Such power is 
not without limits however. The role of governors in crafting initial budget requests and the power 
held by many to reduce or veto particular budgetary line items gives the governors a similar club to 
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results compatible with legislative policy preferences. Finally, legislatures may 
use their power to structure state government to vest administrative duties in 
themselves or in officials that the legislature may appoint. 
Though each of these mechanisms is important and worthy of comparative 
study, this article will focus solely on the last method of asserting influence listed 
above-legislative efforts to vest themselves or their appointees with administra­
tive powers. Such efforts clearly present a number of challenges to constitu­
tional theory. Obviously, attempts by legislatures to vest executive authority in 
their members or appointee s  may violate traditional principles of separation of 
policymaking and policy-executing powers on several grounds.16 Moreover, de­
pending on how these efforts are structured, they may fall afoul of state constitu­
tional provisions vesting specific powers and duties in the governor, 17 restricting 
the length of legislative sessions, 18 or barring legislators from holding particular 
offices.19 Various courts that have been called upon to decide these issues have, 
not surprisingly, reached divergent conclusions as to the constitutionality of 
such efforts by legislatures. However, as will be developed below, those differ-
hold over the heads of administrators. See generally Coble, supra note 13, at 678-87 (1990) (describ­
ing legal battles that eventually vindicated governor's power to prepare budget recommendation free 
of legislative influence, and legislature's responses); Antonia C. Moran, Note, Expenditure Control: 
Balancing the Constitutional Powers in Connecticut, 20 CONN. L. REV. 953, 1008-27 (1988) (tracing 
growth of gubernatorial power over budget and over state administrative agencies in modem era). 
15. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 9, at 173-76 (discussing oversight and intervention by standing 
committees and individual legislators). As Professor Rosenthal summarizes: 
Although the governor is the chief administrator, it is not unusual for the head of a depart­
ment to spend as much time relating to the legislature as to the governor and the gover­
nor's staff. Nor is it unusual for those at the top of the ladder in career service to spend 
more time trying to pacify the legislature than trying to figure out what the governor might 
want to do. The governor's concern is episodic, the legislature's - through one house or 
the other, a single committee or several, and any number of individual members - is 
continuous. Some legislator is always on the bureaucracy's b a ck. Moreover, "bureaucrats 
fear legislators" because legislators are "important, abrasive, insistent and vindictive." 
Id. at 173-74 (quoting WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., TAMING THE BUREAUCRACY 221 (1989)). 
16. A number of constitutional objections may be raised. The mere exercise of a power of 
appointment may itself be considered essentially "executive" in nature and thus beyond a legislator's 
legitimate authority. Performance of administrative functions by individual legislators may violate 
state "incompatibility" clauses. Finally, any attempt to exercise indirect control over the adminis­
tration of laws through appointment of administrators may violate basic allocation of powers princi­
ples by im�ermissibly joining lawmaking and law-applying power or by infringing on the ability of  
the e xecuti:e branch to carry out its  constitutionally assigned duties. See infra notes 129-221 and 
accompanymg text. 
. 17 · Two types of such provisions that can be found in many state constitutions are those grant­m� the governor general power to appoint administrative officials, and those vesting the governor 
with a duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. See infra notes 65-66 74.77 115-19 135 - 36 
and accompanying text. 
' ' ' 





on �lauses barring legislators from holding particular offices are of two types: "in-compattbthty prov1s1ons which bar a le · 1 t f h Id' · . . · . . . g1s a or rom o mg executive office or exerc1smg executtve auth�nty while simultan.
eously retaining his legislative seat; and "ineligibility" provisions which bar a l�gislator from occupying an office which has had its pay or benefits increased during that legisla­tor s tenn. Only th� first type of clause raises true distribution of powers issues. See infra notes 120-3 I and accompanying text. 
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ences do not seem to be the result of differences in constitutional texts or history, 
but rather of the real debate over how distribution of powers principles common 
to all American constitutions should be applied to state governance. 
This ongoing debate regarding the emerging state constitutional law of sep­
aration of powers has been obscured by the relative lack of  scholarly commen­
tary discussing these issues in a specifically state constitutional and comparative 
context. With few exceptions, commentary on state constitutional separation of 
powers questions has tended to focus on particular states viewed in isolation;20 
comparisons between the states and the federal government have generally been 
limited to a restricted range of separation of powers issues.21 This paucity of 
analysis directed at the consequences of the pervasive differences between federal 
and state governments for purposes of allocation of powers analysis has had 
unfortunate results. In particular, it has led some state courts to rely excessively 
on federal precedents, or otherwise to fail to focus on the relevant differences 
between states and the federal government with respect to these issues. 
The thesis of this article is that there are systematic differences between the 
federal government and the states with respect to their constitutions and their 
place in the American scheme of government, and that these differences make 
the development of an independent theory of state constitutional allocation of 
governmental powers both possible and desirable. While a full articulation of 
such a theory is surely beyond the scope of any single article, 22 the effort here 
will be to look at a particular set of issues, that is, those posed by the perform­
ance of administrative functions by legislators or legislative appointees, as a first 
step toward sketching what an independent state-based approach might entail. 
Accordingly, Part I sets the stage by briefly laying out basic principles and cur­
rent federal law, and then argues that the structural differences between states 
20. One major exception to this sweeping generalization is exemplified in Professor Bruff's 
analysis of selected separation of powers issues under the Texas Constitution, which paid careful 
attention to relevant differences between state and federal governments. See generally Harold H. 
Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1 337 (1990). Other 
pieces taking a broader comparative view include Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Eligibility of Public Of­
ficers and Employees to Serve in the State Legislature: An Essay on Separation of Powers, Politics. and 
Constitutionai Policy, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 295; and John V. Orth, Forever Separate and Distinct: 
Separation of Powers in North Carolina, 62 N.C. L. REv. 10- 1 4  (1983) (comparing jurisdiction deci­
sional law o n  separation of powers). 
2 1 .  See, e.g., Louis Fisher & Neil Devins, How Successfully Can the State's Item Veto be Trans­
ferred to the President?, 75 GEO. L.J. 159, 1 88 - 95 ( 1 986) (discussing item veto provision ofBalanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1 985); Levinson, supra note 1 1 , at 85-86 (discussing 
various models of legislative and executive veto power); Neil C. McCabe, Four Faces of State Consti­
tutional Law: Challenges to Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition Provisions, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1 77, 
209- 1 4  (1989) (discussing implications of state speedy trial provisions for federal Speedy Trial Act). 
22. Any complete theory of allocation of powers under state constitutions would clearly require 
consideration of a host of issues. Some, including the related issues of the non-delegation doctrine, 
legislative vetoes and their less coercive variants, and informal legislative oversight over administra­
tion, have already been mentioned. See discussion supra notes 1 1 - 1 3. Other important issues in­
clude: (I) the scope of the governor's powers to oversee the state administrative process and, in 
particular, the relations between governors and other statewide elected officials; (2) line item vetoes, 
and the other infinite permutations on the theme of shared control of state budgeting; and (3) the 
host of problems involved in state judicial review of administrative action. 
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and the federal government are so significant that they preclude reliance on fed­
eral law as a guide to the resolution of state separation of powers problems. Part 
II focuses on state court decisions and argues that the structural similarities 
among states are sufficient for them to be considered together as part of a unified 
field of inquiry. Part II then briefly surveys and critiques relevant state constitu­
tional texts and decisions dealing with the power of legislators or legislative ap­
pointees to exercise administrative functions. It finally attempts to sketch the 
possible outlines of a state-based approach, arguing that the "pragmatic" ap­
proach of the better reasoned state cases is both compatible with the original 
beliefs and intentions of the founding generation, and appropriate in light of 
specific policy concerns posed by state-level governmental innovation. 
I. DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: ON THE PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY OF 
FEDERAL PRECEDENT TO ISSUES OF SHARED CONTROL OF ST A TE 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS 
A. Basic Concepts and Federal Analysis 
The principle of separation of powers is not explicitly stated in the Federal 
Constitution, but is instead implicit in the clauses that "vest" the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers of the federal government in Congress, the Presi­
dent, and the federal courts, respectively.23 It is clear that the founders intended 
to separate the powers of the new national government into three branches, but 
that they did not embrace any "pure" concept of separation of powers. Rather, 
the government they created was a compromise between two somewhat inconsis­
tent approaches, partially embodying both the conceptual distinctions drawn by 
Montesquieu and others among different types of power, and the English tradi­
tion of "mixed government," characterized by a system of checks and balances 
among different governmental institutions. 24 These competing principles have 
given rise in the federal cases to two distinct lines of analysis. One line, which 
may be referred to as the "formalist" or "conceptual" approach, requires classi-
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1 & art. III, § l. Despite the lack of an explicit statement 
in the Federal Constitution, it has never been doubted that some form of separation was intended. 
See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928) (noting while some state constitutions 
expressly provide for separation of powers, and others, like the Federal Constitution, do not, princi­
ple is "implicit in all"). Indeed, one of the major motivations for the creation of the Constitution 
was the perceived need to improve the efficiency of the federal government by removing day-to-day 
administrative tasks from the purview of the original Congress established by the Articles of Confed­
eration. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115-16 (1926) (quoting James Madison, ANNALS 
Of CONGRESS 581 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)). 
24. The fullest account of the emergence and interaction of these two concepts can be found in 
M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION Of POWERS 21-118 (1967) tracing the 
development of such doctrines from classical times to the British Constitution in the late eighteenth 
century. See also W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING Of THE SEPARATION Of POWERS 24-27 (1965) 
(describing emergence of British notion of mixed government, and distinguishing it from concept of 
separation of powers); Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and 
Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 214 (1989) (tracing evolution of separation of powers 
doctrine during constitution-making period in U.S.); Matheson, supra note 20, at 304-05 (describing 
separation of powers theories in United States during revolutionary period). 
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fication of governmental functions as either "executive," "legislative," or "judi­
cial" in nature, and as signs plenary control accordingly.25 Under this analysis, 
mechanisms by which the executive and legislative branches may share control 
of administrative organs are always suspect and usually prohibited. 26 The other 
line of analysis, which can be referred to as the "functionalist" or " checks and 
balances" approach, focuses on the need to preserve a dynamic balance of effec­
tive power among the constitutional branches, and usually involves an es sen­
tially ad  hoc inquiry into the effect of a particular institutional arrangement on 
the autonomy and core functions of those branches.27 Under this approach, 
novel institutional arrangement s mixing conceptually distinguishable personnel 
25. This conceptual approach is generally labeled "formalist." Statements of the principle can 
be found in federal cases stretching back many years, including the following classic formulations: 
[T]he Constitution was so framed as to vest in the Congress all legislative powers therein 
granted, to vest in the President the executive power, and to vest in  one Supreme Court 
and such inferior courts as Congress might establish, the judicial power. From this divi­
sion in principle, the reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the branches 
should be kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the 
Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires. 
Myers v. U nited States, 272 U.S. 52, 1 16 (1926), overruled by INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional sys­
tem, that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the 
legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power; the executive cannot exercise 
either legislative or judicial power; the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legisla­
tive power .... 
Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make 
laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforce­
ment. The latter are executive functions. 
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 1 89, 201-02 ( 1 928). The Supreme Court has continued to 
employ this type of analysis in many, but not all, recent cases. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714, 715 ( 1986) (officer subservient to Congress may not be assigned "executive" powers); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 1 42 (1976) (only officials appointed by President in accordance with Appoint­
ments Clause may perform "executive" duties). 
26. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 734 (striking down, on formalist grounds, statute vesting 
"executive" authority to trigger automatic budget cuts in official ultimately responsible to Congress); 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983) (declaring unconstitutional all "legislative vetoes" of ad­
ministrative decisions); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140-41 (striking down statute granting executive en­
forcement authority to Commission comprised mainly of congressional officers or appointees). 
The classic statement of the consequences of such formalist analysis for any attempt by Con­
gress to share in or oversee the administration of its laws can be found in Justice Burger's peroration 
in Bowsher: 
(A]s Chadha makes clear, once Congress makes its choice in enacting legis lation, its partic­
ipation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indi­
rectly-by passing new legislation. (citation omitted] By placing the responsibility for 
execution of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act in the hands of an 
officer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over 
the execution of the Act and intruded into the executive function. The Constitution does 
not permit such intrusion. 
478 U.S. at 733-34. 
27. This approach is generally labeled "functionalist." The principle seems to have been im­
plicit in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935). which held that Con­
gress could limit the power of the President to remove members of "independent" regulatory 
agencies exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. However, the principle received its 
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or functions, or limiting the President's effective control of administrative offi­
cials, are permissible so long as they preserve that dynamic balance bet"'.een the 
branches and do not threaten the ability of any branch to carry out its core 
responsibilities. 28 
It is a gross understatement to say that the United States Supreme Court's 
analysis of separation of powers issues has been the subject of intense scholarly 
criticism. The Court's reasoning and results have been variously described as 
"an incoherent muddle,"29 "abysmal,"30 and a "mess."3 1 The critique has re­
sulted only in part from the inherent shortcomings of the two lines of analysis 
sketched above--that government operations often cannot realistically be cate-
first clear statement from Justice Jackson, who clearly rejected definitional approaches and empha­
sized that the powers of the constitutional branches often mix and overlap: 
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to 
judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based upon isolated clauses or even 
single Articles tom from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to se­
cure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a 
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, au­
tonomy but reciprocity. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
Although no single canonical statement of what this analysis requires has yet been articulated, 
its core elements can be gathered from a number of statements in the opinions of its adherents. As 
applied to problems of government structure, the essential inquiry was formulated in terms of pre­
serving the "balance" among the branches, ensuring that no branch was hindered in carrying out its 
core functions, and preventing any branch from unduly aggrandizing itself at the expense of another. 
See, e.g. , Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,  380-83 (1989) (defending "flexible" approach to 
separation of powers concerns and defining essential issue as whether proposed arrangement will 
"undermine authority and independence of one or another coordinate Branch, the extent to which [a 
provision of law] prevents [a branch] from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions," or 
whether it "impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of" one of the branches); Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-91 , 693-94 (1988) (defining inquiry variously as whether Congress has 
"unduly" interfered with President's exercise of executive power and constitutional duty to "take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed," as whether the case presents "an attempt by Congress to 
increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch," or whether case poses "a danger of 
congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions"); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 7 14, 770 
( 1986) (White, J., dissenting) (defining whether there is "a genuine threat of encroachment or ag­
grandizement of one branch at the expense of the other" (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I ,  122 
( 1976)); INS v .  Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1000 ( 1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("[l]n determining 
whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry 
focuses on the 
_
extent to which it prevents [one of the branches] from performing its constitutionally 
assigned fun�ttons. · · · [and] .whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote obiect1ves with in the const1tut1onal authority of Congress.") (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of 
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). 
7s. See
.
' e.g. • Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380 - 4 1 2  (1989) (finding no constitutional violation in Con-
gress s creation of United States Sentencing Commission as body d f bo h · d "  · 1 d . . . . . compose o t JU 1c1a an non-judicial appointees, charged with quasi-legislative functions, and located within judicial branch); 















. mg ongress may secure mdependence o special counsel charged wuh mvesttgatmg executive branch · d b d · · · f m1scon uct y epnvmg executive o 
hnth power to choose such counsel and power to remove them t '" d ) , excep 1or goo cause . 2'l. See Brown , supra note 8 at 1 5 1 7  & JO (I" · · · 
• . . • n. 1stmg 1mpress1ve roster of articles highly critical of Court s analysis, or lack thereof). 
JO. Elliott, .tupra note 8, at 506 . 
. 1 1 .  Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 ( 1988). 
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gorized i n  the way that the formalist theory requires, 3 2  and that the balancing 
test which lies at the core of the "functionalist" approach often leads to ad hoc 
and apparently unprincipled decisions. 33 The depth of the critique reflects the 
Court's apparently unpredictable vacillations between those approaches, and its 
failure to articulate a clear and convincing theory to undergird its decision to 
apply a particular approach in a particular case. 34 
Nonetheless, despite these problems of theory, the outline of the current 
distribution of powers between Congress and the President is  becoming tolerably 
clear, at least as applied to specific issues regarding control and staffing of the 
federal administrative bureaucracy. Federal government agencies are created by 
Congress, under organic acts which determine not only the agencies' existence, 
but also their composition, mission, powers, and level of independence. 35 Con­
gress may delegate substantial power and discretion to agencies or officials, pro­
vided only that Congress articulate by statute some "intelligible principle" on 
which officials and reviewing courts may rely to ensure that the policies estab­
lished by the legislative branch are being followed. 36 Congress may and does 
exercise various forms of informal supervision over agencies and officials 
32. See, e. g. , Brown, supra note 8, at 1 523-27 (warning of consequences of formalist approach); 
Sargentich, supra note 8, at 437- 38 (discussing reasons for growing disenchantment with formalist 
approaches); Pierce, supra note 8, at 2-6 (critiquing Justice Scalia's formalist "vision" in Morrison v. 
Olson). 
The problems here go deep. The first requirement of any "categorical" analysis is to define the 
relevant categories clearly. However, the Court's attempts to define and distinguish the concepts of 
'"legislative," "executive," and "judicial" power have not to date proven particularly helpful in 
resolving hard cases. Thus, for example, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983), Chief Justice 
Burger, writing for the majority, held that t h e  action by one branch of Congress to reverse a deporta­
tion decision was "legislative" in nature because all congressional acts fall presumptively into that 
category, because that "had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of 
persons,"' and because Congress could have achieved the same result by statute. Id. at 952-53. In 
contrast, Justice Powell, concurring, would have classified the same act as "judicial" in nature be­
cause it did not enact a general rule, but rather applied that rule to a particular person. Id. at 964 -
65. I n  a n y  case, both definitions are clearl y  overbroad. Many undoubtedly executive and judicial 
acts-such as awarding a government contract or judicial construction of a statute-surely affect 
individuals' rights and duties, and could j u st as surely be accomplished by legislation. Likewise, 
many clearly executive decisions-such as deciding which applicant will be awarded a valuable li­
cense-involve application of general criteria to individuals. 
33. See,  e.g. , Sargentich, supra note 8, at 439- 44 (discussing two models of functionalist under­
standing of s eparation of powers problems); see generally Carter, supra note 8, at 357-64 (criticizing 
recent functionalist decisions in Morrison and Mistretla). 
34. See, e.g . .  Brown, supra note 8, at 1530 - 3  I (noting Court's failure to articulate any consis­
tent set of extrinsic values that would explain ultimate purposes to be served by separation of pow· 
er,); Bruff, supra note 20, al 1 342-43 ("The Su preme Court's rationale for choosing one approach 
over the other in a particular case . . .  is ultimately obscure-perhaps even to the Justices."): Elliott, 
s11pra note 8, at 5 30 - 32, (arguing Court's narrow literalism has obscured core concepts that should 
inform separation of powers analysis). But see Stern, supra note 8, at 46 1 -M (finding Court's diver· 
gent approac hes persuasive) . 
.1 5 .  The constitutional authority for Congr ess's power to create these structures of government 
is found in the Necessary and Proper Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I. § !I, c l .  1 8. 
36. See supra note JO and accompanying text. 
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charged with carrying out such delegated duties,37 but may not overrule particu­
lar administrative acts by any means short of full and formal legislation. 38 
Although staffing of the federal administrative bureaucracy has been held to 
be essentially an "executive" function, 39 Congress may impose some limits on 
the President's discretion in both the hiring and firing of certain officials. For 
purposes of appointment, the Federal Constitution divides officials into three 
categories: high ranking "officers of the United States" who may be appointed 
only by the President, subject to the Senate's "advice and consent;"40 "inferior" 
37. See generally R. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 3 . 1  (1985) which 
lists the various mechanisms by which this informal oversight can be exercised: 
Congress has a wide variety of means, both statutory and non-statutory, by which it 
can seek to control agency discretion. . . . Appropriations can be wielded to punish or 
reward agencies and restrictions can be placed on the use of appropriated funds. Congress 
can also shape administrative decisions indirectly by applying political pressure through 
the use o f  committee reports, through budgetary, oversight, or investigatory hearings and 
hearings o n  the nominations of administrators, and through direct communications with 
administrators. The effectiveness of this last group of controls can be i ncreased by requir­
ing that agencies report to Congress before they act, by utilizing the General Accounting 
Office to investigate agency conduct, and by employing the Congressional Budget Office to 
consider the economic effects of government programs. 
Id. at 43; see also Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 207, 227-44 (1 984)) (discussing oversight methods, interest group pressures, and internal 
agency characteristics); Strauss, supra note 2, at 59 1 - 96 (discussing internal and external procedures 
as well as inter-governmental relationships). 
38. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 1 9, 954 ( 1983) (Congress may not overrule decision of execu­
tive officer exercising delegated authority through anything short of formal statute). While the nar­
row holding of Chadha involves only the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, Justice 
Burger's opinion appears to presume a very restrictive view of the role of Congress in overseeing the 
administration of the laws: 
Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically to 
the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable aliens to remain in this country in 
certain specified circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice to delegate authority is 
precisely the kind of decision that can be implemented only in accordance with the proce­
dures set out in Art. I. Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's 
deportation-that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadha-no less than Congress' original 
choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves 
determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage 
followed by presentment to the President. Congress must abide by its delegation of author­
ity until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. 
Id. at 954-55;  see also 8?wsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 7 14, 733 -34 ( 1986) (limiting role of Congress to 
the enactment of leg1slat1on, not active participation in its execution). The Court's insistence on an 
across-the-board condemnation of the legislative veto in all cases regardless of context drew consid­
erable critical commentary. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Wa� There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Com
.
ment on the Supr�me Court 's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 791-92 (1983) (cnucizmg court for failure to distinguish between use of vetos in regulatory context and executive­
congrcss1onal relations). 
39. See Myers v. Unite� 
.. 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 1 6 1 ,  164 (1 926) (holding power to appoint and remove govermncnt officials IS m its nature an executive power" and constitutional limitations of 
general proposition arc to be strictly construed). 
40· U.S. CoNs1:: art . II, § 2, c I .  2. The hard question, of course, is defining the class of "officers of the United States who must be approved by the Sen t Th c h . a e. e ourt as attempted to define the term. hut without notable success. See, e.g. , Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 ,  1 26 ( 1 976) ("[A]ny ap-
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administrative officials who may be appointed by the President, by the courts, or 
by heads of departments, as Congress may choose;41 and mere "employees," the 
appointment of whom is not governed by the Constitution. 42 Congress may pre­
scribe the qualifications of appointees43 and may, within limits, restrict the Pres­
ident's authority by conferring the power to appoint certain inferior officers on 
heads of departments or on the courts.44 However, members of Congress may 
not personally serve on administrative organs,45 nor may congressional appoin-
pointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the 
United States.' "); see generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 ( 1 988) ("The line between 
'inferior' and 'principal' officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little gui­
dance into where it should be drawn."). 
4 1 .  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c l .  2. 
This category of "inferior officers" has proven as difficult to describe or define as its converse. 
Without attempting a comprehensive definition, the Court in Morrison held that independent coun­
sel appointed to investigate executive branch misconduct under the federal Ethics in Government 
Act of I 9 7 8, though independent of any direct control by superior authority, nonetheless "clearly 
falls on the 'inferior officer' side of that line." Morrison, 187 U.S. at 67 1 .  The Court pointed to three 
factors as supporting this conclusion: that the independent counsel was removable (though only 
under limited circumstances) by the Attorney General who was thus a "higher ranking" official; that 
the counsel had "limited duties" and was "limited in jurisdiction" to a single investigation; and 
finally that she was "limited in tenure" in that her appointment would terminate when the particular 
investigation was completed. Id. at 67 1 -72; see also Freytag v. Commissioner, 1 1 1  S. Ct. 263 1, 264 1 
( 1 99 1 )  (holding "special trial judges" appointed to assist regular judges of United States Tax Court 
also "inferior" officers, appointment of whom can be vested in Chief Judge of Tax Court). 
42. Freytag, I 1 1  S. Ct. at 2640; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 1 26 n. 1 62 ( 1 976) (per curiam). 
43. See, e.g. , Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,  4 1 2  ( 1 989} (upholding United States 
Sentencing Commission against distribution of powers challenge). Though the organic statute 
vested ultimate power to appoint the seven Commissioners in the hands of the President, it signifi­
cantly restricted his choices: "At least three of the members shall be Federal judges selected after 
considering a list of six judges recommended to the President by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States. No more than four members of the Commission shall be members of the same polit­
ical party." Id .  at 368 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 99 1 (a) ( 1 988)). 
44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c l .  2; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675-76 (noting Congress's 
discretion with respect to such appointments is broad, limited only by general allocation of powers 
concerns and as yet ill defined notion that there ought to be no "incongruity" between functions of 
appointing aut hority and power to appoint particular official). 
45. See, e.g. , Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft 
Noise, Inc., I 1 1  S. Ct. 2298, 2308 ( 1 99 1 )  (individual members of Congress could not serve, even "in 
their individual capacities" on body created to oversee operation of certain D.C. area airports); 
Springer v. Phili ppine Islands, 277 U.S. 1 89, 20 1 - 02 ( 1 928) (Congress could not authorize Philippine 
legislature to appoint two officers of that legislature to sit on boards of directors supervising certain 
public corporations in territory). 
The constraint on such "dual officeholding" im posed by the implicit general principle of separa­
tion of l egislative and executive power is supplemented by other federal constit utional provisions 
explicitly excl ud ing a member of Congress from occupying an office the benefits of which have been 
raised during the member's term, or from simultaneously occupying both an executive "office" and a 
legislative seat: 
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be 
appoin ted to any civil Office under t h e  Authority of the United States, which shall have 
been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased d u ring such time: and 
no Person holding any Office under t h e  Uni ted States, shall be a Member of either House 
during his Contin uance in Office. 
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tees or others subject to congressional control exercise significant "executive" 
functions.46 Congress may not retain for itself the power to remove any admin­
istrative officials by any means other than impeachment,47 and may not restrict 
the President's power to remove certain officials carrying out purely executive 
functions. 48 Congress is permitted, however, to grant some degree of security in 
office-by limiting either who may exercise that removal power or the grounds 
on which it may be exercised, or both-to inferior officers not appointed by the 
President or whose duties are only "peripheral" to the core of the President's 
powers, 49 or to the so- called "independent" agencies that also exercise quasi­
judicial or quasi-legislative functions. 50 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, c l .  2. 
These provisions were considered highly important by the founders, as security against repeti­
tion of what they considered to be the corrupt and undemocratic practice of eighteenth century 
British ministries in securing the support of members of Parliament through appointment of those 
members to lucrative offices. GORDON s. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
1776 - 1 787 143- 48 ( 1969); Matheson, supra note 20, at 308. Perhaps surprisingly, these restrictions 
have been very seldom litigated. The only case raising incompatibility issues to reach the United 
States Supreme Court, in which plaintitfs asserted that sitting members of Congress could not consti­
tutionally hold commissions in the Armed Forces Reserve, was dismissed without reaching the mer­
its. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 4 1 8  U.S. 208 ( 1974). The single recent lower 
court case to address the issue stands only for the unexceptional proposition that the incidental 
exercise by Congress of a particular power that might be considered "executive" in nature does not 
convert members of Congress into federal officeholders in violation of U.S. CONST. art I, § 6. Atkins 
v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1067 (Ct. C l .  1 977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 ( 1 978). 
46. See, e.g. , Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 7 14, 733- 34 (1986) (Congress could not vest "execu­
tive" functions in Comptroller General because that official removable by Congress by means other 
than impeachment); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1 20 - 43 (Federal Election Commission could not exercise 
any executive or quasi-judicial powers because majority of Commissioners either legislative officers 
or legislative appointees); see also Springer, 277 U.S. at 199 (Philippine legislature could not retain 
authority to appoint members of Board of Directors of certain public corporations). 
47. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722-23. 
48. See, e.g. , Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding unconstitutional statute 
that purported to limit President's authority to remove postmasters), overruled by INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 9 1 9  ( 1 983). In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the court significantly limited 
Myers by holding that although "there are some 'purely executive' officials who must be removable 
by the President at will if he is to be able to accomplish his constitutional role," that category does 
not include all officers wielding purely executive powers. Id. at 690 - 9 1 .  
49. See , e.g . •  Morrison, 487 U.S. at 69 1 - 92 (holding Congress may limit grounds on which 
"independent counsel" appointed to investigate and prosecute government officials suspected of 
cnmmal v10lat10ns may be removed). Although the counsel's functions were purely executive in 
nature. and "(a)lthough the counse� exercises no small amount of discretion and judgment in decid­
mg how to carry out his or her duues under the Act," the Court professed itself unable to "see how 
t�c Prc
.
sidcnt 's need to control the exercise of that discretion is so central to the functioning of the 
hc..:uuvc Branches to require as a matter of constitutional law that 1 b t · bl · 11  b , . . . .  . counse e ermma e at wt y the 1 resident. Id. ;  see also Umted States v. Perkins, 1 1 6 U.S. 483, 485 ( 1 8 86) ("[W]hen Congress, hy law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments it may limit and restrict 
the power. of removal as 11 deems best for the public interest."). 
50. S••t• , e.g: · H
�mphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 ( 1935)  (holding Congress could hm1t President s removal authority by providi.ng C · · f · . omm1ss1oners o Federal Trade Comm1s-""" he appomted for fixe� terms and removed only for cause). To distinguish Myers, the Court relied on the Com m1�'1on s role as an "ind d " · . . . epcn ent agency and its exercise of quasi-judicial and 4ua\1-lcg1sl11t1ve functmu See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 ( 1 958) (holding Congress 
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In sum, the allocation of federal governmental authority reflected in recent 
case law does not take an expansive view of the powers of Congress. To be sure, 
the Court has recognized the possibility of "independent" agencies5 t  and has 
permitted some degree of infringement on executive branch autonomy where 
necessary to uncover misconduct within that branch. 52 However, the Court has 
in other contexts tended to confine Congress to a single role--that of passing 
statutes of general effect and future applicability. The bulk of federal decisions 
have, in effect, supported the centralization of power in the President by striking 
down most efforts by Congress to construct formal mechanisms by which it 
might exercise oversight over the most dynamic aspect of government, the bur­
geoning administrative bureaucracy. 
B. The Limited Relevance of Federal Precedents to State Distribution of 
Powers Issues 
One of the enduring issues in state constitutional law is the extent to which 
state courts interpreting state constitutions may rely on precedent from other 
jurisdictions, and in particular on precedent from federal courts interpreting the 
Federal Constitution, as persuasive authority. While most judicial and scholarly 
analysis of these questions has focused on cognate federal and state guarantees of 
individual rights, 53 the underlying methodological issue applies as well to 
�ay limit President's power to replace members of War Claims Commission, body exercising quasi­
JUdicial authority). 
5 1 .  See, e.g. , Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 629. The Court's rhetorical support for this 
concept has not been constant, however. 
52. See, e.g. , Morrison , 487 U.S. at 69 1 - 92 (upholding good cause provision limiting President's 
ability to control independent executives and counsel); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 454 (1977) (upholding statute limiting former President's control over papers and tape 
recordings he created while in office); United States v. Nixon, 4 1 8  U.S. 683, 7 1 3  ( 1 974) (holding 
executive privilege did not shield President from obeying subpoena to produce evidence for use in 
criminal trial). 
53. The revival of interest in state constitutional interpretation was sparked in large part by a r�ction to decisions of the Burger Court cutting back on criminal procedural protections and indi­
vidual rights. See, e.g. , RonaJd K. L. Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitutions-Beyond 
the "New Federalism, " 8 U. PUGET SouND L. REV. vi, vii-xiv (1984) (tracing development of that 
revival); Earl M. Maltz et aJ., Selected Bibliography on State Constitutional Law, 1980-89, 20 
�u:1'�ERS L.J. 1093 (1989) (noting great majority of articles listed concern criminal procedure or 
tn�tv1dual rights). Not surprisingly, in light of this genesis, virtually all of the important scholarly 
anicles debating issues of interpretive methodology and the persuasiveness of federal precedent­
whatever substantive position they may have taken-likewise focused on the interaction of federal 
and state rights guarantees. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Pro­
tection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (discussing impact of Supreme Court 
decisions under Fourteenth Amendment on state constitutional interpretation); Ronald K. L. Col­
li
.
ns & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitu­
tional Individual Rights Decisions, 55  U. CIN. L. REV. 3 1 7, 322-39 (1 986); Hans A. Linde, First 
Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 387-92 (1980) (dis­
cussing how state courts and lawyers have approached constitutional claims in areas where Supreme 
Court has been both active and inactive); Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the 
Theory of State Constitutional Law 1 5  HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 434- 48 ( 1 988) (exploring role 
federalism plays in state constitu�ional analysis); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's 
Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 
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problems of governmental structure and the distribution of powers among the 
branches of state government. The consensus that has emerged from that debate 
can be readily stated, if not always so readily applied: State courts always have 
the power to interpret state constitutional provisions independently. In certain 
circumstances, such as where the substance of a state constitutional provision 
was derived from a foreign source, 54 or shares historical and functional similari­
ties with similar provisions of the Federal Constitution or of the constitutions of 
other states, relevant precedent from those other jurisdictions is entitled to re­
spectful attention and may be relied upon. However, particularly when the text 
or drafting history of a state constitutional provision differs significantly from 
federal or sister state cognates, where the issue involves some unique aspect of 
local history or culture which differs from that of the rest of the nation, where 
well established local precedent points toward a different conclusion, or where 
there is some flaw in the reasoning or result of the proffered foreign precedent, 
reliance may be inappropriate. 55 
To some extent, a lengthy argument for the independence of state allocation 
of powers analysis from its federal counterpart may seem like an exercise in 
battering down an open door. Those courts that have squarely addressed the 
issue have concluded, correctly, that the divergences between federal and state 
constitutions are too great to permit much reliance. 56 Nonetheless, many state 
courts continue to rely heavily on federal cases analyzing the proper distribution 
of powers between the President and Congress for guidance in resolving conflicts 
between their own governors and legislatures, at least in the sense of treating 
federal precedents as very persuasive, and as establishing the conceptual catego-
403-04 (1 984) (asserting state constitutional claims must be evaluated "upon state constitutional 
analysis and not upon misplaced reliance upon Supreme Court federal constitutional 
interpretations"). 
54. See generally John M. Devlin, State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age of Federal 
Retrenchment: Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of State Rights Derived from Federal Sources, 3 
EMERGING ISSUES STATE CONST. L. 195, 226- 44  (1990) (tracing derivation of state constitutional 
protections of autonomy privacy from federal sources, and arguing such rights should therefore be 
interpreted in accord with interpretation given such rights by federal courts at time they were 
adopted into state law). 
�5 .  See generally Collins & Galic, supra note 53, at 325 (noting state courts generally feel need 
to point to some non-result oriented factor to justify divergence from federal precedent); Williams, 
supra note 
.
5 3, at 385.-89 (noting criteria developed by state courts to justify rejecting Supreme Court interpretation of s1m1lar federal constitutional question); Robert F. Williams, Methodology Problems 
in Enforcing State �onstitutional Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 143, 1 7 1  ( 1986-87) (emphasizing 
st
.
ate courts should independently evaluate constitutional rights based on state constitution's text 
history, and state
. 
social int�rpretation before analyzing any federal constitutional claims). Stat; 
courts have occa
.
s10nally articulated a simila r  set of factors as governing the degree to which they 
will rely on foreign precedent in interpretin g  state constitutions. See, e.g. , State v. Gunwall, 720 
P.2d 808, 8 1 2- 1 3  (Wash. 1986) (en bane) (discussing reliance on federal precedent); People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 1 47, 1 53 (lll. 1984) (same) . 
. 






om on the Appomtments Clause contained in Article I I  § 2 of the Federal onstltutton and that the Kansas constitut1'on co t · · 
' 
n ams no eqmvalent. Id. 
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ries and modes of analysis that the state courts employ i n  analyzing their own 
state constitution. 57 
The temptation to rely on this well-developed body of federal precedent is 
undeniably strong. Governments in all states are organized similarly to their 
federal counterpart, sharing both the familiar tripartite allocation of powers 
among functionally differentiated legislative, executive, and judicial branches, 
and some degree of interbranch "checks and balances" designed to afford each 
branch sufficient opportunities to control the excesses of the others. 58 More­
over, many of the specific questions that have confronted state courts in this 
area, for example, whether legislators may appoint members of administrative 
bodies, o r  the propriety of the legislative veto mechanism, are broadly similar to 
the problems that have been considered in recent federal distribution of powers 
cases. Yet another, and probabl y  the most important, factor is the tendency of 
contemporary American lawyers to think about all issues of constitutional law 
in terms of categories and conceptual constructs originating in federal cases. 
Federal cases and the web of scholarly commentaries that have grown up 
around them provide lawyers, scholars, and state courts with an extensive and 
familiar set of precedents and ready-made analytical tools lying readily available 
for use in analyzing state distribution of powers issues-tools that we are all 
predisposed to use by the still ingrained tendency of American law schools to 
teach constitutional law solely in terms of the analyses articulated by federal 
courts interpreting the Federal Constitution. 59 
Despite its obvious temptations, however, reliance on federal law does not 
lead to happy results in state allocation of powers cases, as the Louisiana experi­
ence in State Board of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green 60 amply demon­
strates. In its successive opinions in Green, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
considered the makeup and powers of the Louisiana Board of Ethics for Elected 
57. See , e.g. , Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 149 N.E.2d 273, 293 - 96 (Ind. 1958) (citing 
several federal cases); Tucker v. State, 35 N. E.2d 270, 280-83 (Ind. 1 94 1 )  (relying extensively on 
Myers v. United States, 487 U.S. 654 ( 1 98 8), and commentators on Federa l Constitution, to hold 
that power to name officials inherently "executive'" in nature); Board of Ethics For Elected Officials 
v. Green. 540 So. 2d 1 1 85, 1 1 90-93 (La. Ct. App. 1 989) (citing several federal cases); Alexander v. 
State. 44 1 So. 2d 1 329, 1336 (Miss. 1 983) (referring to federal sources as hav ing "aut horitatively"' 
addressed issues of separation of powers analysis); State v. Bailey. 1 50 S. E. 2d 449, 452-54 (W. Va. 
1 900) (ex tensively discussing and following federal precedents). 
58. These similarities are not accidental;  rather. they reflect the facr t h at the drafters of the 
various state constitutions, though opera ting over a time span of more than 200 years, have always 
shared a common intellectual heritage both with each other and with the framers of the Fedcrnl 
( 'onst it u t i on. See l(enerally infra notes 73- 74 and accompanying rcxt .  
59. See Daniel R. Gordon, The Dem ise of Amaican CmJJtitulicmali.<m: Death by l.<'l(al f:ducu· 
lion , lo S. lu . U. L..J., 75-82, 89 ( 1 9'l l )  (dec ry i ng tendency to sec all nH1 ' t i t u t i onal issues in terms 
of federal constitutional analysis and advocating revisiom to standa rd con s t i t u t ional law courses and 
c1st·hooks as necessary remedy). 
oO. 540 So. 2d 1 1 85 (La. App. Ct . )  ( Grt•en / ), a.ff"d, 545 Sn 2d l<l.\ I ( I .a 1 989) (<irt•c•n /I ). 
ujj" d in par/, rcv 'd i11 part, 566 So. 2d 1>2J ( La. l 'l90) (Grt•1•11 II/ ).  The <ir<'<'n dcl't\1011 was hneRy 
noted and c ri t i q ued for its ultimate depart u re from formalist pnnnple' 111 F l i 1.ahct h Vaujlhnn llukrr, 
Note. Umrpinl( th<.' Executive Pmwr: Stal<' Hoard of E1hin ji>r f:frctC'd Oj]inal• '" <iran, �I I.A I .  
Rt v 'l l I ( 1 99 1 ). 
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Officials, the administrative agency that administers the Louisiana Campaign 
Finance Disclosure Act.61 The Board was composed of five persons: two elected 
by the State House of Representatives, two elected by the State Senate, and one 
chosen by the Governor.62 The Act authorized the Board to perform both tradi­
tionally "quasi-legislative" and traditionally "executive" functions, and specifi­
cally gave the Board power to bring civil enforcement actions against violators 
of the Act.63 In 1988 the Board brought a civil action alleging that Louisiana's 
then-recently elected Commissioner of Insurance had knowingly falsified cam­
paign finance reports. 64 In response, Commissioner Green argued that the 
Board's civil suit represented an assertion of executive authority by a legisla­
tively dominated entity in violation of the allocation of power provisions of the 
Louisiana Constitution. 65 
In its initial opinion, the Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed the results of 
prior Louisiana jurisprudence by adopting the "formalist" analysis articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo 66 and held, by a bare 
four to three majority, that an entity composed largely of legislative appointees 
could not constitutionally exercise the executive power to initiate prosecutions.67 
61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18 :148 1 - 1 532 (West Supp. 1993). The Board, for these purposes, 
sits as the "Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance Disclosure" a n d  exercises the powers of 
that supervisory committee. Id. §§ 18: 1 5 1 1 . 1 - 1 5 1 1.2. 
62. Id. § 42: 1 1 32. The Senate and House may choose any non-civil servant. The Governor's 
appointee must be a former judge of one of the Louisiana courts. 
63. Louisiana statutes gave the Board authority to: adopt rules and regulations necessary to 
effectuate the purposes of the Act; render advisory opinions; receive and maintain the documents 
and reports that the Act requires candidates to file; investigate potential violations of the Act; for­
ward information to the appropriate district attorney regarding possible criminal violations of the 
Act; and bring civil suits to collect civil penalties for violations of the Act. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 1 8. 1 5 1 1 . 2 - 1 5 1 1 . 6. 
64. The allegations in the case were particularly lurid. The suit against Green claimed that he 
had falsified his returns to conceal that over $2 million in loans to his campaign had come from the 
owners of Champion Insurance, a troubled company that soon thereafter became embroiled in bank­
ruptcy and criminal charges of fraud. Green I, 540 So. 2d at 1 1 86 . 
. 
65. Lo�isi�n�'s consti�ution is explicit regarding separation of powers: "vesting" legislative, ex­
ecutive, and Jud1c1al power m the state legislature, governor, and courts respectively, LA. CONST. art. 
lll, § I, art. IV, § l, art. V, § l; explicitly reaffirming that such powers shall not be mixed, LA. 
CONH: art. II, § I; and specifically forbidding any person "holding office in" any department from 
exerc1smg power belonging to any other department LA CONST art II § 2 Th h th · t 
. . 
· · . . , . oug e pom was 
not discussed m Green , the Louisiana Constitution also grants the G t · t d . overnor power o appom an remove 
.
members of executive boards and commissions in the executive branch, but limits that power 
to positions not otherwise provided for "by law:" 
( H )  Appointments 
( l_) The governor shall appoint · . . the members of each board and commission in the executive branch whose election or appointment is not provided by this constitution or by law. 
• • • 
( l )  Removal Power The gover f 
. . 
. 
· nor may remove ram office a person he appoints, ex-c
,
ept a person appointed for a term fixed by this constitution or by law. I.A. CONST. art. IV, § 5. 
66. 424 U.S.  I ( 1976). 
67. Green II, 545 So. 2d at 1031  (opini f h . on o t en Judge Pike Hall, sitting by designation in 
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On rehearing, that opinion was vacated and the court issued a second opinion, 
again by a bare majority, which cited Morrison v. Olson .  68 In this second opin­
ion, the Green court found that the legislature exercised n o  actual "control" over 
its appointees, and concluded that the challenged Act therefore did not violate 
the state separation of powers principles after all.69 That opinion too was va­
cated, only to be reinstated, still by only a four to three majority, after the ascen­
sion of the Louisiana Supreme Court's then newest member, Justice Pike Hall. 10 
The decision in Green is noteworthy in two related respects. First, all of the 
court's successive opinions treated federal precedents as persuasive, at least in 
the sense of establishing the conceptual categories and modes of analysis that the 
Louisiana court could and did employ in analyzing its own state constitution.  
The successive decisions differed only as to which federal cases should be fol­
lowed, not as to whether such reliance would be proper. Second, while the 
Green court articulated a rationale for its ultimate decision-the legislature's 
lack of ongoing "control" of its appointees-that rationale appears to be more 
related to debates among members of the Federal Supreme Court regarding pur­
ported distinctions between Buckley and Morrison than to any pre-existing Loui­
siana analysis. Despite three tries, the Louisiana Supreme Court failed to root 
its rationale in Green in either a persuasive body of Louisiana precedent or a 
broader context of distribution of powers analysis under the state constitution. 7 1  
place of Justice Lemmon, joined b y  Justices Marcus, Watson, and Cole). Prior to Green, only one 
Louisiana case had addressed these issues directly. In Guidry v. Roberts, 335 So. 2d 438 (La. 1 976), 
the Louisiana Supreme Court had considered the original version of the Louisiana Campaign Fi­
nance Disclosure Act. The court there relied heavily on the federal decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. I ( 1 976), in holding that the state constitution would permit committees composed of legislative 
appointees t o  receive reports and to review them for compliance with law, but that such a committee 
could not constitutionally exercise the executive authority to determine whether violations would be 
prosecuted. The court reached this latter conclusion without directly deciding the separation of 
powers issue presented, ruling instead that the statute, giving the Board sole discretion whether to 
refer a case for prosecution, violates LA. CONST. art. V, § 26(B), which gives local district attorneys 
"charge of every criminal prosecution by the state in his district." 
68. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
69. State Board of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green, 559 So. 2d 480, 482-83 (La. 1 990) 
(opinion of Justice Lemmon, joined by Chief Justice Dixon and Justices Dennis and Calogero). The 
Green court did not directly rely upon Morrison for the "legislative control" test that was ultimately 
adopted. However, in the absence of any firm state constitutional basis for that "control" test, see 
infra note 7 1 ,  the conclusion appears inescapable that the Louisiana court was at least heavily influ­
enced by the Federal Court's analysis in Morrison. In Morrison, the Court emphasized Congress's 
inability to remove--and thus, its lack of practical control over-Special Prosecutors as support for 
its conclusion that the office was not so constituted as to interfere impermissibly with the President's 
ability to carry out his constitutional duties and thus, did not violate federal separation of powers 
principles. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-86 ( 1 988) (distinguishing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 
U.S. 7 1 4  ( 1 986)). 
70. Green III, 566 So. 2d at 623 (opinion of Justice Lemmon, joined by Chief Justice Calogero 
and Justices Dennis and Hall), denying rehearing and reinstating opinion originally published at 559 
So. 2d 480, rev g  540 So. 2d 1 1 85 ( 1 989). Justice Hall's position on these issues apparently changed 
between the time he authored the court's original opinion and his eventual joining in the court's final 
opinion. 
7 1 .  The operative distinction that the Green court ultimately adopted-that performance of 
executive functions by legislative appointees only violates separation of powers principles when the 
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The problems the Louisiana courts encountered in Green were neither iso­
lated nor accidental. Rather, they were typical of difficulties encountered by 
many state courts confronting distribution of powers issues and resulted from 
the court's failure to consider fundamental divergences between federal and state 
governments and constitutions-divergences that suggest that relevance of fed­
eral models to issues of state constitutional law is questionable to say the least. 
Several considerations suggest that state courts should not put much reliance on 
federal analysis when interpreting their own state charters: the intrinsic weak­
nesses of federal precedents; origins at different historical periods; structural dif­
ferences; differing pragmatic concerns; and the lessened importance of 
"tyranny" concerns in a federal system. 
1 .  The Intrinsic Weaknesses of Federal Precedents 
As noted above, current Federal Supreme Court decisions on the distribu­
tion of governmental powers are distinguished neither by the consistency of their 
results nor by the depth and persuasiveness of their analyses.72 It may be, as 
noted above, that the competing functionalist and formalist approaches, which 
have polarized decisionmaking in the United States Supreme Court, each have 
intrinsic validity in that each is rooted in one of the two streams of thought that 
went into the American distribution of powers tradition. The federal cases, 
however, continue to provide no theoretically coherent way to reconcile these 
competing principles and no rationale that can explain why the Court chooses 
either approach over the other in particular cases. Thus, federal analyses are 
unlikely to provide any firm grounding for a convincing and consistent state 
constitutional analysis. 
2. Origins at Different Historical Periods 
The Federal Constitution and state constitutions are generally creatures of 
very different historical periods. Very few state charters date from the revolu­
tionary era; most were drafted during the gilded age or later.73 Such latter-day 
l�gislature also e�ercises "control" of those appointees-was at best weakly supported in prior Loui­
sian� la'.". The smgle precedent that the Green court cited for that proposition, State ex rel. Guste v. 
Legislative Budget Comm., 347 So. 2d 160 (La. 1977), is scarcely on point. In Guste, the Louisiana 
S�preme Court faced the very different question of whether a statute empowering the Governor to 
pick 24 o� the 28 members of a legislative committee impermissibly infringed upon the independence 
of the legislature. Id. at 165. In holding that it did not the Guste court focused not on the issue of 
"control" but
. 
rather on the essential information gath�ring and advisory nature of the committee. 
Id· �us, while both Guste and the last of the Green opinions shared a rejection of the "formalist" 
analysis, they shared little else. More troubling, neither Guste nor Green ultimately made much 
attempt to ex�lain �hy the particular analyses they espoused were the proper approach to the diffi­
cult const1tut1onal issues presented. 
. 
72· See s�pra notes 29- 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's anal· ys1s of separation of powers issues. 
73·
. 




New Hampshire, drafted in 1784; and Vermont drafted in 1 793. Aside from the Mame Constitution drafted i 1820 ti f h 
' d ' n 
• a o t e rest date from times two generations or more remove from 1787. As Professor Bruff h 
· ed 
· 
h as pomt out, the Federal Constitution is a product of the Enhg t· 
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constitutions, drafted by people who experienced the governmental irresponsibil­
ity and corruption resulting from i nitial experiments with untrammelled legisla­
tive authority, 74 contain few broad or conceptually pure grants of authority to 
any branch. Unlike the very short and open-textured Federal Constitution, state 
constitutions generally seem drafted so as to restrain all branches' potential for 
mischief-by incorporating a large number of specific mandates and prohibi­
tions and by allowing each branch strengthened powers to oversee and control 
the excesses of the others. 75 While reformers have tried to push for state consti­
tutions that are closer to the federal model, their efforts have been largely inef-
enment, and reflects that era's "qualified optimism about the power of government to improve soci­
ety" by creating a federal government whose powers could freely grow to meet new needs. Bruff, 
supra note 20, at 1 338 -39. In contrast, the latter part of the nineteenth century was a time of public 
scandal and disillusionment with government on all levels. Thus, the Texas Constitution of 1876, 
like many d rafted at about that time or thereafter, was intentionally drafted to be "long, specific and 
confining," and intended to shackle the powers of all three branches of the state government. Id. 
74. The original revolutionary era state constitutions often paid lip service to the principle of 
separation of powers, but were noteworthy more for the clear predominance of their respective legis­
latures over the other branches of state government. See generally Casper, supra note 24, at 216-19 
(discussing early separation of powers concepts); Matheson, supra note 20, at  309- 14 (noting states 
in 1 776 gave only verbal recognition of concept of separation of powers in constitutions, which 
resulted in powerful legislature and correspondingly weak executive); Robert F. Williams, The State 
Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania 's Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influences on 
American Constitutionalism , 62 TEMP. L. REV. 541,  547 (1989) (noting "lack of effective checks on 
the powerful unicameral assembly" established by initial Pennsylvania Constitution, is result of con­
temporary political culture which stressed largely unalloyed democratic majoritarianism). For dis­
cussion of the early constitutions of particular states, all of which reflected some degree of legislative 
hegemony, see, e.g., JAMES L. UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, VOLUME 
I: THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES 7-26 (1986) 
(explaining South Carolina's legislative hegemony in power politics as being attributed to control of 
key government appointments and influence in financial policy); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW 
JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 4-5 (1 990) (noting New Jersey's 1776 Consti­
tution provided for little in way of separation of powers, extending even to legislative election of 
governor); Moran, supra note 14, at 955-62 . (noting dominant position of legislature under Charter 
that served Connecticut as constitution until 1 8 1 8); Orth, supra note 20, at 5-6 (noting North Caro­
lina's founding fathers committed to principle of separation of powers, but Constitution of 1776 
nevertheless granted predominance of legislature over other branches by providing for election of 
Governor, Members of Council of State, Attorney General, State Treasurer, State Secretary, and all 
Judges by General Assembly). The primary exception to this early tradition of legislative dominance 
was New York, where a relatively strong executive was created at the outset. PETER J. GALIE, THE 
NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 3-6 (199 1 )  ("[T)he New York constitu­
tion of 1 777 provided for the strongest executive in the American states, giving her the longest term 
with reeligibility, direct popular election, and a share with the judiciary in the veto power."). 
Later constitutions were enacted largely in an effort to control what were perceived as the 
excesses of state governments in general, and state legislatures in particular. See, e.g. , Bruff, supra 
note 20, at 1 33 8 - 39 (discussing Gilded Age disillusion with government in general); Moran, supra 
note 14, passim (tracing gradual growth of executive power in Connecticut, in response to legislative 
incapacity); Sheryl G. Snyder & Robert M. Ireland, The Separation of Governmental Powers Under 
the Constitution of Kentucky: A Legal and Historical Analysis of L.R. C. v. Brown, 73 KY. L. J. 165, 
167-68 ( 1 984 -85) (noting "desire to control legislative excesses constituted the principal reason" for 
calling Kentucky Constitutional Convention of 1 890). 
75. See, e.g. , Bruff, supra note 20, at 1 338 - 39 (noting transition in context of Texas Constitu­
tion); LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 9-16 (1990) 
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fective. Most state constitutions continue to be long, detailed, and characterized 
by many specific restrictions on the political branches. 76 
3. Structural Differences 
While it is true that all constitutions in the American tradition share certain 
basic similarities of form, there are enough structural differences between the 
Federal Constitution and state constitutions to make state reliance on federal 
distribution of governmental power precedents suspect. For example, state con­
stitutions do  not grant, but merely allocate, pre-existing reserved sovereign pow­
ers. Unlike the branches of the federal government, the state legislatures are not 
limited, even in theory, to any listing of .enumerated powers. Thus they wield, in 
theory as well as in fact, sovereign authority to set up the organs of state govern­
ment in any fashion not clearly forbidden by the people.77 As another example, 
one might note that federal analyses have often been based, at least in part, on 
the observation that the framers of that document intended to create a "unitary 
executive. "78 Most states, in contrast, authorize multiple independently elected 
(discussing Louisiana Constitution); LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE ST A TE CONSTITUTION: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE 16-17 (1990) (discussing Tennessee Constitution). 
76. An example of this continuing tendency can be found in Louisiana. Culminating a process 
of increasing detail in successive constitutions, the Louisiana Constitution of 1 92 1  was, already when 
adopted, a long, detailed, and confusing "mish-mash of organic and statutory law," that both contin­
ued prior restraints on the ability of the legislature to govern and added new ones. Mark T. Carle­
ton, History of Louisiana Constitutions, in LEWIS E. NEWMAN, ED., Focus ON CC/73 7 (Baton 
Rouge: LSU Institute of Government Research, 1973). So detailed and dedicated to protection of 
special interests was that constitution that virtually any significant (and many an insignificant) 
change in government policy required constitutional amendment. By 1 970, that constitution had 
grown to an unwieldy monster of some 250,000 words, including 536 amendments. A revolt of the 
voters, who in 1970 rejected all 53 proposed amendments ( !), led to calls for a constitutional conven­
tion, which met in 1973 and 1974. The result of that convention, the Louisiana Constitution of 
1974, was an improvement, but only a modest one. At 30,000 words, it is still quite long. The 
restraints it places upon the political branches-particularly in requiring that taxes can only be 
enacted by two-thirds vote, LA. CoNST. art. VII, § 2, and in dedicating much of the state's revenue 
to specific purposes-have contributed significantly to the state's chronic fiscal crises. See generally 
Hargrave, supra note 75, at 12-19 (discussing impact of constitution's strict provisions). 
The Louisiana Constitution is not alone. While multiplication of examples could consume 
many pages, I cannot resist a brief reference to the Alabama Constitution which as of 1 990 con­
tained .287 sections and 
.





the legislature to authonze the Jefferson County Commission to "prohibit the overgrowth of weeds 
an� the storage and accumulation of junk, inoperable automobiles and other Jitter," (but only if the 
legislature so votes by a three-fifths majority), and another permitting bingo games by charitable 
groups m Calhoun County. ALA. CONST. amends. 497, 508. 
77. Several courts have relied upon this concept of the inherent powers of state legislatures to 
support arguments that the legislature, as holder of the sovereign power of the people, has authority 
to divest the governor of the power to a 
· t · · · · . . ppom certain adm1mstrattve officials, or to appoint those officials itself. See infra notes 144 -45 fo d '  · f · . . . 
r a 1scuss1on o cases relying on the inherent powers of state 
kg1�latures. Congress, m contrast, wields only delegated powers Its po th · t 
process arc thus st · ti d I' . · 
wers over e appomtmen 
F d " 1  C 
. 
. 
nc Y e imited by the terms of the appointments clause of article II § 2 of the 
c era onst 1tut1on . ' 
78. The "unitary executive" arg b · ft 
tution which vests 'cd I . 
ument •. ne y stated, starts from the text of the Federal Consti-
. 
· · ' era executive authonty only · · 1 . . 
d�nt alnnc the duty to mak ., h h 
in 
.a sing e President and imposes on that Presi-e sure t at t c Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1 ,  
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statewide executive officers, 79 thus diffusing executive power and weakening ar-
3. From these texts and from the founders' goals of assuring energy and accountability in the execu­
tive branch, the "unitary executive" argument concludes that the President must retain the power to 
direct the activities of all administrative officials (except those who, like judicial clerks or congres­
sional staffers, labor solely for another branch). Though the Federal Supreme Court seldom uses the 
phrase, some such concept seems to have undergirded a number of decisions, from Myers to Chad ha 
and Bowsher. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: 
Unitary Executive, Plura/ Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1 1 55, 1 1 65-68 (1992) (discussing variations 
on theory); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and 
the President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 99 1 ,  1 000- 1 3  ( 1 993) (discussing framers' view 
of President's role as Chief Administrator). 
The decision in Morrison, which permitted "independent counsel" investigating executive mis­
conduct to be insulated from direct presidential control, 487 U.S. at 705-1 5, has been decried by 
some as a rejection of this principle, at least in the strong form proposed by Justice Scalia. See 
Calabresi & Rhodes, supra this note, at 1 208-09 (Morrison signals "arguably irreversible" rejection 
of any strong version of unitary executive position); Lee S. Lieberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formal­
istic Perspective on Why the Court was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV . 3 1 3 , 335-42 ( 1 9 89). However, 
such claims seem to be at least somewhat overstated. Morrison did not go much beyond 
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), in limiting the President's authority to 
control the methods and results of federal administration. While the cases were theoretically distin­
guishable, in that the independent counsel in Morrison exercised only executive-type powers, the fact 
remains that the situation presented in Morrison-the evident need to promote the perception and 
reality of justice by insulating the person investigating the executive branch from control by that 
branch-is very unusual, to say the least. While the purity of the federal "unitary executive" theory 
may have been sullied, it seems quite unlikely that the theory or result of Morrison will extend much 
beyond its facts. 
79. See, e.g. , ALA . CONST. art V, § §  1 12, 1 16 (providing for separate statewide election of 
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, State Auditor, Secretary of State, State Treas­
urer, Superintendent of Education, and Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries). Although the 
list of statewide elected officials varies from state to state, most provide for several such indepen­
dently elected executives. See ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § I; ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 3; CAL CONST. art. 
V, § 1 1 ; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § I; CONN. CONST. art. Fourth, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. 111, § 2 1 ;  
FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4 & 5; GA. CONST. art. V, § III, para. I ;  IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § I ;  1 1.1.. 
CONST. art. v. § I ; IND. CONST. art. 6, § I; KAN. CONST. art. I , § I ;  KY. CONST. § 9 1 ;  LA. CONST. 
art. I V, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. v. § 2 1 ;  MINN. CONST. art. v. § I; Mrss. CONST. art. 5, §§ 133 & 
1 34; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 17; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § I; NEV. CONST. art. 5, § 19; N.M. CONST. 
art. V, § I ;  N.Y. CONST. art. V, § I ; N.0. CONST. art. V. § 13;  OHIO CONST. art. III, § I; OKI.A. 
CONST. art. VI, § 4; OR. CONST. art. VI, § I ;  R.I. CONST. an. VIII. § I; s.c. CONST. art. VI, § 7; 
S . 0. CONST. art. IV, § 7; TEX. CONST. art. IV, §§ I & 2; UTAH CONST. art. VII, § I ;  VT. CONST. ch. 
II, §§ 47-49; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 3; W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § I ;  Wrs. CONST. art. VI, § I ;  
Wvo. CONST. art. IV, § 1 1 .  
A few states-primarily those with the oldest constitutions-go beyond this and provide for 
clccr ion of some executive officers by the legislature. ME. CONST. arl. V, pt. 2, § I: pl. 3, § I (provid­
ing for legislative election of Secretary of State and Treasurer respectively); MASS. CONST. pt . 2, Ch. 
2, § IV, art. I , ( §  80) (providing for legislative election of Secretary, Treasurer and Receiver General. 
Commissary General, Notaries public, and Naval officers); N.H. CONST. pt .  2. arl. 67 (providing for 
legislat i ve election of Secretary of State and Treasurer); Tr.NN. CONST. arr. V I I . § 3 (providing for 
lt•gislativc election of Treasurer or Treasurers and Comptroller of Treasury ). 
Relatively few states follow the federal pattern and provide for a uni ta ry executive. Interest· 
ingly, however, several of the more recen t state constitutions, including those of A laska, Hawaii, and 
New Jersey, fall into this group. At.ASK A CONST. art. Il l ,  § 8 (providmg only elected oflkiul' arc 
Governor and Lieutenant Governor, who run together on single ticket ): l lAw. C0Ns·1 . art. V. § I>  
(prov iding heads of all principal deparrments will be nominated by Governor and confirmed t>y 
Senate); IOWA CONST. art. IV, §§ J . J  (providing similar provision as Alaska); Mu. CoNsT. 11rl. I I  
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guments that derogations from gubernatorial authority violate the founders' 
vision.80 
4. Differing Pragmatic Concerns 
The pragmatic concerns that should inform distribution of powers analysis 
on the state level are also significantly different from those that are operative on 
the federal level. Some of these pragmatic concerns relate to the ability of state 
legislatures to fulfi11 their role as a co-equal leg of the tripod that sustains in­
creasingly complex state governments. To cite but one example, Congress is in 
session for the bulk of each year and is endowed with a large and professional 
staff. 8 1  It thus enjoys a substantial institutional capacity to gather information 
on a continuous basis and to deal with emergencies as they arise. In marked 
contrast, many state legislatures meet for only short and intermittent sessions, 
and the legislators themselves are often only part-time politicians with other 
livelihoods that require attention. 82 State legislative staffs are smaller and less 
regimented than their federal counterparts. 83 These realities have a number of 
practical consequences. Most obviously, state legislatures must often make spe­
cial arrangements to deal with sudden funding needs or similar problems that 
§ 18 (same); N.J. CONST. art. V, § IV, � 3 (similar provision to Hawaii). The Pennsylvania and 
Virginia executives are almost unitary, with the constitutions of both states providing for popular 
election of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General only. PA. CONST. art. 4, § 5; 
VA. CONST. art. 5, § 15. 
80. Independent election by the people gives those elected state executive officials far greater 
autonomy, and far greater control over their departments, than any federal official enjoys. And that 
autonomy is exactly what the framers of those state constitutions intended to achieve. See Michael 
B. Holmes, Comment, The Constitutional Powers of the Governor and the Attorney General: Which 
Officer Controls Litigation Strategy When the Constitutionality of a State Law is Challenged? 53 LA. 
L. REV. 209 (1992) (arguing in event of conflict, independently elected Louisiana Attorney General, 
and not Governor, authorized to determine what position state will take in litigation). Thus, even 
under the broadest reading of Morrison and Humphrey's Executor, the President retains far greater 
control over the processes and results of the federal administrative machine than governors typically 
enjoy over their respective state executive branches. 
81 .  These staff members are of several types. Each congressional committee has a professional 
staff, �ch officer of Co�gress has an office staff, and each member of Congress has a personal staff. 
Some idc:8 of_ the_ 
total Size of these staffs may be gleaned from the 1992 Congressional Staff Direc­
tory, which hsts m excess of 17,000 names in its "Individual Index." 1992 CONGRESSIONAL STAFF 
DIR�c:roR� I 2 (�n L. Brownson ed., 1992). In addition, Congress has created a number of 
ad�imstrative agencies, such as the Congressional Budget Office, which also lend expertise and 
assistance to Congress. 
82. S�e •. e.�. • �nyder_& Ireland, supra note 74, at 174 (noting weaknesses of legislature under 
current M1ss1ss1ppi Constitution). 
83. Durin� the last several decades, many legislatures have begun to meet more frequently and 
for longer sessions, and have increased the number and professionalism of their staffs. Rosenthal, 




.ncies r�main important. Many state constitutions still limit the length and fre­quency 0� �egislative sessions. And, while special sessions and similar mechanisms may provide some additional scope, they too a�e l��ited in length and subject matter. Legislative staffs of even the
_ 
largest states rarely top 1000 md1v1duals in total, as compared to the many thousands of staff assistants, many of whom have deep and specialized rt" h · expe ise, w o assist Congress. 
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may arise when the legislature is out of session, 84 or to acquire the expertise 
required to confront the executive branch. As will be seen below, certain inno­
vative m echanisms that several state legislatures have created in an effort to deal 
with these institutional problems-mechanisms such as "State Finance Coun­
cils"85 and "Legislative Research Committees"86-have produced a significant 
amount of state constitutional case law and doctrine that has no federal 
equivalent. 
Less obvious but equally important, this "part-time" aspect of many state 
legislatures has specific relevance for issues concerning the methods by which 
legislatures exercise their authority to oversee state level administrative bodies. 
Like C ongress, state legislatures are frequently required, by force of circum­
stance if not by choice, to delegate large measures of discretion over important 
and politically salient issues to administrative bodies. However, while state ad­
ministrators may have of late become somewhat more responsive to legislators, 
intermittent sessions and limited staffs still tend to make state legislators far less 
able than members of Congress t o  exercise influence through informal oversight 
mechanisms, such as hearings o r  direct contact with administrators. 87 Thus, 
judicial decisions that have the effect of cutting off mechanisms of direct legisla­
tive influence on administrative a gencies-for example, decisions forbidding leg­
islative vetoes of administrative rules or precluding the legislative branch from 
appointing administrative officials-may well have a different effect on state leg­
islatures than they have on Congress. For Congress, the effect may only be a 
substitution of one method of oversight for another. For state legislatures, the 
result may be the substantial elimination of any effective oversight at all. 
5. Tyranny Concerns and the Federal "Safety Net" 
Finally, and most fundamentally, the states and the federal government 
differ crucially with respect to the most basic issue of all-the purposes meant 
to be served by the distribution of governmental powers. Framers, 88 schol-
84. Most state constitutions provide for special sessions in the event of real emergencies. How­
ever, such mechanisms clearly do not provide any secure basis for legislative acquisition of expertise, 
or of responding to any but the most pressing of crises. 
85. See infra notes 21 1-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of such mechanisms. 
86. See infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of such mechanisms. 
87. See, e.g. , Bruff, supra note 20, at 1 346 (discussing relatively "weaker" ties between state 
administrative and political branches). 
88. The classic statement is James Madison's frequently quoted lines from Federalist No. 47, 
and his exposition of Montesquieu: 
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the author­
ity of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that . . .  the accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many . . · 
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 261-62 (James Madison) (M. Chadwick ed., 1987). To be sure, 
Madison went on in Federalist No. 48 to argue that a system of judiciously mixed powers and 
"checks and balances" among the branches, rather than any absolute conceptual separation, was the 
best way to avoid that tyranny. But this does not derogate from the fact that it was the tyranny that 
could result from the concentration of power that the founders and their critics both feared. 
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ars, 89 and the Supreme Court90 all agree that the primaI?' reason governmental 
powers were separated on the federal level was and rema1�s to p�eclude the tyr­
anny that could result if those governmental powers, and m particular the pow­
ers to make and to execute the laws, were combined in a single set of hands. 
Moreover, avoidance of such a concentration of power is itself an instrumental 
value. While concentration of power may have other negative consequences as 
well, it is the potential of such a "tyrannical" government to oppress individu­
als-to enforce unfair laws in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion-that was 
and remains the core concern.91 On these propositions there can be little dis-
89. As Professor Redish and a co-author recently put the point, both colorfully and from the 
heart: 
[W]e believe that the separation of powers provisions of the Constitution are tremendously 
important, not merely because the Framers imposed them, but because the fears of creep­
ing tyranny that underlie them are at least as justified today as they were at the time the 
Framers established them. For as the old adage goes, "even paranoids have enemies." It 
should not be debatable that, throughout history, the concept of representative and ac­
countable government has existed in a constant state of vulnerability. This has been almost 
as true in the years since the Constitution's ratification as it had been prior to that time. 
Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern ": The Need for Pragmatic Formal­
ism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 453 (1991). 
90. See, e.g. , Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) ("The declared purpose of separating 
and dividing the powers of government, of course, was to 'dilfus[e] power the better to secure lib­
erty.' ") (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 ( 1 952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring)); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960-61 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting FEDER­
ALIST No. 47); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965): 
This "separation of powers" was obviously not instituted with the idea that it would pro­
mote governmental efficiency. It was, on the contrary, looked to as a bulwark against 
tyranny. For if governmental power is fractionalized, if a given policy can be i mplemented 
only by a combination of legislative enactment, judicial application ,  and executive imple­
mentation, no man or group of men will be able to impose its unchecked will. 
E�en 
_
when arg�ing that a novel scheme for mixing powers does not violate distribution of powers 
principles, Justices base their argument on the anti-tyranny principle-arguing that there is no real 
danger of tyranny in the issue at hand. See, e.g. , Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for 
the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, I l l  S. Ct. 2298, 2 3 1 7  (1991) (White, J., dissenting) ("It is absurd 
to suggest that the �ard's power represents the type of 'legislative usurpatio[n] . . .  which, by 
a�sembh�� all �wer tn the same hands . . . must lead to the same tyranny', that concerned the 
Framers. ) (quoting F�DERALIST No. 48 (James Madison)); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
36 ' : 3KO -R 1 < 1 989) (noting some overlap of powers foreseen by founders and would not violate their 
anti -tyranny concerns) . 
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pute. However, it is important to note that the distribution of powers principle 
serves other related but distinguishable purposes as well. Despite the Supreme 
Court's occasional disclaimers,92 one of these other goals was what the framers 
�oped would be an increase in energy and efficiency in government administra­
tion-an increase to be gained primarily by the centralization of executive au­
thority in a single person separate and apart from Congress. 93 Other identified 
purposes served by the distribution of powers include the increase in political 
accountability that results from having responsibility for particular functions 
clearly placed in particular hands,94 and the prevention of any branch abdicat­
ing its core responsibilities. 95 Nonetheless, in interpreting the Federal Constitu-
from executive power. If it were joined to legislative power, the power over life and liberty 
of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the legislator. If it were joined to 
executive power, the judge could have the force of an oppressor. 
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 1 S7 (Anne M. Cobler et al. eds. & trans., 1 989); see also 
FEDERALIST, supra note 88, at 261 -62 (Madison) (tyranny results from concentration of power); 
Redish & Cisar, supra note 89, at 4S3 (concerns about tyranny valid even today). 
92. See, e.g. , INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 1 9, 944 (1 983) ("Convenience and efficiency are not the 
primary objectives-or the hallmarks-<>f democratic government . . . .  "); United States v. Brown, 
381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965) ("[s)eparation of powers not instituted to promote governmental 
efficiency"). 
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). See generally Arthur Selwyn Miller, An 
Inquiry into the Relevance of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, With Special Emphasis Upon the 
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 27 ARK. L. REV. 583, 588-89 (1973) (discussing importance of 
efficient executive to founders and persistence of that theme in subsequent distribution of powers 
analysis). 
94. See, e.g. , THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Chadwick ed., 1987) 
(asserting importance of having executive head dependent only upon people for his reelection, and 
therefore accountable to people for his conduct of office); THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 385 (Alexan­
der Hamilton) (M. Chadwick ed., 1987) (emphasizing need for single executive, to assure he would 
be politically responsible for acts). 
95. This point was most recently and forcefully made by Justice Scalia, dissenting in Mistretta, 
and arguing that delegation of the power to set criminal sentencing guidelines to a special agency, 
including a judge, violated the requirements of separation of powers in part because it enabled Con­
gress to avoid its duty to make certain hard decisions: 
By reason of today's decision, I anticipate that Congress will find delegation of its 
lawmaking powers much more attractive in the future. If rulemaking can be entirely unre­
lated to the exercise of judicial or executive powers, I foresee all manner of "expert" bodies, 
insulated from the political process, to which Congress will deleg�te various ��ions of its 
lawmaking responsibility. How tempting to create an expert Medical Comm1ss1on (mostly 
M.D.'s , with perhaps a few Ph.D.'s in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, "n<; 
win" political issues as the withholding of life-support systems in federally funded hospi­
tals, or the use of fetal tissue for research. This is an undemocratic precedent that we set­
not because of the scope of the delegated power, but because its recipient is not one of the 
Three Branches of Government. 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 ,  422 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia glanc­
ingly noted, the concerns he expressed are allied to the concerns that underlie t�e non-delegation 
doctrine, which is itself an aspect of distribution of powers. While the non-delegation has fallen .
mto 
desuetude in the federal courts, its principles have not been entirely forgotten. �et, t:I· , A�encan 
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., d1ssentmg. JOmed by 
Burger, C.J.) (insisting that allowing Secretary of Labor to determin� cenain health. 
and safety stan­
dards constitutes unconstitutional delegation of congressional leg1slat1ve authonty to e;11ecut1ve 
branch); Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. tlJ7, 67 1-88 ( 1 980) (Rehn-
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tion, the specter of a totalitarian concentration of power remains real, and the 
need to articulate a body of doctrine that cannot be used to justify such a threat 
to individual liberty remains a crucial constraint on interpretation. Other goals 
of distribution of power can be given only a secondary role. 
State governments, however, are in a different position. Whatever may 
have been the case when state constitutions were originally drafted, states today 
do not operate in a legal vacuum, but rather are subject to the restraining influ­
ence of paramount federal law. This pervasive background o f  federal law is es­
pecially salient in the area of individual rights, providing a "floor" beneath 
which protection of individual liberties may not fall. In particular, the Federal 
Bill of Rights and, to a lesser extent, the Federal Civil Rights96 and Voting 
Rights97 statutes, provide a potentially significant degree of protection against 
anti-democratic or oppressive acts by state authorities. To be sure, the Federal 
Supreme Court has never yet held that any combination of state governmental 
powers constituted, in itself, a violation of any of the substantive protections of 
federal constitutional or statutory law. To the contrary, the question of whether 
or how the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the state shall be sepa­
rated or mixed has been held to remain a matter of state law alone.98 However, 
quist, J., concurring) (arguing that challenged statutory provision should have been voided on non­
delegation grounds because Congress had avoided rather than resolved fundamental but difficult and 
politically divisive choice regarding how to balance workplace safety and cost concerns). 
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-88, 2000-2000h-6 (1988 & Supp. 1991). These statutes are primarily 
directed against discrimination because of race or similar factors rather than against autocracy per 
sc. Nonetheless, they at least provide some potential protection against those "tyrannies" that are 
intended to or have the effect of discriminating against a protected group in society. 
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1975f (l988 & Supp. 1993). As with the Civil Rights statutes, the 
voting rights laws are directed only to a limited range of oppressive acts; here, racial discrimination. 
However, some of the processes that the voting rights acts set up-such as requiring prior approval 
within the federal court system before a proposed change in state voting laws may function to deny 
an individual the right to vote-could well be an obstacle in the path of our hypothetical state tyrant. 
98. See, e.g. , Dreyer v. Illinois, 1 87 U.S. 7 1 ,  83 (1902) (criminal's federal due process rights not 
violated when sentenced in accord with Illinois Indeterminate Sentence Act, even if combination of 
functions given to Illinois Board of Pardons under Act would have violated federal distribution of 
powers principles). While the result in Dreyer is doubtless correct-the combination of functions 
com�lained of was minor at worst, and closely analogous to what the Federal Supreme Court upheld 
m Mistrett��.
the Dreyer Court's language is unfortunate because of the absolute tone of its rejection 
of the posstbthty of a federal constitutional violation arising out of a combination of functions on the 
state level: 
Whet�er the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether 
dtstmct and 
.
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it is difficult to i magine that truly egregious or liberty-threatening violations of 
the separation principle would not-precisely because of the combination of in­
compatible governmental functions-violate the federally protected substantive 
rights of citizens. For example, if a state were to combine prosecutorial and 
judicial functions in a single person, surely anyone convicted would have a via­
ble claim that her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment had been violated.99 Thus, to the extent that federal law provides a 
reliable safeguard against tyrannical oppression of the individual, arguments 
that strict application of the doctrine on the state level are necessary to achieve 
this same i nstrumental result become correspondingly weaker. 
An i nteresting, though as yet speculative, alternative ground for federal 
protection of individual liberty against despotic concentration of state govern­
mental power is raised by the recent resurgence of interest in the Guarantee 
Clause of the Federal Constitution. 1 00 That clause is the only element of the 
Federal Constitution that directly speaks to the several states' internal processes 
of governance. While it is not entirely clear what the framers meant by the 
concept of "republican" government, we can at least have some confidence 
about what that concept emphatically did not permit-that is, monarchy, aris­
tocracy, or any similar form of centralization of powers in any individual or 
group. 10 1 The relationship between these concerns and the anti-tyranny and 
anti-centralization purposes of the separation of powers principle is readily ap­
parent, and has led at least a few courts and commentators to argue that the 
99. The argument proposed here seems compatible with post-Dreyer analysis from the Supreme 
Court. For example, in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), the Court held the question of 
whether the work of a state legislative i nvestigating committee should be enjoined depended on 
whether the subject matter of that investigation "may fairly be deemed within its province. " Id. at 
378. As Professor O'Neill has pointed out, this language clearly implies that the Court may deter­
mine what is the proper "province" of a state legislature, at least where, as in Tenney, "(t]he individ­
ual rights at stake were of a high constitutional order." O'Neill, supra note 98, at 545. 
In subsequent cases, the Dreyer principle of state autonomy in allocation of governmental func­
tions has been frequently restated. It has not, however, been used to justify what would otherwise be 
a violation of basic substantive federal rights. For example, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 
234 ( 1 957), the State Attorney General was statutorily clothed with both executive and legislative 
powers, making him a "one man legislative committee" charged with investigating subversives. The 
petitioner in the case was charged with contempt for refusing to answer certain of the Attorney 
General's questions. While the Court refused to rely upon the apparent violation of separation of 
powers principles as grounds, id. at 255, it nonetheless overturned the contempt conviction. Where 
lower courts have relied on the Dreyer principle, the most basic issues of fundamental fairness simply 
were not at stake. See, e.g. , Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1 191,  1 195 (4th Cir. 1 989) (holding Virginia's 
$750,000 statutory cap on medical malpractice violated no federal guarantees-neither right to trial 
by jury, nor separation of powers, nor right to due process); Ware v. Gagnon, 659 F.2d 809, 812 (7th 
Cir. 198 1 )  (holding Federal Constitution does not preclude state from vesting power to revoke parole 
in administrative agency). 
1 00. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Fonn of 
Governm ent . . . .  " U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
IOI . See, e.g. , THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 234 (James Madison) (M. Chadwick ed. 1987) 
(comparing foreign governments of dissimilar principles and forms); THOMAS M. COOLEY, TR�A­
TISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 45 (7th ed. 1903) (referring to prohibitions against nob1hty, 
monarchies, and aristocracies). 
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Guarantee Clause can and should function as the ultimate "backstop," ensuring 
at least a minimal degree of separation of powers in the states. 102 To be sure, the 
constraints imposed by the Guarantee Clause do not take the form of stringent 
or legally enforceable rules. On the contrary, the concept of republican govern­
ment permits a wide range of experimentation by the states, 103 and the clause 
has been held to be enforceable only by Congress rather than by the courts. 104 
Nonetheless, the Guarantee Clause remains available as a potential basis for fed­
eral intervention-by the political branches if not by the courts-if a state gov­
ernmental power were to become so concentrated or oppressive as to constitute a 
threat to republican principles. 
In any event, even if federal law does not outlaw centralization of political 
power in the states per se, it surely provides significant protection to individuals 
against many of the potential consequences of such tyranny. 10s At a minimum, 
102. See, e.g. , Fox v. McDonald, 13 So. 416, 420 (Ala. 1 893) (noting guarantee of republican 
form of government properly vests power of selecting officers of government in people, and power to 
appoint to office not inherently executive function); Comment, Treatment of the Separation of Powers 
Doctrine in Kansas, 29 KAN. L. REv. 243, 246-54 (1981) (discussing framers' intent regarding guar­
antee clause and separation of powers doctrine at state level). 
1 03. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 263-66 (James Madison) (M. Chadwick ed. 1987) (sur­
veying differing degrees and forms of separation of powers in various states and pronouncing them 
all compatible with liberty); see generally Jn re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Commis­
sion), 6 1 2  A.2d 1, 16-18 (R.1. 1992) (holding amendment to state constitution which withdrew au­
thority to prescribe substantive ethics rules for state officials from legislature and gave power instead 
to appointed committee, fell within broad range of state governmental structures permitted by Guar­
antee Clause of Federal Constitution). 
104. See Pacific States Tel. &. Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 1 1 8  ( 1 9 1 2) (emphasizing that Con­
gress's determination of whether particular state government is "republican" form binding on every 
other department of government); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) l,  42 (1 849) (arguing, in 
dicta, determination of whether particular state government "republican" lies with Congress rather 
than courts; in other words, is a political rather than legal question). Scholars have argued, however, 
that the courts could use that clause to defend certain important structural features of our system of 
government, or to vindicate certain individual and political rights of individuals. See Deborah Jones 
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COL UM. L. 
REV. I, 2 (1988) (arguing guarantee clause could be used to guarantee some degree of autonomy for 
states against federal regulation); see also sources cited id. at 22 n . 1 22 (proposing several other 
applications of the clause). 
105. See, e.g. , Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1980) (noting rule that binds 
federal courts not t� impose consecutive sentences for multiple crimes all arising out of event, unless 
Congress so authorizes, and rooting that aspect of Double Jeopardy Clause in distribution of powers 
concerns-that Congress rather �han courts shall determine punishments for crimes). In dictum, the 
court raised-a�d apparently spht--on the issue of whether Dreyer might preclude application of the 
full force of this
. 
rule to states. Justice Brennan, for the Court, s uggested that Dreyer would not 
proh1b11 apphcatton of at least some federal constitutional standards· 
Th C · 
. 
. c . ou
.
rt has held that the doctnne of separation of powers embodied in the Federal 
Consutullon is not mandatory on the States . . . .  It is possible, therefore that the Double Jeopardy Clause docs not through th F h 
' 
h . . • 
e ourteent Amendment, circumscribe the penal 
aut only of state courts m the s h · · · 
D P l 
ame manner t at it hm1ts the power of federal courts. The 
ue rocess C ause of the Fourteenth A d h 
I fi d . . 
men ment, owever, would presumably prohibit state cour s rom eprmng persons of libe 1 . 
cept to the extent th . d b  
r y  or property as pu111shment for criminal conduct ex-
au orize � state law. 
Id. at 689 n.4 (citations omitted) (emph 
· ddcd) asis a · However, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argued 
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the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech, press, and assembly 
would likely provide some protection for political activities by opponents of such 
a state regime; the criminal procedural guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments would give some protection against official retaliation; and 
the due p rocess, equal protection , and voting rights guarantees of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments would give some protection against at least some 
forms of oppression or electoral manipulation, particularly if they were class­
based. I n  addition, while the Federal Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts are 
primarily directed against discrimination because of race or similar factors 
rather t h an against autocracy per se, several of their provisions would at least 
make it difficult for a dictatorial state regime to deal "efficiently" with its oppo­
nents. Most important, all of these rights can be vindicated in the federal courts, 
a system that is by design independent of any control by state authorities. State 
authorities can potentially be brought to account in many ways in federal court, 
including through civil actions, 1 06  criminal actions, 107 and habeas corpus 
proceedings. 108 
I n  arguing that we enjoy some external protection from tyranny by state 
governments, I do not wish to be understood as claiming that state courts should 
ignore issues regarding the concentration of state governmental powers, or of the 
potentia l  for abuse inherent in such concentration. One who lives and teaches in 
the state that Huey Long made famous would never so rashly contend. Rather, 
the question is one of emphasis. The contentions are two. The first is that fed­
eral law provides a "safety net" against that "tyranny"-tyranny in the sense of 
oppression of individuals by an arbitrary government-that might conceivably 
result down the road if some mixing of powers were permitted today. The sec­
ond is that because of that safety net, arguments to the effect that rigid adher­
ence to formal separation of powers is the only sure safeguard against loss of 
liberty a re more relevant and convincing in the context of federal distribution of 
powers analysis than they are in the context of state analogues. Thus, this differ­
ence may justify a somewhat greater degree of flexibility in state constitutional 
interpretation. By "flexibility," however, I assuredly do not mean that "any­
thing goes." On the contrary, concentration and conflation of governmental 
powers can produce many bad consequences. My point is only that the unique 
position of states as actors within a federal system may, rightly understood, free 
state courts construing state constitutions to concentrate somewhat less on re­
mote and hypothetical concerns about the prevention of oppression, in order to 
concen t rate more on the other concerns that underlie distribution of powers 
analysis- concerns such as maintaining efficiency, preserving accountability, 
and preventing any branch from abdicating its responsibilities. 
that the federal courts can never second -guess stales courts as lo their reading of stale s1u1u1es, or 
'late legislat ive intent.  Id. at 706 (Rehnquist, J .. dissen ting). 
106. 42 u .s.c. § 1 983 ( 1 988). 
107. I ll  U.S.C. §§ 24 1 ,  242 (Supp. 1 99 1 ) 
IOK .  28 U. S.C. § 2254 ( 1 988 & Supp. 1 99 1 ). 
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II. TOWARD A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION OF 
POWERS: LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION IN CHOOSING 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS 
A. Is There Such a Thing as State Constitutional Distribution of Powers Law? 
For the reasons discussed above, it appears that federal distribution of pow­
ers precedents should provide only limited guidance for state courts considering 
similar issues. However, the converse proposition-that decisions from sister 
states have validity as persuasive precedents-remains to be established. Cer­
tainly the obstacles to a unified state constitutional approach to distribution of 
powers issues appear formidable. State constitutional texts differ markedly with 
respect to these issues. These divergences, therefore, must be addressed before 
any notion of a unified state constitutional approach to these issues can acquire 
more than superficial validity. 
The most immediately striking difference among state constitutional texts 
concerns their respective guarantees of the separation of governmental powers. 
Ten state constitutions follow the federal pattern by omitting any express re­
quirement of separation of powers, incorporating that principle instead only by 
implication from provisions establishing the three branches of the state govern­
ment and "vesting" each type of power in one of those branches. 109 Twelve 
states go beyond this to include an express statement that governmental powers 
shall be separated, either standing alone1 10 or coupled with an express prohibi­
tion against any department exercising any powers belonging to another, except 
as otherwise provided elsewhere in the constitution. 1 1 1  The remaining state con­
stitutions are even more pointed, coupling an express statement of the separation 
109. The ten states without express separation of powers provisions arc Alaska, Delaware, Ha­
waii. Kansas. New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin. All ten, 
however, explicitly vest legislative, executive, and judicial powers in those three branches. ALASKA 
CONST. art. 11. § 1 . art. Ill, § I ,  art. IV, § 1 ,  DEL. CONST. art. II, § I ,  art. III, § I ,  art. IV, § I ;  
HAWAII CONST. art. 1 1 1, § I ,  art .  V ,  § I ,  art .  VI, § l ;  KANSAS CONST. art. 1 ,  § 3 ,  art. 2, § 1 ,  art. 3, 
§ l; N.Y. CONST. art. Ill, § 1, art. IV, § I, art. VI, § 1 (phrased in terms of creating "unified court 
system . . rather than "vesting"' judicial power); N.D. CONST. art. III § 1 ,  art. V, § J , art. VI, § I ,  art. 
XI, § 26 (explicitly stating three branches arc "co-equal"); OHIO CONST. art. II, § I ,  art. III, § S, art. 
IV § l ;  PA . CONST. art. II, § I ,  art. IV, § 2, art. V, § l; WASH . CONST. art. II, § ) ,  art. III, § I ,  art. 
IV. § l ;  Wisc. CONST. art. IV, § I ,  art. V, § 1 ,  art. VII, § 2. 
1 10. Sill stat�onnecticut, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and 
South Dakota-have provisions that, though variously worded, confine themselves to an expression 
of the separation the powers principle. CONN. CONST. art. II; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6; Mtss. CONST. 
art. I. § l; N.H. CONST. Part First, art. 37; R.I. CONST. art. V; S.0. CONST. art. II. The New 
Hampshi
.
rc provision is noteworthy in that it clearly presupposes that the principle will not be im­
posed m tts full conceptual rigor: "In the government of this state, the three essential powers thereof, 
to wtt. the legislative. executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, 
each other. as the nature of a free government will admit or as is consistent with that chain of 
connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution
' 
in one indissoluble bond of union and 
amity . .. N.H. CONST. Pan First, art. 37 . 
. 
1 1 1 . Sill statcs.--Alabama, Arizona, Illinois, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and Vermont-have 
provi§ion\ of thi§ type. ALA . CONST. an. Ill, §§ 42 &: 43; ARIZ. CONST. art. Ill; ILL CONST. art. II. § I :  M As.'1._ CoNST. pt. 1 . art. XXX; OKLA . CONST. art. IV, § l; VT. CONST. ch. II, § S. Again, while theic prov1\1on� arc very difrercntly phrased, the basic content is common. 
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principle with an additional clause explicitly prohibiting "any person" belonging 
to or exercising power under any branch from holding any office1 12 or exercising 
any power or function 1 1 3 belonging to another. At least one state court has 
attached importance to these textual differences, refusing to rely on precedent 
from states whose separation of powers clauses were phrased differently from its 
own. 1 14 
Other textual provisions relevant to this analysis also show marked varia­
tions from state to state. Virtually all states have constitutional provisions that 
vest executive authority in the governor and impose upon the governor a duty 
to see that the laws are faithfully executed. Yet states disagree on what spe­
cific powers their respective governors will be given to carry out this duty. 
Some states vest a general power to make administrative appointments in the 
govemor1 1 5  or specifically debar the legislature from making such appoint-
112. Louisiana appears to be the only state with provisions so phrased: 
§ 1. THREE BRANCHES 
Section I .  The powers of government of the state are divided into three separate 
branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. 
§ 2. LIM ITATI ONS ON EACH BRANCH 
Section 2. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of these branches, 
nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the 
others. 
LA. C ONST. art. II, §§ 1 & 2. 
113. Twenty-seven states have constitutional separation of powers provisions of this type. 
ARK. C ONST. art. IV, § I; CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3; COLO. CoNST. art. III; FLA. CONST. art. II, 
§ 3; GA. C ONST. art. I, § II, para. III; IDAHO CONST. art. II, § I ;  IND. CONST. art. 3, § I; IOWA 
CONST. art. III, § I ;  KY. CONST. §§ 27 & 28; ME. CONST. art. III, §§ 1 & 2; Mo. CONST. Declara­
tion of Rights, art . 8; MICH. CONST. art. Ill, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. III, § I ; Mo. CONST. art. II, 
§ I; MONT. CONST. art. III, § I; NEB. C ONST. art. II, § I ;  NEV. CONST. art. 3, § I; NJ. CONST. art. 
III, para. l ;  N.M. CONST. art III, § I ; OR. CONST. art. III, § I ; s.c. C ONST. art. I, § 8; TENN. 
CONST. art. II, § I ;  TEX. CONST. art. II, § l ;  UTAH CONST. art. V, § I ; VA. CONST. art. III, § I ;  W .  
VA. C ONST. art. 5 ,  § l ;  WYO. CONST. art. 2, § I .  The Tennessee provision may be taken as typical: 
"No person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers prop­
erly belonging to either of the others, except in the cases herein directed or permitted." TENN. 
CONST. art. I I ,  § 2. 
114. J.F. Ahem Co. v. Wisconsin State Bldg. Comm'n, 336 N.W.2d 679, 693-94 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1983) (noting separation of powers principle present in Wisconsin constitution only by implication, 
and therefore declin ing to regard factually similar cases from states with express separation of pow­
ers clauses as persuasive precedent); see also Legislative Research Comm 'n v. Brown, 664 S. W .2d 
907, 912 (Ky. 1984) (relying on strict wording of state's separation of powers clause as reason, 
among others, to reject "liberal" interpretations of some sister state courts). But see infra notes 128 
and 223-28 for examples of cases that do not depend on the wording of the text. 
1 1 5. One common format for vesting such broad appointment powers in the governor recites 
that, unless otherwise provided in the constitution, the governor shall appoint all single executive 
heads of departments and all boards or commissions which head depart ments, or which have regula­
tory or quasi-judicial functions. See, e.g. , ALASKA CONST. art. I l l, §§ 25-26 (Governor appoints 
department heads and approves selection of chief executive officer); MICH. CONST. art. V. § 3 (Gov­
ernor appoints executive officer); N.J. CONST. art . V, § IV (same); S . D. CONST. art. IV. § 9 (same). 
Other provisions are variously phrased, but are equally clear that it is the governor who has the 
power to a p point, though tha\ power is sometimes subject to c
_
onfirmation by the Senate or the 
legislature as a whole. See, e.g. , fl.A. CONST . art. IV, § 6(a) (requmng either confirmation by Senate 
or approval by three cabinet members); ILL.  CONST. art. V, § 9(a) (requiring majority of Senate); 
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ments 1 1 6 while others leave it to the legislature to decide the method by which ' . 
officials will be appointed-including, in some cases, reservmg that
 power to 
itself. 1 1 7 Some states carefully differentiate those administrators who must be 
gubernatorial appointees from those for whom the legislature may determine the 
method of appointment, 1 1s while in other states the text is, on its face, remarka­
bly unclear as to which branch controls the mechanisms of appointment. 
1 1 9 
MINN. CONST. art. V, § 3 (requiring advice and consent of Senate); Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 5 1  (same); 
N.Y. CONST. art V, § 4 (same); VA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (requiring confirmation by General Assem­
bly). 
Particularly when combined, as they usually are, with additional provisions making clear that 
such appointees serve at the pleasure of the governor, these appointment provisions obviously 
strengthen the governor, and tend to locate both control of the administrative bureaucracy and 
responsibility for its actions squarely in the governor's hands. 
1 16. See, e.g. , ILL. CoNST. art. V ,  § 9(a) (prohibiting General Assembly from electing or ap­
pointing officers of executive branch). In a few states this prohibition stands as a specific exception 
to the legislature's otherwise plenary authority to regulate how administrative officials will be cho­
sen. See, e.g. , OHIO CoNST. art. II, § 27 (prohibiting General Assembly from making any appoint­
ment or filling any vacancy); W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (same). 
1 1 7. See supra note 79, noting scattered provisions in older state constitutions placing power to 
elect certain specified state officials in the hands of the legislature. A more common method of 
granting effective power to the legislature is for the state constitution to provide that the governor 
may appoint subordinate officials only insofar as he is authorized to do so "by law" or, alternatively, 
that the governor enjoys the power to appoint unless the legislature provides by law for some other 
methods of election or appointment of that official. See, e.g. , DEL. CONST. art. III, § 9 (providing 
exception for vacancies that occur within two months of election); IND. CONST. art. 15, § I (appoint­
ments not provided for in constitution must be appointed as prescribed by law); KAN. CONST. art. 
1 5, § l (same); ME. CONST. art. v. pt. I , § 8 (same); Mo. CONST. art. II, § to (same); NEV. CONST. 
art. 15, § 10 (same); OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 13 (same); PA CONST. art. IV, § 8 (providing various 
methods of making appointments depending on office involved and time of vacancy); R.I. CONST. 
art. IX, § 5 (same as Indiana); TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (granting legislature power to establish 
method of filling vacancies); VT. CONST. art. II, § 20 (appointment power limited by constitution 
and law passed by legislature); Wis. CONST. art. XIII § 9 (same). 
Several state courts have held that such provisions have the effect of authorizing the legislature 
to vest itself with the power to make certain administrative appointments, and that no violation of 
separation of powers inheres in doing so. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 1 1  Nev. 1 28, 
1�2-43 ( 1 876) (recognizing authority of legislature to choose officers of municipal corporations); 
Rtchardso� v. Y.oung, 125 S.W. 664, 668 (Tenn. 1910) (recognizing power of appointment does not 
rest �xclus1vely m a�y .
one br�ch); see also Caldwell v. Bateman, 3 1 2  S.E.2d 320 (Ga. 1984) (up­
h.oldmg statute permuting legislature to make appointments to administrative body, without discus­sion of appomtments clause of state constitution); Parcell v. State, 620 P.2d 834, 837 (Kan. 1 9 80) 
(same). 
. . 1 1 8. Interestingly, the Hawaii Constitution provides that the legislature may prescribe how md1v1dual heads of departments are to be h b h h · . . c osen, ut t at t e governor must appomt members of boards or comm1ss1ons. HA w CONST art V § 5 Th Lo · · · · · 
. . 
· 
· · • 
· e u1s1ana Const1tut1on, m contrast, makes 
precisely the op�s1te allocation. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(H). 
1 1 9. Prov1s1ons of this sort typicall ·d h h · . . Y prov1 e t at t e governor shall appomt all officers whose appomtment "1s not otherwise provid d fi " s h 1 . . , ,  e or. uc anguage leaves unclear whether the "other pro-v1s1on referred to must be found i th · · . n e state const1tutton or may be provided by statute. If the former, then the governor has wide powe f · 
h 
. .ti rs 0 appointment. If the latter then the legislature will ave stgm cant control over the appointment process s 
' 
CONST art IV § 6· M c . ee, e.g . •  COLO CONST. art. IV, § 6; IDAHO · 
· 
• , ONT. ONST. art. VI, § 8; N.M. CONST . § 5(8)- UTAH CONST rt VII § lO· W · 
art. V, § 5, N.C. CONST. art. III,  
. . a . ' 
• . v A. CONST. art. VII, § 8 At least one court has construed this 1 
· 
anguage to mean that the governor has appointment 
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In addition, while the vast majority of state constitutions include provisions 
specifically forbidding legislators from occupying other governmental positions 
during their legislative terms, 1 20 those constitutions differ significantly as to the 
exact content of the prohibition. Some of these incompatibility clauses are very 
broadly phrased, prohibiting legislators from occupying any "office" 121 or from 
accepting any other form of employment with the state or its subdivisions122 
during their legislative terms. Others are a bit more limited, forbidding legisla­
tors only from occupying "lucrative" offices or "offices of profit" while holding 
their legislative seats. 1 23 Yet other provisions are quite narrow in scope, forbid-
authority unless the legislature otherwise provides. State ex rel Martin v. Melott, 359 S.E.2d 783, 
785-86 (N.C. 19 87). 
1 20. Such provisions serve a number of purposes. In addition to providing further support for 
basic separation of powers concerns, they were also intended, like their federal cognate, to avoid 
what the founders saw as the potential for corruption inherent in the practice of British ministries to 
secure the support of members of parliament by dealing out lucrative offices to those supporters. See 
supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
121 .  Though such provisions differ in detail as to their phrasing, the Hawaii version may be 
taken as typical: "No member of the legislature shall hold any public office under the State . . . .  The 
term 'public office', for the purposes o f  this section, shall not include notaries public, reserve police 
officers or officers of emergency organizations for civilian defense or disaster relief." HAWAII 
CONST. art. III,  § 8; see also ARK. CONST. art. V, § 10 (prohibiting holding of any civil office); CAL 
CONST. art. IV, § 1 3  (prohibiting holding of any other office or state employment); Cow. CONST. 
art. V ,  § 8 (any federal or state office); CONN. CONST. art. III, § 1 1  (same); DEL CONST. art. II, § 14 
(creating exceptions for attorneys and militia); MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (creating exceptions for 
post master or notary public); MONT. CONST. art. V, § 9 (creating exceptions for notary public and 
militia); N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 28 (prohibiting legislators from contracting with state for one year); 
N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (prohibiting any full time employment); OHlO CONST. art. II, § 4 (creating 
exceptions for officers of political parties, notaries public, and militia); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 1 8  
(prohibiting concurrent state and federal employment); WY. CONST. art. 3 ,  § 8 (creating exceptions 
for militia and notary public). 
1 22.  The Arizona provision may be taken as typical of these: 
No member of Legislature, during tenn for which he shall have been elected or appointed 
shall be eligible to hold any other office or be otherwise employed by the State of Arizona or 
any county or incorporated city or town thereof. This prohibition shall not extend to the 
office of school trustee, nor to the employment as a teacher or instructor in the public 
school system. 
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 5 (emphasis added); see a/so MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 8. 
I 23. The Florida constitution may be taken as typical of the very common provisions of this 
sort, limited to "lucrative" offices, or offices of "profit" or "emolument:" 
No person holding office of emolument under any foreign government, or civil office of 
emolument under the United States or any other state, shall hold any office of honor or 
emolument under the government of this state. No person shall hold at the same time 
more than one office under the government of the state and the counties and municipalities 
therein, except that a notary public or military officer may hold another office, and any 
officer may be a member of a constitution revision commission, taxation and budget reform 
commission, constitutional convention or statutory body having only advisory powers. 
FLA. CONST. art. II, § 5(a). See also, to like effect, ALA. CONST. art . X V I I ,  § 280 (prohibiting dual 
employment if annual salary exceeds $200); A LASKA CONST. art. II ,  § 5 (prohibiting holding of any 
office or position for profit); GA. CONST. art. Ill , § II ,  para. IV; low A CONST. art. I l l, § 2 2  (prohih­
iting holding of any position if salary exceeds $ 1 00  a year); ME. CONST. art. I V, pt. 3. § 1 1  & art. I X .  
§ 2;  Mo. CONST. art. III, §§ JO - 1 1  (prohibiting holding of a n y  office or position fo r  profit); Mo. 
CONST. art. I I I, § 12 (prohibiting holding o f  lucrative offices or positions); NEB. CONST. art. I l l , § 9 
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ding legislators only from simultaneously holding office under the federal gov­
ernment or the government of another state, 124 or from holding an office the 
election to which is vested in the legislative assembly. 12s Some of the clauses are 
exceedingly specific as to what combinations of offices are forbidden, 126 while 
others are open ended, leaving it to the legislature itself to define which offices 
are incompatible with legislative service. 127 
Moreover, these fairly narrow textual points, important as they are, do not 
tell the whole story. Different state constitutions embody radically different vi­
sions of the relative weight of the political branches. Some state constitutions 
were written to allow their legislatures to dominate the processes of state govern­
ment, weakening the governor by splitting executive authority among several 
independently elected officials, by limiting the substantive powers of the gover­
nor, by limiting the governor to one or a few terms of office, or through other 
mechanisms. Other state constitutions show an obvious preference for a strong 
executive branch, and manifest this preference through such mechanisms as lim­
iting legislative sessions, giving a governor extensive line-item veto authority, or  
through other arrangements. 
Thus, it may well be argued that each state's doctrine on the allocation of 
governmental power between political branches has a strong and inherent ele­
ment of the sui generis, devoid of much potential to teach or learn from other 
states. To some extent this is true. Specific textual or historical differences may 
well mandate unique results in individual cases. And, more broadly, states with 
well defined traditions of dominance by either of the political branches may find 
(same); N.J. CONST. art. IV, § V, para. 4 (prohibiting holding of offices for profit and holding of both 
judgeship and seat on legislature); N.Y. CONST. art. Ill, § 7 (prohibiting dual civil appointment); 
PA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (prohibiting holding of any civil position where there is any monetary bene­
fit); S.C. CONST. art. Ill, § 24 (prohibiting any dual state or federal employment); S.D. CONST. art. 
III, § 3 (prohibiting employment in excess of $300 a year); TENN. CONST. art. II, § 26 (prohibiting 
any dual state employment other than position in militia or as justice of peace)" TEX. CONST. art. Ill 
§ 19 (prohibiting legislative office); UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 6 (exempting miiitia, Post Master, and 
United States Commissioner from dual employment ban); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (prohibiting state 
and federal employment). 
1 24. See NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (prohibiting employment under two governments simultane­
ously); R.I .  CONST. art. IX, § 6 (same); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1 4  (same) . 
. 125
. See IND. CONST. art. V, § 30 ("No Senator or Representative shall during the term for 
which he was 
.. 
elccted, be eligible for any office, the election to which is v�ted in the legislative 
assembly . . . . ); OR. CONST. art. IV, § 30 (same). 
1.26
. The oldest constitutions are the most specific. See, e.g. , MASS. CONST. ch. VI, art. 2 
(providing details of salary and distinguishing between offices); N.H. CONST. arts. 94 _ 95 (listing 
offices); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 54 (same). 
1 21 7  · The Louisiana incompatibility provision seems the most open ended: "The Jeaislature shall 
enact aws defining and regulating d I 1 . 
c· 
ffi h Id. . 
ua emp oyment and defining regulating and prohibiting dual 
o cc o mg m_ state and local government." Statutes enacted in res . 
been upheld against constituti 1 h 11 
ponse to this mandate have 
197<1) The North Caro11·na 
ona 
l
c a enge. Bellon v. Deshotel, 370 So. 2d 22 1 ,  223 (La. App. Ct. 
· cqu1va ent generally proh·b·t I · 1 � . 
"offices of profit .. b 1 ·d h 
1 1 s egis ators 1rom simultaneously occupying 
· 
• u provi cs t at the General A bl 
general law. N.C. CONST. art. VJ § 9 The Ka 
ssem � �ay make exceptions to this rule by 
federal employees from serving 1· 
'
th ·1 . 1 
nsas Constitution, m contrast, absolutely prohibits 
n e eg1s ature and goes t . 
addi1ional disqualifications. KAN. CoN 
' on ° empower the legislature to enact 
ST. art. II,  § 5.  
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it more true to the intentions of their framers to consider decisions from states 
with similar approaches to be more relevant than decisions from states with a 
different philosophy. 
Despite these divergences, however, it seems possible to make useful com­
parisons among states with respect to basic principles of allocation of powers 
between governor and legislatures. Courts in fact do so. While some decisions 
rely solely on their own in-state distribution of powers precedents, most state 
distribution of powers decisions cite and rely upon precedent from other 
states. 128 Such cross-state reliance is not unjustified. To be sure, some differ­
ences in constitutional texts are so express in their mandates and so clear in their 
divergences as to preclude any real comparison between jurisdictions. However, 
these observations apply only to a limited number of issues in a limited number 
of states. Many state constitutional texts are unclear, not self-evidently requir­
ing either a pro-executive or a pro-legislative interpretation. More importantly, 
most of the hard issues relating to the distribution of powers between governors 
and legislatures-including most of the questions involving the authority of leg­
islators to confer administrative tasks on themselves or their appointees-are 
simply not answered by these texts. Such issues must be determined through the 
analysis of those basic separation of powers principles that all states share. 
Thus the possibility exists to make useful state comparisons with respect to 
the basic allocation of powers principles between governors and legislators. But 
to determine whether there are real possibilities for a unified state constitutional 
approach, it is necessary to look to the cases, to see whether their analyses show 
sufficient similarity and cohesiveness across state lines. 
B. Allocating Power Between Governors and Legislatures: The Exercise of 
Administrative Powers by Legislators or Legislative Appointees 
As was noted above, state legislatures cannot avoid delegating large meas­
ures of discretion over important and politically salient issues to administrative 
bodies. However, ceding total control over those administrators' exercise of that 
discretion to the executive is often politically unacceptable, particularly in sensi­
tive areas such as the regulation of political campaigns or preparing the state 
1 28. See, e.g. , Fox v. McDonald, 1 3  So. 4 1 6, 420 -2 1 (Ala. 1 893) (discussing precedent from 
several states); Greer v. State, 2 1 2  S.E.2d 836, 838-39 (Ga. 1975) (same); Book v. State Office Bldg. 
Comm'n, 1 49 N.E.2d 273, 293-97 (Ind. 1958) (citing both federal and sister-state precedent); State 
ex rel. Black v. Burch, 80 N.E.2d 294, 300-02 (Ind. 1 948) (relying on precedent from New York and 
Louisiana for broad construction of "functions" of branch of government); Frazier v. State, 504 So. 
�d 675, 697 (Miss. 1987) (relying on precedent from Oklahoma and Texas to construe incompatibi�­
lty clause); Alexander v. State, 441 So. 2d 1 329, 13 35-37 (Miss. 1 983) (relying on federal and Indi­
ana precedents); State ex rel Spire v. Conway, 472 N.W.2d 403, 4 1 6  (Neb. 1991) (carefully picking 
among precedents from other states); State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 286 S.E.2d 79, 86-87 (N.C. 
1982) (citing precedent from many states and discussing several at length); Monaghan v. School 
District No. l, 3 1 5  P.2d 797, 803-04 (Or. 1957) (relying on precedent from Indiana, Louisiana, and 
New York); State ex rel. State Office Bldg. Comm'n v. Bailey, 1 50 S.E.2d 449, 452 (W. Va. 1966) 
(extensively discussing federal and Indiana precedent); J.F. Ahern Co. v. Wisconsin State Bldg. 
Comm'n, 336 N.W.2d 679, 693- 94 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (distinguishing some sister-state precedents, 
and expressly following analysis developed by Kansas courts). 
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budget. Since state legislatures are generally far less able than Congress to exer­
cise influence through informal oversight mechanisms, legislators may reason­
ably believe that the only practical alternative is to secure legislative influence 
directly, by structuring state government so that the legislature has a role in 
choosing the administrators who will actually carry out its programs. 
This legislative input into choosing agency members can take many forms. 
In its weaker form, the legislature may require the governor or other appointing 
authority to make appointments from a short list provided by the legislature, or 
may retain for itself or its leadership the power specifically to designate individu­
als to serve as its representatives on the board or commission. More intrusive, 
and more constitutionally suspect, are systems whereby the legislature vests ad­
ministrative functions in its own members, either by providing for the appoint­
ment of individual legislators to a traditional agency or board or by transferring 
administrative functions to a legislative committee. 
Not surprisingly, these efforts by legislators to vest administrative powers in 
themselves or their appointees have aroused varying responses from the different 
state courts. To be sure, some of these divergent results may be explained on the 
basis of differences in constitutional texts and history among those states. But as 
will be developed below, each method by which legislatures may seek influence 
over staffing seems to have given rise to several lines of analysis that garner 
support across state lines, and thus give some indication of emerging state-based 
approaches to the analysis of separation of powers issues. 
Model 1 :  Legislative Appointment of Administrative Officials 
There is no doubt that state legislatures, like Congress, enjoy some powers 
with respect to the appointment of administrative officials. The legislative 
branch always enjoys the authority to appoint its own functionaries who per­
form duties incidental to the legislative process. 129 With respect to officials with 
broader administrative duties, legislatures typically possess the power to set their 
qualifications130 and to approve certain high ranking gubernatorial appoin-
1 29. The concept of "administrator," as used in the discussion in the text thus does not include 
indi.vidua.
ls or bodies �hich provide "housekeeping" services for the legislatu;e, or which are purely 
advisory m nature. Wtth�ut any �oubt, any reasonable notion of distribution of powers would have 
to be construed �o penmt the legtslature freely to appoint and remove those who merely provide 
advice to the legislature, or who carry out its internal operations See e g Q · D Id . , . .  , umn v. onnewa , 
483 N.E.�d 2 1 6, 222 (Ill. 1985? (hold
_
ing legislative appointment of Board charged to recommend 
levels 0f
.
compcn�a!lon. for pubhc officials docs not violate appointments clause of Illinois Constitu­
tion, �hich for_bids legislatu�e f�om appointing executive officials; here Board operates only in advi­
sory capacity, '" area of leg1slat1ve authority); see also Beadling v. Governor 308 N W  2d 269 272 
( M ich. Ct. App. 1 98 1 ) (d�p·t I . d. · f l  · · · 
' . . ' 
. . . 
· 
1 e c car tn 1cat1on o eg1slat1ve tntent to contrary, state statute granting 
high ofth:ials nght to appeal terminations to Governor could not apply to Director of House of 
Representatives fiscal agency· general se t" f · · 
. . . 
. 
. 
• . para ion o powers pnnctples precluded executive agency from p.issi�g upon propn.ety of termination of purely legislative official). DO. Se1' , e.g . .  Murnll v. Edwards, 6 1 3  So. 2d 185 190 La Ct . . 
leaishtur- •'h0<i·-· to le . . . 
' ( · · App. 1992), (notmg even tf � · 
• ' � ·�·  ave appotnttve power m h d f . 
th .__ h. f . 
an s 0 governor, legislature may still "require that 
c mcm.>er\ 1p o a certain board of commi · · · · r . 1. • f . 
ssion possess certam qualtficat1ons or be representative o cer am .1reas o society, or that certain representative rou s i . . . govrrnor for appointment") c 1 d . d 6 
g P n society submit nominees to the ' er · enie 
• 1 4  So. 2d 6S (La. 1993). However, if the legislature vests 
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tees. 1 3 1 However, the question remains whether legislatures may go beyond this 
limited role and, unlike Congress, confer on themselves or their leadership the 
power to designate members of certain administrative boards and commissions. 
As was noted above, a few state constitutions specifically resolve this question, 
either by explicitly vesting appointive authority in the governor132 or by explic­
itly forbidding the legislature to exercise such powers. 1 33 In most cases, how­
ever, state constitutional appointment clauses are not facially exclusive; rather 
they are generally phrased to permit a construction that would allow legislatures 
to determine both how and by whom statutory administrative officials may be 
chosen. 1 34 
I n  the absence of an explicit constitutional answer, the question of whether 
legislatures or their leadership may appoint administrative officials must be re­
solved o n  general distribution of powers grounds. This in turn requires consid­
eration of two distinguishable sub-issues. The first sub-issue arises out of 
constitutional provisions "vesting" executive authority in the governor and asks 
whethe r  the mere act of appointing a government official is so inherently "execu­
tive" in nature that it must be reserved, absent explicit constitutional direction 
to the contrary, to the governor or some other executive branch official. If the 
answer to the first sub-issue is "no," the second sub-issue arises-assuming that 
a legislature or legislative leader may appoint an official, whether and to what 
extent general separation of powers considerations preclude that legislative ap­
pointee from performing particular executive or administrative duties. 
The first of these sub-issues can be disposed of fairly briefly. There is au­
thority i n  some states for the proposition that the act of appointing subordinate 
administrative officials is, in itself, an inherently and exclusively executive func­
tion. Such claims have been made in federal cases, 135 in some older state 
the governor with the power to appoint a particular official, it cannot describe the appointees' qualifi­
cations so narrowly as to limit substantially the governor's discretion to choose whom to appoint. 
Id. at 1 90 - 9 1 ;  see also Wittler v. Baumgartner, 144 N.W.2d 62, 7 1 -72 (Neb. 1 966) (where constitu­
tion vests appointive authority in governor, legislature may not describe qualifications of those ap­
pointees i n  such way as to limit governor's choice to only one or few individuals), overruled by State 
ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortg. Fin. Fund, 283 N.W.2d 12 (Neb. 1 979). 
1 3 1 .  Vi rtually all state constitutions that authorize gubernatorial appointment of senior admin­
istrative officials also provide for senatorial or, more rarely, legislative confirmation of these choices. 
See provisions cited supra, note 1 1 5. Such provisions have seldom been litigated, but it is clear that 
the power to reject is broad indeed. See ,  e.g. , Kraus v. Kentucky State Senate, 1 992 WL 3 1 1 175 (Ct. 
App. Ky. Oct. 30, 1 992). 
1 3 2.  See ,  e.g. , provisions cited supra , note 1 1 5. 
1 3 3 .  See supra note 1 1 6 and accompanying text. 
1 34. See supra notes 1 1 7- 1 9  and accompanying text. 
1 35.  See ,  e.g. , Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 1 1 6 (1926) (deriving inherent and exclusive 
presidential power to hire and fire administrative officials from "vesting" and "take care'" clauses of 
the Federal Constitution), overruled by INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 1 9  ( 1 9 8 3). But see Mormon v. 
Olson, 4 8 7  U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (upholding vesting of appointment power in non-executive officer). 
It is n oteworthy-and telling-that the major article discussing the leading case on appoint­
ment authority under the Kentucky Constitution, while asserting that, "(i]t is generally recog111zed 
that the power to appoint Executive Officers is inherently executive," supports this assertion solely 
by citation to federal case law. Snyder & Ireland, supra note 74, at 21 0 - 1 1 & nn . 23 1 & 232. 
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d · 
· 11 131 H 
cases, 1 36 and occasionally in more recent state court ec1s10n
s as we . ow-
ever, most of the more recent and better reasoned state cases hav
e correctly 
rejected this broad assertion of inherent and exclusive executive power. The 
authority to appoint administrative officials belongs ultimately to the people, 
and in drafting a constitution, the people may allocate the authority to appoint 
in any way they wish, or may keep it to themselves by making those offices 
elective. Thus, in the absence of a clear constitutional mandate to the con­
trary-an express grant of an exclusive appointing power to the executive, some 
argument that such authority is required in a particular case by the necessary 
implication of some other express grant of executive authority, or an express 
restriction on the legislature-ordinary principles of state constitutional inter­
pretation would suggest that the legislature is not precluded from choosing a 
method other than executive appointment to fill the offices it creates. 138  Nor 
1 36. See, e.g. , Tucker v. State, 3S N.E.2d 270, 280-85 (Ind. 1 94 1 )  ("except in cases where the 
power of appointment is merely incidental to a major power expressly granted" in constitution, or 
where new office created by legislature is made elective rather than appointive, power to name offi­
cials part of "executive power'' vested in governor); In re Opinion of the Justices, 21 N.E.2d SS I, 
556-57 (Mass. 1 939) (despite constitutional provision giving legislature power to "provide by fixed 
laws for the naming and settling of all civil officers," power to appoint "special commissioners" 
charged with redrawing election districts "executive power" which legislative officials cannot exer­
cise); In re Opinion of the Justices, 19 N.E.2d 807, 817- 1 8  (Mass. 1 939) (same result). 
1 37. See, e.g. , Alexander v. State, 441 So. 2d 1329, 1344.45 (Miss. 1 983) (power to appoint at 
"core" of executive power and, therefore, legislature may not appoint individuals to serve on admin­
istrative agencies that perform executive functions); Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 
S.W.2d 907, 922-23 (Ky. 1984) (discussing mixed precedents, but ultimately concluding power to 
appoint inherently executive in nature); Opinion of the Justices, 309 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Mass. 1 974) 
(state " Electronic Data Processing and Telecommunications Commission" unconstitutional on 
ground, among others, that "[c]reation of a public office is a legislative function, but the appointment 
of a particular person to office is the function of the executive department") (quoting Committee of 
Admin. v. Kelley, 215 N.E.2d 653, 6S7 (Mass. 1966)). 
. 
N�te, howev�r, that Alexander (completely) and Legislative Research Comm 'n v. Brown (par-
tially) involved situations where legislators themselves were personally occupying administrative 
�oles. They were not just the appointers, but the appointees as well. This factor raises additional 
issues'. see supr� �otes 120-27, and may account for the court's hostility to the assertion of non­
execuuve appomt1ve authority in those cases. 
138.  It is a traditional and fundamental tenet of state constitutional law that the legislature 
rather than the executive is the "res1·d I I t " f h · 
· · 
. . ua ega ce o t e ongmal sovereign power of the people. Thus, state executives, hke their federal counterparts, enjoy only those powers conferred by the 
terms and necessary implications of th · · · · 
· · 
. e1r respective constitutions. State leg1slatures, however, unhke Congress, retam all powers not expl1'c1'tl t k f h · · · · Y a en rom t em by the const1tutton. This residual power 
has been properly held to in I d I h · · · . , . . 
c u e, un ess t e constitution provides to the contrary, the power to 
exercise
. 
the people s ongmal authority freely to determine how officials will be chosen. 
p 2d :�� �:;�;
n
�
w� made expl�citly by the Arizona Supreme Court in Lockwood v. Jordan, 2 3 1 
· • . · . ( nz. 1951), which held that the power to appoint "post auditor" was not inher-
ently executive m nature. The court in Lock ood . . 
ered the power to 8 · t . .1 
w argued that m Anzona, at least, the people consid-
ppom pnman y a "polif I 
· 
" · 
k.. ffi . 
ica question which they largely kept to themselves-ma mg many o ccs elective and surrend . h . 
inherent necessities and '. . 
enng t e nght to choose officials only in so far as "the 
propnet1es seemed to req · · " ld 
that appointment power in 1 . . 
uire it. · at 433. The court concluded therefore 
I . 
genera 15 not mherently "executive." Id. Rather the legislature may not on y provide a mode for fillin . . 
' 
not prohibited by the constituf 
g a va�ancy 10 office, but tt may create offices when 
ton and provide for election of the officers by the people, 
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must the core concept of executive power-the power and duty to carry out the 
laws-necessarily imply the exclusive power to appoint all of the subordinate 
officials who may have some hand in administering the laws. The executive is 
obligated to enforce the laws only to the extent that law itself permits her to do 
so. Thus, even if a provision restricting her ability to choose certain subordi­
nates were to interfere with enforcement of a particular law to some extent, that 
restriction is itself part of the law and adherence to it is conceptually indistin­
guishable from the executive's duty to abide by any substantive limitations the 
legislature may choose to engraft onto its laws. 1 39 For these or similar reasons, 
most recent decisions have upheld the power of state legislatures to confer ap­
pointment authority on persons who are not members of the state executive, at 
least where the legislature's choice as to the holder of that authority is related to 
the functions of the agency. 140 
Additional questions are raised, however, if the legislature purports to re­
serve such appointment authority for itself or its leadership. Even if such an 
allow for their appointment by a board or commission of their creation, or by the execu­
tive, o r  may itself make the appointment. 
Id.; see also State ex rel. Morford v. Emerson, 8 A.2d 154, 1 56 -58 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939) (limiting 
executive's power to make appointments); State ex rel Martin v. Melott, 359 S.E.2d 783, 787 (N.C. 
1987) (appointment of Director of Administrative Hearings not exercise of executive power); Wentz 
v. Thomas, 1 5  P.2d 65, 70-71 (Okla. 1 932) {permitting legislature to create and appoint members to 
State H i ghway Commission). Similar arguments have also been used to uphold the legislator's 
power to create investigatory committees of its own members, committees that may continue to 
function even after the legislative session has ended. See, e.g. , State v. Fluent, 191 P.2d 241, 246 
(Wash. 1 948) (noting legislatures have such powers unless explicitly restricted in state constitution), 
cert. denied sub nom. Washington Pension Union v. Washington, 335. U.S. 844 (1948). 
Such arguments from the original reserved powers of the legislature, however, have not always 
been accepted as sufficient to allow it to vest executive functions i n  individual legislators. See, e,g. , 
State ex rel. Anderson v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 345 P.2d 674, 678-79 (Kan. 1959) (rejecting 
argument that such vesting of original sovereign authority in state legislature permits legislature to 
require that Governor appoint individual legislators to State Office Building Commission, arguing 
such con struction would permit legislature to institute "parliamentary" government of sort founders 
clearly rejected); Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 9 1 3  (Ky. 1984) (while 
legislature repository of all state powers not vested elsewhere, this does not allow it to vest executive 
functions in legislators; residual power includes only those powers legislative in nature). 
1 39. See State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 359 S.E.2d 783, 787 (N.C. 1 987) (distinguishing be­
tween "the power to execute the laws" which it held to fall within core of executive authority, and 
power to appoint others, which held did not). 
140. See, e.g. , Caldwell v. Bateman, 3 1 2  S.E.2d 320, 325 (Ga. 1 984) (upholding statute empow­
ering Speaker of House and President of Senate to appoint two of five members of Georgia Cam­
paign and Financial Disclosure Commission); State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 359 S.E.2d 783, 786-87 
(N.C. 1 987) (rejecting arguments that text of state constitution vests governor with exclusive appoin­
tive aut hority and act of appointing inherently exercise of executive power; and upholding statute 
giving Chief Justice of State Supreme Court power to appoint Director of State Office of Administra­
tive Hearings); see also Chiles v. Public Serv. Comm'n Nominating Council, 573 So. 2d 829, 832-33 
(Fla. 1 99 I )  (legislature could freely determine how members of PSC would be appointed, since func­
tions of agency-though both "executive" and "legislative" in nature--primarily legislative); In re 
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d 25, 29- 30 (Fla. 1973) (upholding legislative appoint­
ments to administrative agency without discussing whether appointment is "executive" function); 
Parcell v. State, 620 P.2d 834, 836 (Kan. 1 980) (same); State Bd. of Ethics v. Green, 566 So. 2d 623. 
625 & n.4 (La. 1 990) (same). 
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exercise of appointment authority by the legislative branch survives scrutiny 
under the appointments or vesting clauses of a state constitution, it ma� still fall 
afoul of more general distribution of powers concerns, as expressed m many 
states' explicit separation of powers mandates. 141 
One line of analysis of these issues takes an essentially "formalist" approach 
to distribution of powers analysis. In these cases the central issue tends to be­
come one of classification-a legislative body or leader will be allowed to ap­
point an official if, but only if, that official's duties are construed as essentially 
"legislative" in character; a court, if but only if the official's duties are seen as 
essentially judicial. Decisions from several states-including Louisiana, Massa­
chusetts, Mississippi, and North Carolina-have taken such an approach, strik­
ing down mechanisms of appointment that they saw as incompatible with the 
functions of the appointee, 142 and upholding those that were seen to be 
compatible. 143 
One problem with such a conceptual approach, as with similar federal anal­
yses, is that it is often very difficult to classify the functions of the appointee so 
neatly. 144 But even where the duties of appointees can be classified with reason­
able certainty, this approach can lead to results that seem hard to justify on 
grounds of efficiency, accountability, or the need to prevent abdication of polit­
ical responsibility-or even on grounds of any realistic fear of dangerous concen­
tration of power. For example, in Opinion of the Justices, 145 the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a proposed Electronic Data Processing 
141 .  On the distinction between vesting or appointments clause analysis and separation of pow­
ers analysis, see Charles Herman Winfree, State ex rel. Martin v. Melott: The Separation of Powers 
and the Power to Appoint, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1 109 ( 1988), criticizing the Martin court for concentrat­
ing only on the appointments clause issues, and failing to consider seriously the distribution of pow­
ers issues raised when a legislature retains appointment authority in its own hands. 
142. See, e.g. , Opinion of the Justices, 309 N.E.2d 476, 479-80 (Mass. 1974) (holding, among 
other things, that neither courts nor legislature could appoint members to proposed Electronic Data 
Processing and Telecommunications Commission, which would have unified operational control 
over all data processing and communication services for entire state government); Alexander v. 
Sta_te, �l So. 2d 1 329, 1344-45 (Miss. 1983) (distinguishing prior cases and holding, inter a/ia, that . 
leg1slat1ve appointees could not exercise executive function of overseeing how appropriations were 
spent);
. 
see also �late ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 359 S.E.2d 783, 789- 9 2  (N.C. 1987) (Martin, J., 
dissenting) (arg.uing du lies of Director of State Office of Administrative Hearings primarily executive and leg1slattve in nature, and therefore cannot be appointed by Chief Justice). 
143.  See Melott, 359 S.E.2d at 787-88 (Meyer, J., concurring) (arguing question of who may 
appoint depends upon duties of appointee, that duties of Director of Office of Administrative Hear­
ings primarily judicial in nature, and permissible to vest appointment authority in Chief Justice of 
�tale Supreme Court); 
.
Guidry �· Roberts, 335 So. 2d 438, 445-46 (La. 1 976) (legislature might 
appoint members of ethics commtttee because committee exercised no "executive" functions). Com­




�1s�iss.ippi S�ate Med. Ass'n, 381 So. 2d 1046, 105 l (Miss. 1980) (uphold­ing statute permitting MtSSissippi Medical Association to appoint three members of State Board of 
Health). 
144. See, e.g . . Melott, 359 S E  2d at 789 92 (i h' h · · · 
· . . · . · 
- n w 1c maJonty opm1on and dissent disagreed largely on question of whether dutres of Director of State Offi f Ad · · · · b I ·r. d · · . . . 
ce o mm1strat1ve Hearmgs should 
c (; ass1 1c as primarily Jud1c1al, executive or Iegislaf · b · · . ' 1ve m nature; est answer to quest1on-fam1l-1ar to test takers everywhere-appears to be "all of the above"). 
145. 309 N.E.2d 476, 479-80 (Mass. 1974). 
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and Telecommunications Commission. That Commission would have been 
composed of members appointed severally by the governor, the legislative lead­
ership, and the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court, and would have unified 
operational control over all data processing and communication services for the 
entire state government. Though the court described the motives behind the 
commission as "laudable," 146 and acknowledged the possibility for some flexibil­
ity in analysis where classification of the appointee's functions would be "ambig­
uous," 1 47 it nonetheless held that the essentially "executive" functions to be 
performed by the Commission precluded vesting any appointment authority 
with either the court or the legislature. 148 While the court was doubtless correct 
in its classification of the Commission's functions as "executive," it is hard to see 
how such an arrangement could pose any real danger to the state, how it could 
obscure political accountability for any branch's substantive work, or how it 
might interfere with any branch or allow any branch to avoid its constitutional 
responsibilities. The court did make some effort to argue that giving anyone 
outside the judicial branch operative control of its data processing or telecom­
munications systems might hold some "potential for dangerous concentration of 
indirect but very real control;" 1 49 but the proof of that contention was essen­
tially b y  assertion. Surely telephones are no more necessary to the court's ability 
to function than are, for example, heat and light or the physical structure of the 
courthouse. Yet it would be difficult to argue that the court may not pay its 
utility bills through a centralized administrative disbursing office, or that the 
constitution requires the court to maintain its own unique building maintenance 
staff. 
Other courts have reached different results, upholding the power of the leg­
islature to appoint administrators even if those administrators exercise non-legis­
lative functions. However, most of these courts have reached their results 
without m uch in the way of convincing analysis of the separation of powers 
issues inherent in such cross-branch appointments. As was noted above, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court in Green adopted an analysis apparently based upon 
federal "functionalist" models, focusing its analysis solely on whether the legis­
lature retained "control" of its appointees on the Board of Ethics for Elected 
Officials after they were appointed. 1 so While this factor may certainly be rele­
vant in determining whether a legislative appointment scheme constitutes an ef­
fort at legislative aggrandizement, it seems less than complete as an analysis of 
the distribution of powers requirement in this area. The Georgia Supreme Court 
in Caldwell v. Bateman , 1 s 1  which similarly upheld the propriety of legislative 
appointees serving on the State Campaign and Financial Disclosure Commis-
146. Id. at 479. 
1 47. Id. 
148. Id. at 480. 
149. Id. at 48 1 .  
1 50. State ex rel. Bd. of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green, 566 So. 2d 623, 625 (La. 1 990). 
See generally supra notes 60·71 and accompanying text for discussion of Green . 
. 
1 5 1 .  3 1 2  S.E.2d 320 (Ga. 1984) (upholding statute granting legislative leaders authority lo ap­
point two of five members of State Campaign and Financial Disclosure Commission). 
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sion, was even less explanatory. It focused only on whether a legislator's exer­
cise of the allegedly executive power of appointment violated the incompatibility 
clause of the Georgia Constitution, without discussing the more basic separation 
of powers issues implicit in such a n  appointment. 152 
These choices between sterile conceptualism or superficial functionalism are 
not, however, the only options for a state court considering these issues. A dif­
ferent line of decisions has emerged that takes a more pragmatic and potentially 
fruitful approach to state distribution of powers questions, one that focuses in­
stead on the particular circumstances of each case and the real possibility of 
interference with the goals served by separation of powers if legislative appoin­
tees were permitted to exercise those particular functions, regardless of how 
those functions might be conceptually classified. Thus, for example, in Parcell v. 
State, 153  the Kansas Supreme Court considered an issue very similar to that 
considered by the Louisiana court in Green -whether legislative appointees 
might serve on the Kansas State Governmental Ethics Commission. The Com­
mission consisted of eleven members with appointment authority carefully allo­
cated among both the political branches and the political parties: five members 
to be appointed by the Governor; two by the President of the Senate; two by the 
Speaker of House; one by the Minority Leader of House; and one by the Minor­
ity Leader of Senate. 154 Like the Louisiana Board of Ethics analyzed in Green , 
the Kansas Commission was empowered to perform both legislative and execu­
tive functions. 155 As in Green, a politician under investigation for alleged viola­
tion of the state campaign finance laws challenged the constitutionality of the 
Commission, arguing that a committee dominated by legislative appointees may 
not perform executive functions. 
The Kansas Supreme Court's prior decision in State ex rel. Schneider v. 
Bennett , 1 56 which will be discussed below, 157 had established a framework for 
1 52. 3 1 2  S.E.2d at 325. Compare Lockwood v. Jordan, 23 1 P.2d 428, 433 (Ariz. 195 1),  in 
which the Arizona Supreme Court upheld legislative appointment of a "post auditor" for the state. 
The court w�s at pains to argue that the legislature was not utterly debarred from exercising appoint­
ment authonty. However, on the underlying issue of separation of powers, the court did little more 
tha� punt-identifying the "primary" duties of that auditor as one of advising the legislature, and 
leaving the door o�n for consideration of separation issues "if and when legislation is passed" im­
posing executive duties on that auditor. Lockwood, 231 P.2d at 433. It is hard to conceive however 
how any kind of auditor could operate without performing some functions ordinarily �onsidered 
executive m nature. 
1 53 .  620 P.2d 834 (Kan. 1980). 
1 54. Id . at 835. 
15 5 .  The powers
. 
of the Commission included the power to adopt regulations for administering 
the state Campaign Finance Act to create fi fi d.d · · · 
. 
. 
• onns or can 1 ates to use m reporting on their financial 
affairs, to review those reports to issue d · · · · · 
. . . 
• 
a v1sory opinions mterpreting the Campaign Finance Act, to 
mvesttgate complaints and if it finds ca t fi h · · . . . .' 
use, o re er t e matter to a D1stnct Attorney for prosecu-
tt0n. Wh
.
ile the Co'.11mission has no direct enforcement authority of its own the court had little difficulty m concludmg that at least so f · ' 
h 
. me o its powers were among those "traditionally ascribed to" 
t e executtve branch. Id. at 836. 
1 56. 547 P.2d 786 (Kan. 1976). 
1 5 7 .  See infra notes 202- 1 1  and accom · · · 
C t. . d . . 
panying text for a d1scuss1on of the Kansas Supreme our s prior ec1s1on. 
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analysis of such distribution of powers issues in the state. According to Bennett, 
the crucial inquiry does not focus solely on any conceptual classification of func­
tions, but rather considers all of the specific facts of the case to determine 
whether the challenged arrangement constitutes a "usurpation by one depart­
ment of the powers of another department," defined as whether a department is 
being "subjected directly or indirectly to the coercive influence of" another, and 
whether there is "a significant interference by one department with the opera­
tions of another department. " 1 58 To this extent, the Bennett/Parcell analysis 
seems somewhat similar to federal analyses of the "functionalist" or "checks and 
balances" stripe. 1 59 However, the Kansas court offered what appears to have 
been a significant advance on federal law by specifying a non-exclusive but useful 
set of four criteria that can be used to guide the judicial consideration of the 
issues: 
First, is the essential nature of the power being exercised-Is the 
power exclusively executive or legislative or is it a blend of the two? A 
second factor is the degree of control by the legislative department in 
the exercise of power. Is there a coercive influence or a mere coopera­
tive venture? A third consideration of importance is the nature of the 
objective sought to be attained by the legislature-Is the intent of the 
legislature to cooperate with the executive by furnishing some special 
expertise of one or more of its members, or is the objective of the legis­
lature obviously one of e stablishing its superiority over the executive 
department in an area essentially executive in nature? A fourth con­
sideration could be the practical result of the blending of powers as 
shown by actual experience over a period of time, w here such evidence 
is available. 1 60  
Applying these factors, the court i n  Parcell held that the presence of legislative 
appointees on the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission did not violate the 
requirements of separation of powers, even though those legislative appointees 
constituted a majority of the Commission's membership and would be eligible to 
chair that Commission. Since the Commission did not possess direct enforce­
ment authority, the court had no trouble concluding that its functions were not 
"essentially" executive in nature. 161  Applying the second factor, the court saw 
the Commission's structure as an attempt to secure an appropriate balance be­
tween the branches and the political parties, and therefore an exercise in "coop­
eration" rather than an assertion of "coercive" control by either branch over the 
other. 1 62 The third factor was also satisfied in the court's view because diffusion 
of appointment authority was necessary-and therefore "cooperative" rather 
than hegemonic in nature-to insure that the Commission would both be and be 
1 5 8.  Parcell v. State, 620 P.2d 834, 836 (Kan. 1980) (quoting State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 
547 P.2d 786, 792 (Kan. 1976)). 
1 5 9. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
1 60. 620 P.2d at 836 (quoting Bennett, 547 P.2d at 786). 
1 6 1 .  Parcell, 620 P.2d at 836. 
1 62. Id. at 836- 37. The court noted that not only did the system guarantee the governor five 
out of eleven members would be his own appointees, but also that between five and seven of the 
members would be of her political party. Id. at 837. 
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perceived as sufficiently independent of both of the political branches whose 
members it might be called upon to investigate. 163 Finally, the court endorsed 
the trial j udge's speculative, but probably well founded, conclusion that the 
"practical" effects of this mixture of powers would be positive in nature. 1 64 
To be sure, the analysis used by the Kansas Supreme Court in Parcell is not 
beyond criticism. The four factors identified by the court-the "essential" na­
ture of the powers being exercised, the degree of cross-branch control, the pres­
ence or absence of hegemonic intent, and the practical consequences-while 
perhaps useful, may well be very difficult to apply in particular cases. Classifica­
tion of governmental functions is always difficult, and the answer to other ques­
tions posed-questions such as whether a particular level of influence by one 
branch over another rises to the level of "coercion," or w hether the legislators' 
intentions are benignly cooperative or hegemonic-appear to reside primarily in 
the eye of the beholder. Nor is it obvious why these four factors were chosen by 
the courts. Neither Parcell nor Bennett contains any convincing derivation of 
these factors from the basic concepts or purposes underlying distribution of 
powers theory, and the factors identified by the court appear only indirectly 
relevant to the concerns of efficiency, accountability, or abdication that ought to 
lie at the heart of distribution of powers analysis on the state level. Nevertheless, 
the Kansas approach does point in a useful direction. Its analysis seems far 
better able to accommodate the evolving needs of state governance, while at the 
same time preserving the necessary core of autonomy that each branch must 
retain. It is certainly more likely to lead to socially beneficial results than the 
strained conceptualism of the Massachussets court in Opinion of the Justices, 165 
or the unsupported single-factor "control" test of the Louisiana court in 
Green . 1 66 
Model 2: Legislators Performing Administrative Functions 
The last set of issues to be discussed in this partial survey involves legisla­
tors who per�o?ally .
serve on administrative committees, or who personally un­
dertake a�mmtstrattve tasks, while simultaneously retaining their legislative 
seats. It is clear that sitting legislators may perform administrative functions 
that are part of t�e inte�al ?P�rations of the legislature itself. But when legisla­
tors venture outside of this hmtted realm and undertake administrative functions 
relating to the wider functions of government, two additional issues are raised: 
first, whether such a dual role violates state constitutional incompatibility 




• • a com mat1on o unctions m a  smgle per-
1 63. Id. 
164. Id. 
165 .  Sec supra notes 145- 49 and acco · r · · 
I L6 "-- 60 
mpanymg text ior d1scuss1on of Opinion of the Justices. 
u . .>ec supra notes 
• 71 and accomp · , . 
16 7 S 
anymg text •Or discussion of State v. Green . . cc supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text for d' . . . . 
compatibility clauses. Su gene 11 M h 
1scuss1on of state constitutional m-
. ra Y at eson, supra note 20 at 327-30 So . 
. 
do not contain an express incom t'bT 1 '. 
· me state constitutions 
or the equivalent . In such circ:� 
1
t 
1 tty c ause, or '?ay contain clauses limited to "offices of profit" s ances, a separation of pow · · h' . press prohibition on any person 1· n 0 b h . 
ers prov1S1on w 1ch includes an ex-
ne ranc performing th f . e unctions of another, see supra notes 
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son violates distribution of powers concerns. 
Cases involving these issues fall into two general categories. The first type 
are relatively innocuous, consisting of cases in which individual legislators oc­
cupy minor pre-existing executive or administrative posts. Such cases promi­
nently include legislators who are also employed as teachers in the state's public 
schools or universities, 168 or cases in which an individual legislator happens to 
occupy a seat on a traditional administrative board or commission. 169 In such 
cases the essential issue is usually whether the combination of roles at issue vio­
lates the particular terms of the state constitution's incompatibility clause. Basic 
distribution of powers concerns are of relatively minor import. 110 
The second-and potentially more dangerous-category of cases is that in 
which the presence of individual legislators on the body performing assertedly 
executive or administrative functions is mandated by the law that creates that 
body. Such results can be obtained in either of two ways. First, an enabling 
statute might specify that one or more legislators be appointed, either ex officio 
or in their individual capacities, to a seat on what is otherwise a traditional 
1 12- 1 3 ,  has been used by some courts as an alternative constitutional basis for a broad prohibition on 
simultaneous exercise of legislative and administrative roles. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Black v. Burch, 
80 N.E.2d 294, 302-03 (Ind. 1948) (holding members of General Assembly cannot be employed by 
administrative department). 
1 68.  The issue of whether an individual can be simultaneously a member of the legislature and 
a public school or university teacher has generated a surprising amount of controversy. Compare 
Jenkins v. Bishop, 589 P.2d 770, 774-75 (Utah 1978) (per curiam) (holding teacher may serve on 
legislature) with Begich v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27, 34-35 (Alaska 1 968) (holding public school teach­
ers cannot simultaneously hold legislative office), oyerruled by Zerbetz v. Alaska Energy Ctr., 708 
P.2d 1 270 (Alaska 1985); Stolberg v. Caldwell, 402 A.2d 763, 773 (Conn. 1978) (same); Frazier v. 
State ex rel. Pittman, 504 So. 2d 675, 700 (Miss. 1987) (public school teacher cannot hold office 
where salary derives from tax levies); State ex rel. Spire v. Conway, 472 N.W.2d 403, 415 (Neb. 
1 991)  (tenured assistant professor at state university on unpaid leave also barred); Monaghan v. 
School Dist. No. l, 315  P.2d 797, 802-04 (Or. 1 957) (member of state legislature ineligible for teach­
ing position); see also In re Sawyer, 594 P.2d 805, 809 (Or. 1979) (sitting judge may not be employed 
as paid part-time teacher at public college). 
169. See, e.g. , Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 68 S.E.2d 590, 596-97 (Ga. 1952) (since 
membership on Authority not "civil office," Speaker of House of Representatives can sit as member 
of that Authority without violating state constitutional provision); State v. Hayden, 184 P.2d 366, 
373 (Or. 1947) (holding, on separation of powers grounds, appointment of state representative to 
seat on State "Fish Commission" unconstitutional). 
1 70. This is not to say, however, that important separation of powers concerns could never 
arise in  such circumstances. As was noted at note 120, supra, the founders' generation feared the 
potential for corruption that could result if the appointing authority could use the possibility of 
appointment to a truly lucrative office in return for a legislator's support. Where such circumstances 
exist, real separation of powers concerns are present. 
Though uncommon, a few of the cases involve at least a whiff of such concerns. See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Black v. Burch, 80 N.E.2d 294, 296-98 (Ind. 1948), in which four members of the Indiana 
legislature had been appointed to salaried positions on various administrative agencies-as Secretary 
of the Flood Control Water Resources Commission, Director of Motor Vehicle Department of the 
State Public Service Commission, Superintendent of Maintenance for the Stale High"':ay Commis­
sion, and in an unspecified but remunerative capacity with the Board of Barber Exammers. While 
not quite saying so, the court seemed clearly to imply that the offices were sinecures, and ruled the 
legislators' simultaneous occupation of those offices unconstitutional. Id. at 302. 
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administrative agency. Alternatively, the legislature might ach
ieve a similar re­
sult by purporting to confer administrative or executive powers on w
hat is-or 
was-a purely or primarily legislative body. Examples of such tradition
al ad­
ministrative bodies on which legislators have personally served include adminis­
trative organs that administer the state's capital construction projects1 7 1  o r  
perform other miscellaneous administrative tasks. 172 Examples of legislative 
bodies that have gradually acquired administrative functions of various types 
prominently include the so-called "Legislative Research Commissions" or "Leg­
islative Councils," 173 Legislative Finance Commissions of various types, 1 74 and 
similar legislative bodies purporting to exercise other fiscal powers. 175 
1 7 1 .  The cases are common, and decisions go both ways. Compare Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. 
Auth., 68 S.E.2d 590, 596-97 (Ga. 1952) (holding seat on Authority is not "civil office," and Speaker 
of House of Representatives therefore can sit as member of that Authority); State ex rel Fatzer v. 
Kansas Turnpike Auth., 273 P.2d 198, 207-08 (Kan. 1954) (upholding statute granting seats on 
Turnpike Authority created to finance, construct, and operate various types of road projects t o  
chairmen o f  State and House Committees on Roads); Tall Tower v. Procurement Review Panel, 363 
S.E.2d 683, 685-86 (S.C. 1987) (upholding presence of legislators on Panel which conducts adminis­
trative review of protests arising under state Procurement Code.); J.F. Ahem Co. v. Wisconsin State 
Bldg. Comm'n, 336 N.W.2d 679, 696 - 97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding mixed executive and 
legislative membership on State Building Commission, empowered to, inter alia, select sites for pub­
lic buildings, approve construction contracts, administer construction, and lease those buildings) 
with Greer v. Georgia, 212 S.E.2d 836, 838-39 (Ga. 1975) (striking down statute appointing six 
sitting legislators to World Congress Center Authority, public corporation authorized to construct 
and operate Center); Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 149 N.E.2d 273, 297 (Ind. 1958) (striking 
down Commission created to oversee building of new State Office on ground it contained legislative 
members); State ex rel. Anderson v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 345 P.2d 674, 682-83 (Kan. 1 959) 
(striking down statute providing Governor may appoint only members of legislature to seven person 
State Office Bldg. Comm'n); State ex rel State Office Bldg. Comm'n v. Bailey, 150 S.E.2d 449, 456 
(W. Va. 1966) (holding State Office Building with legislative members unconstitutional). 
1 72. See, e.g. , People v. Tremaine, 168 N.E. 817, 822 (N.Y. 1929) (incompatibility clause pro­
hibits legislators from sitting on committees which control spending); State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 
286 S.E.2d 79, 81 (N.C. 1982) (striking down appointment of four legislators to North Carolina 
Environmental M anagement Commission). Such bodies are probabl y  far more common than the 
�ase law dis�ussing them would indicate. In at least one recent case, an administrative body which 
incl uded legislators among its members-the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation Author­
ity, a body formed to enter into binding financial reform plans with major cities in that state-was 
upheld without discussion of �he merits of the distribution of powers issues raised, on grounds of 
lack of standmg. Local 22, Philadelphia Fire Fighters' Union v. Commonwealth 613 A 2d 522 526 
(Pa. 1 992). 
' . ' 
. 
1 7 3. �<'<'. e.g . . 
_
Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 9 1 5  (Ky. 1984) (strik­
mg down .commission which purported to exercise broad authority over state administrative bureau­
cracy ): See m/ra notes 2 1 1 - 1 9  and accompanying text for discussion of legislative research 
rnmn11t tees ("l.RCs"). 
1. 74· S'.'.'" <'.g. · State �x rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 547 P.2d 786, 798 (Kan. 1 976) (u holdin i n  
part State Fmuncc: Council composed of · · · 
p g 
. 
• executive and leg1slat1ve members exercising broad powers 




. . . . . . . . 
n, power to x compensat10n of executive offi-
uuls. and supervisory power over state c1v1l servic d o· · · f 
2()7 1 . 
e an 1v1s1on o the Budget). See infra notes 1 99-
arH accompunymg tc�t. 
1 7 � - Such cc:mmittecs, often joining executive and legislative officials on the same body come m l{ rc:at variety . .,.1mc have been upheld against . f ' 
ht-en dcdnm.J unconstitutional C 
separation ° powers challenge, while others have 
(S C  1 977)  (upholdi�g State B d ompa; �late ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 236 S.E.2d 406, 409 u get an ontrol Board comprised of Governor, State Treasurer, 
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It is easy to understand why legislatures would want to require a legislative 
presence on certain controversial or politically powerful administrative organs. 
In view of the institutional problems caused by short legislative sessions and lack 
of staff, the urge to create a continuously functioning body, one that can act on 
the legislature's behalf when it cannot fend for itself, can be strong indeed. And 
even while the legislature is in session, the most direct way for legislators to 
assert influence on the way statutes and programs are administered is for legisla­
tors themselves to sit as members of the relevant agency or board. 
Such service by a legislator on an administrative body does not necessarily 
violate state constitutional incompatibility provisions, at least those which, like 
most, preclude sitting legislators from occupying administrative "offices" during 
their legislative terms. 176 Particularly where the legislators serve without pay, 
the additional responsibilities that such service entails may not rise to the level 
of an "office." 1 77 However, even if not made per se unconstitutional by such an 
incompatibility clause, such a combination of roles in a single individual raises 
serious distribution of powers questions-questions that result not only from the 
mixing of conceptually different roles, but also from the real potential for such 
arrangements to allow the combination of lawmaking and law-applying func-
Comptroller General, Chairman of Senate Finance Committee, and Chairman of House Ways and 
Means Committee, all ex officio, and authorized to deal with fiscal affairs of state); Elliott v. McNair, 
156 S.E.2d 42 1 ,  43 1 (S.C. 1 967) (upholding State Budget and Control Board, comprised of Gover­
nor, State Treasurer, Comptroller General, C hairman of Senate Finance Committee, and Chairman 
of House Ways and Means Committee, all ex officio) with Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain, 441 So. 
2d 1329, 1 3 39- 42 (Miss. 1983) (striking down, inter alia, statute setting up joint executive/legislative 
Commission o n  Budget and Accounting with broad powers to prepare proposed state budget, over­
see administration of certain appropriations, regulate purchases by state agencies, and administer 
state employees' life and health insurance plans); Jn re Opinion of the Justices, 1 9  N.E.2d 807, 8 1 7-
18 (Mass. 1 9 3 9) (striking down legislative "Recess Commission" which purported to exercise au­
thority to approve governor's decisions to spend emergency funds); see also Stockman v. Leddy, 129 
P. 220, 223 (Colo. 1 9 1 2) (striking down committee of legislators empowered to investigate and act in 
prosecuting or defending certain actions on part of state), overruled by Denver Assoc. for Retarded 
Children, Inc. v .  School Dist., 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975). 
176. See supra notes 1 2 1 -27 and accompanying text for discussion of state constitutional in­
compatibility provisions. 
177. See, e.g. , Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 68 S.E.2d 590, 597 (Ga. 1 952) (Speaker of 
Georgia House of Representatives could sit as member of state School Building Authority without 
violating incompatibility clause of state constitution). But see Jn re Opinion of the Justices, 19 
N.E. 2d at 8 1 7- 1 8  (legislator's seat on "Recess Commission" of legislature constituted forbidden OC· 
cupation of "civil office" under meaning of state constitution). 
It must be noted, however, that the express incompatibility clauses may not be the only source 
for a constitutional prohibition on dual officeholding. As was discussed at notes 1 1 1 - I J, supra'. some 
state constitutional "separation of powers" clauses contain additional language expressly forb1ddmg 
persons belonging to or exercising powers under one branch from holding office or exerc1smg any 
power or function of another. Such clauses can function as alternative grounds for proh1b11mg a 
legislator from exercising an administrative role. Where such provisions refer to holding "office" in 
another branch, they do not seem greatly broader than a typical incompatibility clau
_
se. However. 
where the second clause of the state separation of powers provision refers 10 persons m one branch 
exercising the "powers" or "functions" of another branch, a much broader prohibition on dual of· 
ficeholding may result. 
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tions in the same persons or institutions. 178 Depending on the circumstances, 
such a combination of roles could well result in the small-scale "tyranny" of 
effectively unfettered discretion on the part of the agency at issue, provide a 
mechanism for the domination of one branch over another, interfere with the 
efficient operation of government, or blur the lines of responsibility and account­
ability that are required to link political actors to the process of democratic con­
trol of govemment. 179 
Although the factual circumstances and outcomes vary, the analyses em­
ployed by state courts to analyze cases involving legislators who personally exer­
cise administrative functions are strikingly similar to the analyses employed in 
the cases involving legislative appointees to administrative agencies, addressed 
above. Here too, many of the courts that have struck down such arrangements 
have done so largely for "formalist" reasons. 180 Thus, for example, in Book v. 
State Office Building Commission ,  1 8 1  the Indiana Supreme Court declared that a 
Commission created to oversee the erection of a new state office building was 
unconstitutional solely because that Commission contained both executive and 
legislative officials among its members. 182 Though the court acknowledged in 
principle the need for "flexible" interpretation of distribution of powers princi­
ples, it relied on federal as well as state authority to conclude that executive and 
legislative functions must be kept radically separate. 1 83  Since the court classified 
the Commission as an "executive" organ, 184 no legislator could serve on it. The 
court made no attempt to analyze why application of such a strict rule was 
1 78. This is the aspect of separation of powers analysis that Professor Vile refers to as the 
"separation of persons" strand. VILE, supra note 24, at 17. 
1 79. See infra notes 180-221 and accompanying text for a futher discussion of these problems. 
1 80. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text for discussion of Book v. State Office Bldg. 
Comm'n. See also Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220 (Colo. 1912) (striking down committee of legisla­
tors formed to prosecute ceratin legal actions on part of state), overruled by Denver Assoc. for Re­
tarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist., 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975); State ex rel. Judge v. Legislative 
Finance Comm., 543 P.2d 1317, 1 3 2 1  (Mont. 1975) (holding committee composed of legislative 
members, purportedly authorized to review and approve expenditures by state agencies in excess of 
appropriations and any allocation of non-general fund monies not available at previous general ses­
sion of legi�lature, unconstitutional); State v. Hayden, 184 P.2d 366, 373 (Or. 1947) (holding state 
representative may not be appointed to State Fish Commission); State ex rel. State Office Bldg. 
Co�m'.n v. Bailey, 150 S.E.2d 449, 456 (W. Va. 1966) (holding committee unconstitutional where leg1slat1ve members perfonn administrative or executive functions). 
1 8 1 .  149 N.E.2d 273 (Ind. 1958). 
1 82. _Id. at 293-97 .
. 
The Commission consisted of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, the 
Budget Director, the legislative members of the State Budget Committee one additional member of 
the Senate 
_
(appointed by the Lieutenant Governor), and one additionai member of the House of Rep. (appomted by the Speaker) All m '-� ed · · · · 
. . 
· emuc:rs serv ex officto; the leg1slat1ve members constituted 
a maJonty of the Commission. Id. at 293 . 
. . 
1 8�· Id. at 293-97 (quoting O'Donoghue v. United States 289 U.S. 5 1 6  530 (1933)· Springer v. Phihppm






ra ters of Federal Constitution, for proposition that strict separation of powe
,
rs must be mam ame . 
1 84. The court's discussion clearly shows the "classifying" approach: methodology of the formalist 
The members of the Commission ar 1 1 . . . 
of necessity, must fall within the ex
e c  e�r Y not Jud1c1al or legislative officers, hence, they, 
ecut1ve department of State Government, and are ad-
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necessary to prevent abuses in the case before it, but rather relied upon the gen­
eralized potential for evil that might occur if similar institutions were in fact 
used to usurp the governor's duty to execute the laws. 1ss 
Recent cases coming to similar conclusions have tended to rely on both the 
formalist argument articulated i n  Book, and on a more general argument about 
the nature of the legislative function-that legislatures may create instrumentali­
ties to implement legislation, but may not "retain some control over the process 
of implementation by appointing legislators to the governing body of the instru­
mentality." 1 86 Such reasoning was applied in Greer v. Georgia to preclude indi­
vidual legislators from serving as members of the Authority created to oversee 
construction of Atlanta's World Congress Center; 1 87 in State ex rel Wallace v. 
Bone to strike down a statute giving legislative leaders power to appoint four 
legislators to the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission; 188 
and in Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain to preclude legislators from sitting on 
the Mississippi Commission on Budget and Accounting, a n  organ that both as-
ministrative officers in the sense that they would perform functions which usually are and 
would be performed by administrative officers within the executive department. 
Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 149 N.E.2d 273, 295 (Ind. 1958). 
185. Id. at 296. "If members of the Legislature may be appointed as members of Boards which 
exercise functions within the executive-administrative department of Government, the door is then 
open for the Legislature to enter and assume complete control thereof." Id. 
1 86. Greer v. Georgia, 2 1 2  S.E.2d 836, 838 (Ga. 1975). 
1 87. Id. at 839. The statute at issue provided that the Authority was to construct and operate 
the Center, and that six of the 20 members of that Authority must be appointed from the members of 
the General Assembly. Id. at 837. The court acknowledged "it is impossible to draw a mathemati­
cal line by which every action can be exactly classified; and there are some matters which do not 
inherently and essentially appertain to one department of government rather than to another." Id. 
at 838 (quoting Southern Ry. Co. v. Melton, 65 S.E. 665, 667 (Ga. 1909)). However, it had no 
difficulty in  concluding that the functions o f  this Authority were "primarily, if not exclusively, exec­
utive," and that legislators were not permitted to have any direct role in implementing the laws. 
Greer, 2 1 2  S.E.2d at 838. The court rejected, without discussion, arguments that such dual service 
would not, under the facts of the case, pose any real threat to the values underlying the separation of 
powers principle. Id. at 837. 
188. 286 S.E.2d 79, 81 (N.C. 1982). The North Carolina Environmental Management Com­
mission was a quasi-independent regulatory agency with the investigatory, permitting, and enforce­
ment powers typical of such an agency. Id. at 79-80. Of the 17 members of the Commission, 1 3  
were to be appointed b y  the governor, two by the Speaker of House from the membership of the 
House, and two by the President of the Senate from the membership of the Senate. Id. The court 
relied upon the tradition of strict separation of powers in North Carolina and an extensive review of 
sister-state precedent to conclude that legislators may not sit on agencies with such operational 
responsibilities: 
It is crystal clear to us that the duties of the EMC are administrative or executive in char­
acter and have no relation to the function of the legislative branch of government, which is 
to make laws. We agree with the Georgia court's holding in Greer that the legislature 
cannot constitutionally create a special instrumentality of government to implement spe­
cific legislation and then retain some control over the process of implementation by ap­
pointing legislators to the governing body of the instrumentality. 
Id. at 88. The court was apparently unmoved by the fact that its decision would affect some 49 other 
North Carolina boards and commissions on which legislators were then serving as members. Id.; see 
generally Orth, supra note 20, at 10-17 (critiquing Wallace as unsupported by precedent and unnec­
essarily rigid). 
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sisted in preparing the state budget and oversaw certain administrative 
expenditures. 189 
Such strict approaches may have some merit at least as prophylactic meas­
ures. Given the real possibility for abuse inherent in allowing those who write 
the laws also to determine how those laws shall be applied, a strict refusal ever 
to allow legislative and administrative functions to be joined in the same person 
may indeed be the safest course. But this formalist approach suffers from the 
defects of its virtues-it has tended to obscure the difference between novel gov­
ernmental arrangements that are real violations of the principles of distribution 
of powers and those that are merely technical violations. Thus, for example, in 
Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain , 190 the Mississippi Supreme Court's formalist 
analysis led it to declare unconstitutional not only the Commission on Budget 
and Accounting's role in supervising expenditures by administrative agencies 19 1  
mentioned above, but also the Commission's role in preparing a proposed budget 
that would thereafter be presented to the legislature as a whole. The court ac­
knowledged that both the Governor and the legislature had important roles in 
the budget-making process, 192 and that each could appoint some of their mem­
bers o r  other experts or advisors to assist them. 193 However, the court held that 
those legislative and executive appointees could not sit together on a common 
budget drafting committee without violating the requirement of separation of 
powers. 194 The grounds for this holding appear to be wholly conceptual-issues 
of whether such an arrangement posed any real danger to the state, whether it 
obscured political accountability for budgeting decisions, or whether it allowed 
any branch to avoid its responsibilities were all left undiscussed. The fact that 
such an arrangement might be of "practical benefit to the state," or that it might 
be "efficient, convenient and useful in facilitating the functions of government" 
was, we were told, "legally irrelevant." 195 
1 89.  441 So. 2d 1329, 1338-42 (Miss. 1983). The statutes at issue in Alexander authorized 
legislators to sit on several administrative boards and commissions, the most significant of which was 
the Commission on Budget and Accounting ("CBA"). The CBA was composed of the Governor, 
Lieutenant Governor, and nine members of the legislature. Its powers included preparing a pro­
posed st�t� bu�get, some administration of appropriations, regulating purchases by state agencies, 
and ad
_
mm1sten�g state empl�yees' life and health insurance plans. Id. at 1 33 8 - 39. The court began 
by notmg wha� tt saw as the intentions of the drafters of the state constitution to enact a particularly 
strong separation of powers provision to declare all such boards and commissions unconstitutional. 
Id. at 1 335- 36. The court sharply dt.st1.ngu1·shed bet I · 1 · d · d · · ween egis ahve an executive roles an c1tmg 
the federal decision in Chadha, concluded that all of the actt'vi·ti'es of th · · ' · h
' 
ti . . . . . 
e comm1ss1on were m eren y 
executive functions m which legislators cannot participate in any way. Id. at 1 338- 42. 
1 90. 441 So. 2d 1 329 {Miss. 1983). 
1 9 1 .  Id. at 1341 .  
1 92 .  Id. at 1 339-40 {noting "budget k. · I · · .. . ma mg ts a egislat1ve prerogative and responsibility" but [t)he legislature has acknowledged the · ht f h 
h b d .. . 
ng 0 t e governor to submit to it his recommendations 
upon t e u get, a nght founded on explicit text of state constitution). 
19 3. The nght of the executive to ap · t h · 
th · ht f th 1 · 1 
pom sue subordinate advisory officials was unquestioned· e ng o e eg1s ature to do so was expressly . d b 
' 
State has the power and pr t' 
recognize Y the court: "The Legislature of this 
. . . eroga tve to create such a committee 
. 
d . . It m its budget-making respo ·b·l· . ,, 
as tt may eem appropnate to assist 
ns1 1 •hes. Id. at 1339.40 
1 94. Id. at 1338- 41 .  
. 
1 9 5 .  Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain 441 S 2d 1 329 . ' o. , 1 33 9  (Miss. 1 983). 
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Nor were earlier cases that reached the contrary conclusion, thus permit­
ting legislators to exercise particular administrative tasks, any models of sophis­
ticated or convincing legal analysis. On the contrary, many of the early cases 
that upheld such mechanisms against separation of powers challenges tended to 
analyze them in a superficial m anner, either avoiding the issue, t96 relying on the 
purest ipse dixit, 197 or simply asserting, without much analysis, that the func­
tions performed by the agency at issue are "incidental to" proper legislative 
functions. 1 98 This lack of critical examination may have been an artifact of the 
196. See, e.g. , Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497 (1861) (upholding constitutionality of statute 
giving committee of three legislators power to authorize charges against Civil War emergency fund). 
The question of whether the structure of the committee violated separation of powers principles was 
squarely presented to the court, in the strongest terms. The Court quoted the grounds of the appeal 
as including the following: 
The appointment of this Auditing Committee, composed as it is of members of the Legisla­
ture, is against Art. 3 of the Constitution of the State, in as much as the distribution of 
powers of the government is violated. If the General Assembly can safely appoint, out of 
its own members, a committee for the settlement and the examination and allowance of 
claims, they can also arrogate to themselves the custody of the public money; the executive 
prerogative of granting pardons; and elaborate, for the judiciary, a set of rules to be ob­
served by the Courts: all of which would lead to revolution and anarchy. 
Id. at 499. The court's rather bland reply merely noted that "the Legislature may prescribe rules as 
to the custody of public money, (see the Embezzlement Law,) may prescribe rules as to the granting 
of pardons, . . . .  and has elaborated a set of rules to be observed by the Courts." Id. at 500-01 .  
While the  implied point as to the absence of "revolution and anarchy" was undoubtedly correct, the 
court really failed to consider the possibilities for abuse that might inhere if a subcommittee of the 
same body that appropriated emergency funds also retained the power to dole those funds out. 
197. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 1 3  So. 2d 674 (Ala. 1943), upholding a World War II 
vintage War Emergency Council-composed of the governor, four members of the House and four 
from the Senate and empowered, while the legislature was out of session, to meet emergencies by 
dispersing $750,000 in discretionary funds. The Court had no hesitation in classifying the disputed 
Council as "administrative" rather than "legislative." Its entire discussion of the separation of pow­
ers of problems posed consisted of less than two obscure paragraphs: 
When the members of the Legislature are selected to serve under the proposed act, 
they do so as members of a board, not as members of the Legislature, nor as individuals. 
They are not ex officio members because they are also chairmen of certain legislative com­
mittees. 
The legislator, who may be appointed on the board, is performing administrative acts 
wholly apart from that which he renders as a legislator. And the Legislature may validly 
select from their membership executive and administrative officers without violating Sec­
tion 42 or 43 of the Constitution. 
Id. at 677-78. The only case cited for authority, Fox v. McDonald, 13 So . 4 1 6  (Ala. 1 893), stands 
only for the proposition that appointment authority is not inherently executive in nature, and that 
the legislature may vest authority to appoint a city police commissioner in a Board, which is in turn 
appointed by a judge. Nothing in Fox speaks to the propriety of legislators performing executive 
functions. 
198. Two Kansas cases from the 1950s seem typical of this genre. In State ex rel. Fatzer v. 
Kansas Turnpike Auth.,  273 P.2d 1 98 (Kan. 1 9 54), the court upheld the Turnpike Authority against 
constitutional challenge on separation of powers grounds. Id. at 207-08. The Authority, like con­
temporaneous bodies in other states, was empowered to issue bonds and to finance, construct, and 
operate various types of state highway projects. Id. Membership on the board consisted of seven 
members, two of whom-the chairmen of the state and house committees on roads-were members 
of the legislat ure sitting ex officio. Id. The other five were representatives of the executive brunch: 
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wartime or other "emergency" circumstances that led to the creation of many of 
these earlier legislative-administrative organs, and may reftect the court's desire 
to avoid standing in the way of a perceived need. 
A more serious approach to analysis eventually began with the ground­
breaking decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in State ex rel. Schneider v. 
Bennett. 199 At issue in Bennett was the State Finance Council, a nine-member 
body composed of the Governor and the leadership of both houses of the Kansas 
legislature. 200 The Council was the successor of prior bodies originally created 
to oversee and approve specific expenditures of emergency funds while the legis­
lature was not in session. 201 Over time, however, the Council had been statuto-
the state Director of Highways, and four other individuals to be appointed by the Governor. Id. at 
206 -07. The court began by noting that the Kansas Constitution does not expressly either authorize 
or prohibit the legislature from appointing its own members as ex officio members of boards and 
commissions, and that the practice had become common. With respect to separation of powers, the 
court refused to find any unauthorized attempt to confer executive authority on legislators: 
While the legislature cannot interfere with nor exercise any powers p roperly belonging to 
the executive, it may engage in activities which may properly be regarded as incidental to 
and within the scope of its legislative duties, and it is not an encroachment on the executive 
for the legislature to create a commission and to designate its members to perform delega­
ble legislative duties. 
Id. at 207. The court did not, however, discuss why administration of a building program is "inci­
dental to" the legislative function. 
In State v. Fadely, 308 P.2d 537 (1957), the court held constitutional a statute that created a 
state emergency fund and set up a "State Finance Council" to make intersession appropriations from 
that fund. Id. at 549-50. The six-member Council was a successor to a prior body administering a 
state war emergency fund, created in 1943, and was composed of the Governor, Lieutenant Gover­
nor, Auditor of State, Speaker of the House, and the chairmen of the Senate and House Ways and 
Means Committees, all serving ex officio. Id. at 541. Although the Council had broad power to 
advise in preparation of the state budget, investigate, hear and determine certain administrative ap­
peals, and approve certain administrative rules, the only challenge was to the Council's power to 
allocate state Emergency funds. The court rejected a separation of powers challenge in a short and 
obscure passage that merely relied on Fatzer for the principle that where legislators "performed only 
administrative duties" this "did not constitute an encroachment on the executive . . . .  " Id. 
199. 547 P.2d 786 (Kan. 1976). 
200. Id. at 794. 
20 1 .  The Council was specifically empowered, by unanimous vote, to issue short tenn debt 
instruments to cover temporary shortfalls within a single fiscal year, and to allocate state emergency 




exercising such functions have a long history. Examples can be found at least 
as. far back as the Civil War, when the Indiana state legislature appropriated a special sum of $ 1  
m1ll1on t o  defray unforeseen emergency expenses and appoi'nted th · d' 'd 1 1  · I . . . ree m 1v1 ua eg1s ators to act as an audttmg committee charged to examine and approve accounts to be paid from that fund. See, 
e.g. , Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind 497 ( 1 86 1 )  (uphold' I · I · · · · mg eg1s ahon agamst separation of powers chal-
lenge). Subsequent emergencies and wars · 
· 
·1 · . . . . 
gave nse to s1m1 ar solutions; legislatures appropriating 
emergency funds and appointing admm1strative bodies, including individual legislators with power 
to approve dispersal those funds See o · · · 
' 







ncy ounci �omposed of governor and eight legislators
-w 1c was given aut onty to disperse discref fi d 
needed to meet war emergencies). 
ionary un s, to supplement regular appropriations as 
In some states, as in Kansas these bodies ev 1 ed .  
sions" and other similar bodies 'set u to make 
0 v int� �eneral-purpose "State Finance Commis-p appropnauons for all types of unforseen expenses 
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rily invested with a broad range of additional supervisory and administrative 
powers as well. 202 The State Attorney General brought an action alleging, 
among other things, that separation of powers precluded such a legislatively 
dominated body from exercising these administrative powers. 
The Bennett court began its analysis by tracing what it saw as the evolution 
from the formalist approach that characterized distribution of powers analysis at 
the beginning of the century, to a "practical" approach that recognized that 
government powers can no longer be clearly separated into conceptual catego­
ries. 203 As was noted above in the discussion of Parcell, the court in Bennett 
went on to reformulate the essential inquiry as whether a particular mixing of 
conceptually different powers constitutes a permissible exercise in "cooperation" 
between the branches or an unconstitutional attempt at "usurpation" of the au-
when the legislature is not in session. See, e.g. , State v. Fadely, 308 P.2d 537 (Kan. 1957) ("State 
Finance Council" not usurpation of power by legislature over executive). 
Not all courts have upheld such arrangements, however. Some have held, on separation of 
powers or incompatibility grounds, or both, that legislators cannot directly exercise such "adminis­
trative" responsibilities. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Judge v. Legislative Fin. Comm., 543 P.2d 1 3 1 7  
(Mont. 1975) (purely legislative committee with power to review and approve expenditures by state 
agencies in excess of appropriations held violative of separation of powers); In re Opinion of the 
Justices, 1 9  N.E.2d 807 (Mass. 1939) (proposed legislation establishing fund for "unforeseen condi­
tions" during second fiscal year where action cannot be postponed until next session, but permitting 
governor to transfer from fund to particular items of appropriation only on consent of special legisla­
tively dominated "recess commission," held unconstitutional). 
202. Bennett, 547 P.2d at 786. As summarized by the court, these additional administrative 
duties included the power to: (1) "[h]ear and determine appeals by any state agency from final 
decisions or  final actions of the secretary of administration or the director of [computer services];" 
(2) "approve, modify and approve or reject proposed rules and regulations submitted by the secre­
tary of administration;" (3) "fix or approve the compensation to be paid to a large number of officers 
and employees of the executive department;" (4) "approve all rules and regulations prepared by the 
director of the division of personnel for carrying out the provisions of the Kansas civil service act," 
including the assignment of government positions to classes and salary ranges; and (5) supervise the 
activities of the division of the budget, the state vocational training program for prison inmates, and 
the state director of architectural services. Id. at 794-95. 
203. Id. at 791 .  The court argued that such a practical approach has been made necessary by 
the fact that the powers of modern government cannot be completely separated. Id. Rather, "[t]he 
most that can be done is to recognize the theoretical classification made and preserve in general 
outline the distinction drawn." Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 60 P. 1068, 1079 (Kan. 1900) (Doster, 
C.J., dissenting)). The court went on: 
In our judgment a strict application of the separation of powers doctrine is inappropri­
ate today in a complex state government where administrative agencies exercise many 
types of power including legislative, executive, and judicial powers often blended together 
in the same administrative agency. The courts today have come to recognize that the 
political p hilosophers who developed the theory of separation of powers did not have any 
concept of the complexities of government as it exists today. Under our system of govern­
ment the absolute independence of the departments is impracticable. We must maintain in 
our system sufficient flexibility to experiment and to seek new methods of improving gov­
ernmental efficiency. At the same time we must not lose sight of the ever-existing danger 
of unchecked power and the concentration of power in the hands of a single person or 
group which the separation of powers doctrine was designed to prevent. 
Bennett, 547 P.2d at 79 1.  
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thority belonging to one branch by another.204 The Bennett court propose
d a 
non-exclusive list of four factors-the essential nature of the power being exer­
cised, the degree of control exercised over the other branch, the objective sought 
in the arrangement, and the likely practical consequences-which might be used 
to help a reviewing court distinguish between the permissible and the impermis­
sible combinations of functions and/ or personnel. 205 Applying this analysis, the 
court concluded that the power given to the Council to expend emergency funds, 
issue short term debt, and transfer money were all permissible, in large part 
because the requirement that such actions be taken only by the unanimous vote 
of the Council gave the Governor an effective veto over the Council's actions in 
this area and thus prevented any usurpation of the governor's role. 2
06 On the 
other hand, the court concluded that the power given to the Council to exercise 
"day-to-day" supervision over operations of the Department of Administration 
was a usurpation of executive authority. Since these matters are essentially exec­
utive in nature, and since action by the Council in these areas required only a 
majority vote, the Council had the potential to exert a "coercive" influence on 
that portion of the executive realm. 207 
While this analysis is subject to the criticism that the four factors are not 
clearly derived from basic separation of powers theory and that they may be 
difficult to apply in some cases, it does seem to have led to defensible results in 
this case. The court's attention seems properly focused on the underlying reality 
of what the Council is actually doing, and where the acts relate to appropriating 
money, the creation of debt or other matters as to which the legislature has a 
legitimate role, the court seems willing to tolerate experimentation. On the 
other hand, the day-to-day operations of government are kept firmly in executive 
hands. This functional split appears well designed to promote the goals of effi­
ciency and accountability, and does not seem likely to lead to any abdication of 
the core responsibilities of either branch. And while, as noted above, the court's 
four factors may not be the last word in the structured analysis, they do seem 
capable of focusing attention on the relevant issues. 
This 
_
line of analysis articulated in Bennett has also captured the allegiance 
of �ourt� m other states. The analysis has been relied upon to uphold the consti­
tut1onahty of the South Carolina State Budget and Control Board, 20s the South 
204. In Bennett, the court stated: 
Th� separation of po�crs doctrine docs not in all cases prevent individual members of the 
legislature from 
.
serving on administrative boards or commissions created by legislative 
enactments. lnd1v1dual members of the legislature may serve 0 d · · t · bo d . . n a m1ms rat1ve ar s or comm1ss1ons wh�rc such service falls in the realm of cooperation on the part f th I · I 
_ turc and there 1s no attempt t fi . 
0 e egis a 
o usurp unctions of the executive department of the 
government. 
Id. at 792. Sec supra notes 153-64 and · · 
205 S 
accompanying text for a discussion of the Bennett analysis. . cc supra note 160 and accompanying te t ti d' . 
Bennett court. 
x or a 1scuss1on of four factors proposed by the 
206. Id. at 798. The court, however, struck down the s "fi 
on non·dclcgation grounds. Id. at 799. 
peci c grant of power to transfer funds 
207. Id. at 797-98. 
2011. State I.';{ rel. Mcleod v. Edwards 236 S E  2d 406 • · · (S.C. 1977). That Board was comprised 
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Carolina Procurement Review Panel,209 and the Wisconsin Building Commis­
sion, 2 10 all of which included legislators as members and all of which performed 
some tasks that would be classified as "executive" in nature. However, the most 
interesting counterpoint to the Bennett line of cases was a decision that did not 
directly rely on Bennett at all In Legislative Research Commission v. Brown ,2 1 1  
the Supreme Court of Kentucky refused to cite or discuss Bennett or any of its 
progeny and, indeed, went out of its way to assert that any "liberal" approach to 
of Governor, State Treasurer, Comptroller General, Chairman of Senate Finance Committee, and 
Chairman of House Ways and Means Committee, all serving ex officio. The Board dealt with the 
fiscal affairs of the state through division s  of "Finance," "Purchasing and Property," and "Personnel 
Administration." Id. at 407. While at least some of the functions of the Board were undoubtedly 
executive in nature, the court found no "usurpation" of executive authority by the legislature on the 
facts. Id. a t  409. The legislative members comprised only a minority on the Board. On the totality 
of the facts, the court found no evidence of any intention to usurp the functions of the executive 
department, but rather saw the legislators' participation as a "cooperative" effort to make the exper­
tise of the Finance Committee chairmen available to the Board. Id. 
209. Tall Tower v. Procurement Review Panel, 363 S.E.2d 683 (S.C. 1987), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Charleston Television, Inc. v. South Carolina Budget and Control Bd., 392 S.E.2d 
67 1 (S.C. 1 9 90). The Panel at issue was composed of: a member of the state Budget and Control 
Board, the chairman of the state Procurement Policy Committee, a member of the House Labor, 
Commerce and Industry Committee, a member of the Senate Labor, Commerce and Industry Com­
mittee, and five other "at large" members appointed by the Governor. Id. at 685. The Panel con­
ducts administrative review of protests of decisions regarding the award of state contracts according 
to the state Procurement Code. Id . 
As in McLeod, the court held that the "overlap" of functions presented in the case did not 
exceed permissible bounds because the legislators were a minority on the Panel, and because the 
Panel's membership appeared to be a "cooperative effort to make available to the executive depart­
ment the special knowledge and expertise of designated legislators in matters related to their func­
tion as legislators." Id. at 685-86. The court went beyond McLeod to hold that the analysis would 
not change even if the Panel were to elect a legislative member as its chairman. Id. at 685. 
2 10. J.F. Ahem Co. v. Wisconsin State Bldg. Comm'n, 336 N.W.2d 679 {Wis. Ct. App. 1983). 
The State Building Commission was a "legislative committee" consisting of the Governor, three 
Assemblymen, three Senators, and a private citizen appointed by the governor. It was empowered 
to, among other things, select sites for public buildings, approve construction contracts, oversee 
construction, and lease the resulting buildings. The court held that the grant of such executive 
powers to a legislatively dominated comm i ttee did not exceed the permissible bounds of separation of 
powers. Id . at 697. 
Although the court in Ahern relied upon Bennett and endorsed its "pragmatic" approach, the 
analysis it adopted appears distinguishable from that employed in Bennett, at least in emphasis. Id. 
at 696. Like Bennett, the Ahern court argued that, although the separation principle was "funda­
mental," it is often impractical to try to classify a particular office as belonging to a particular 
branch. But rather than phrasing the question in terms of coercion versus cooperation, the Ahern 
court foc used more upon the "checks and balances" between the branches: 
The doctrine of separation of powers must be viewed as a general principle to be 
applied to maintain the balance between the three branches of government, to preserve 
their respective independence and integrity, and prevent concentration of unchecked power 
in the hands of any one branch. 
Id. at 695 (quoting State v. Washington, 266 N. W.2d 597, 605-06 (Wis. 1 978)). Thus. the court 
concluded, Wisconsin law permits sharing of power among the branches, subject to the hmll that no 
body be allowed to wield "unchecked power." Id. at 696. 
2 1 1 .  664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1 984). This case is extensively and approvingly discussed in Snyder 
& Ireland, supra note 74, at 103. 
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the interpretation of separation of powers was precluded by the text and drafting 
history of the Kentucky Constitution.212 Nonetheless, both the reasoning and 
the result in that case are compatible with Bennett. 
Legislative Research Committees ("LRCs") of the sort at issue in Brown 
began as a reaction to the shortness of state legislative sessions.21 3  Like the 
"Finance Council" at issue in Bennett, such LRCs have a long pedigree. Typi­
cally, such committees began as groups of legislators who operated between ses­
sions, performing essentially factfinding roles. They were used in several states, 
and-when confined to such limited roles-generally upheld against constitu­
tional challenge.214 However, in 1982, the Kentucky legislature made sweeping 
changes in the status and functions of its LRC. The committee was designated 
an "independent agency of state government" and given, in addition to its tradi­
tional information gathering functions, broad legislative21 5  and administrative 
functions. The court in Brown readily concluded that, despite its alleged inde­
pendence, the LRC was a "legislative" agency.216 The question was whether 
212. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 912-13  (noting that §§ 27 and 28 of Kentucky constitution specifi­
cally require that powers be separated, and that no person belonging one department may exercise 
power belonging to others, and pointing out that main purpose for which Kentucky constitutional 
convention was called was to curb power of state legislature). In rejecting any softening of the 
demands of separation of powers, the Kentucky Supreme Court also drew support from the similar 
positions taken by what it saw as the majority of other states, and by the Federal Supreme Court. 
Id. at 914 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). 
213. Snyder & Ireland, supra note 74, at 103. Snyder and Ireland state in their article: 
The [Kentucky] Constitution of 1 891  resulted in an imbalance of political power be­
tween the Governor and the legislature. Handicapped by its brief session and lack of legal 
existence after its biennial adjournment, the legislature was unable to gather sufficient in­
formation to evaluate legislative proposals submitted by the Governor. This lack of infor­
mation gave the Governor a special advantage in affecting the biennial budget. and thereby 
all of state government. 
A consensus that an entity should be created to provide the legislature with the requi­
site research during the interim between it sessions to enable its members to better dis­
charge their legislative function. Consequently, the Legislative Research Commission 
(L.R.C.) was born . . . .  
Id. at 174. 
214. See, e.g. , State v. Aronson, 3 14 P.2d 849, 856 (Mont. 1957) (holding statute creating legis­
lative council did not violate separation of powers clause); State ex rel. Jones v. Atterbury, 300 
S.W.2d 806, 8 12-13 (Mo. 1957) (holding Constitution of Missouri permitted and provided for in­
terim legislative research committee); State ex rel. Robinson v. Fluent, 191  P.2d 241,  245 (Wash.) 
(h�lding "lnteri� Commi.tt�" au�horized to conduct factfinding investigations, but requiring Com­
mittee be established by JOmt action of both Houses), cert. denied sub nom. Washington Pension 
Union v. Was�ingt
.
?n, 335 U.�. 8� (1948); �tate ex rel. Hamblen v. Yelle, 1 85 P.2d 723, 727 (Wash. 
1947) (uphold1�g State Lc.gislahve Council," performing factfinding functions, against allegation 
that membership. �n Council was "c�vil office" that legislators forbidden to hold). 
215. In add1t1on to the executive or administrative powers discussed in the text, the 1982 
a
.
mendments also �urported to authorize the LRC to exercise, while the legislature was not in ses­
sion, all of the legislative powers of that absent legislature, with the sole exception of the power to 
enact laws. Brown'. 664 S.W.2d.at 912. �e court in Brown held that such a broad delegation of power 
.
to a sub �umt of the legislature ��l�ted state constitutional provisions vesting legislative power m the legislature as a whole and hm1tmg the legislature's term. KY. CONST. § 29 (amended 
1982); Brown , 664 S.W.2d at 914-16. 
2 16. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 9 l l , 916-17. The court held that such 1 · f '  d d c aims o m epen ence com-
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such an arm of the legislature could exercise any of the range of administrative 
functions that the legislature had given it. 
In holding that many of the new functions assigned to the LRC were un­
constitutional, however, the court in Brown did not rely upon any formalist 
analysis. Rather it inquired, as t o  each challenged innovation, how that practice 
would affect the functioning of government. With respect to the LRC's asserted 
power t o  review and suspend administrative regulations-a suspension that 
would last until the next session of the legislature, a period that could be as long 
as twenty-one months-the court reasonably concluded that the power to adopt 
such regulations went to the heart of the Governor's duty to carry out the law, 
and that giving a body over which the Governor had no influence the power to 
suspend such regulations for such a long period of time encroached too deeply 
on that duty.217 On the other hand, the authority given to another legislative 
committee to require the executive branch to report on the state's financial con­
dition, t o  prepare contingency plans in the event of revenue shortfall, and to 
require that the plan be submitted for committee review, was held not to violate 
the state constitution. Since the reviewing committee did not have the power to 
veto the other branches' contingency plans, the court saw the exercise as "coop­
eration" between branches rather than any "usurpation" by the committee of 
the judicial or executive branches' autonomy.218  And, with respect to the power 
given to the LRC to review applications by the executive branch for federal 
block grants, the court proposed what was in effect a compromise. The court 
acknowledged that the legislature had a legitimate interest in monitoring the 
uses to which these sources of non-general fund revenues would be put, and that 
the very limited duration and frequency of legislative sessions posed a practical 
impediment to such oversight. The court, therefore, proposed that the LRC 
could perform these oversight functions on behalf of the legislature; all that 
would be required was for the legislature to establish "adequate standards" to 
guide the LRC in this endeavor.2 19 In effect, the court converted the issue into a 
non-delegation doctrine problem. In doing so, the Brown court seemed to imply 
that legislators can undertake at least some quasi-administrative duties-at least 
where necessary to support a core legislative interest, and where those legislators 
are bound by the same safeguards and limits on their discretion as other admin­
istrators exercising delegated authority. 
Thus, there appears to be at least a degree of sub silentio convergence of 
method, exemplified by a Kansas court that saw itself as rejecting the "strict" 
conceptual analyses220 and a Kentucky court that saw itself as rejecting the "lib-
ported neither with the court's analysis of the committee's functions nor with the mandatory three· 
part organization of the state government. Id. at 9 1 7. The court explained that "(t]here is, simply 
put, no fourth branch of government." Id. 
2 1 7. Id. at 9 1 8- 1 9. The court also noted that, even if the power to review administrative rcgu· 
lations could be considered "legislative" in nature, such power could only be exercised by the legis· 
lature as a whole, not by a small committee. Id. at 919. 
2 1 8 . Id. at 926-27. 
2 1 9. Id. at 929. 
220. State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 547 P.2d 786, 791 (Kan. 1976). 
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eral" analytical altematives.221 Though starting with very different philosophi­
cal commitments, or at least very different rhetorical foundations, both courts 
ended by adopting very similar pragmatic approaches to the actual task of dis­
tinguishing between permissible and impermissible combinations of functions 
and/or personnel. Together, they may well indicate both the power of that 
pragmatic approach to analysis of state distribution of powers issues and the 
probable line of future development. 
C. Toward an Independent State-Level Allocation of Powers A nalysis: On the 
Virtues of Experimentation and Pragmatism 
Any inquiry into the distribution of powers among governors, state legisla­
tures, state courts, and state administrative agencies must acknowledge the great 
breadth of the field. This article has examined only a small part of that field and, 
for that reason, its conclusions must be few, brief, and tentative. Nonetheless, a 
few observations do seem justified. 
First, analogies to and reliance on federal precedents are of only limited 
utility. For a number of reasons set out above-the lack of persuasive force in 
current federal analyses, differences in history and structure between the federal 
and state constitutions, the lesser ability of state legislatures to oversee adminis­
trative agencies, and the existence of pervasive federal protection against oppres­
sion by state authorities-state courts should not rely too heavily on federal 
distribution of powers precedents. Moreover, despite the more express terms in 
which most state constitutions address their commitment to separation of pow­
ers, many of the arguments that most strongly support more rigid and concep­
tual approaches to interpretation on the federal level-the founders' intent to 
create a strong and unified executive, or the need to create prophylactic rules to 
prevent the possibility of future tyranny-apply far less strongly, if at all, in 
interpreting state constitutions. On the contrary, because of the existence of 
federal law as an ultimate protection against oppression of individuals by state 
authorities, state courts have the opportunity to interpret and apply state distri­
bution of powers principles with less concern for theoretical purity or any need 
to avoid precedents that could be misused in the future. They, more than federal 
cour:is .• ha�e th� .
o�port�nity to i�terpret the distribution of powers principles 
explicit or imphc1t m their respective state constitutions in accord with the other 
goals of separation of powers; goals such as efficiency, accountability, and avoid­
ance of abdication. 222 
Second, sta�e courts �an and should rely on relevant precedent from other 
states as persuasive authonty. The same structural features that served to differ­
ent
.
iate �eder�I dis�ribution of powers analysis from its state analogues-the dif­
f er�ng htstoncal circumstances in which the federal and state constitutions were 
written, structural features such as the legislature's original rather than dele­
gated powers and the prevalence of plural state executives, practical problems 
22 1 .  Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 907. 
2 2 2 .  �e supra notes 72-108 and acco · 
cnccs between the 'ederal d t t 
1 �panymg text for more detailed discussion of the differ-. ' an s a e ana ys1s. 
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caused by intermittent legislative sessions and relative lack of legislative staff, 
and the lesser importance of anti-tyranny concerns-all serve to demonstrate the 
profound underlying similarities among all states, no matter what the specific 
phrasin g  of their respective constitutions. 
Nor are these basic similarities significantly overcome by the differences in 
the respective texts of various state constitutions. To take the most obvious dif­
ference, while most states have express separation of powers clauses in their state 
constitution, a minority do not. 223 Such a divergence, however, is more appar­
ent than real. The separation principle is no less important or enforceable for 
being implicit rather than explicit; indeed, as many federal cases show, the ab­
sence of a n  express provision can be compatible with a very rigid view of separa­
tion of powers. Nor, despite o ccasional statements to the contrary, have such 
textual divergences proven to be outcome determinative in the cases. Kansas 
and South Carolina, two of the states without express separation of powers 
clauses, have taken a "pragmatic" approach to these issues,224 but so have Ari­
zona, Louisiana, and Wisconsin ,  three states with constitutions in which the 
principle is expressly stated. 225 Similarly, while Indiana, Mississippi, and North 
Carolina, all states with express constitutional separation of powers language, 
have taken a fairly rigid and conceptual approach to these issues, 226 so too has 
Pennsylvania, a state whose constitution lacks such a provision.227 This is not 
to say that text is unimportant. Certain state constitutional provisions-for ex­
ample, provisions clearly allocating appointment authority, 228 or broadly forbid­
ding dual officeholding229-may mandate particular results with regard to 
specific issues. However, these are different and somewhat specialized questions. 
On the most basic and general issues of state distribution of powers analysis, the 
important structural similarities among states far outweigh their differences, in­
cluding divergent texts. 
Third, some sort of "pragmatic" analysis, such as that adopted by the Ben­
nett line of cases and echoed in part in Brown, appears to be the most promising 
approach to the resolution of state distribution of powers issues for several rea-
223. See supra notes 109-14  and accompanying text for a discussion of state constitutional 
texts. 
224. See, e.g. ,  Parcell v. State, 620 P.2d 834 (Kan. 1980); State ex rel Schneider v. Bennett, 54 7 
P.2d 786 (Kan. 1 976); Tall Tower v. Procurement Review Panel, 363 S.E.2d 683 (S.C. 1987); State 
ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 236 S.E.2d 406 (S.C. 1977). 
225. See, e.g. ,  Lockwood v. Jordan, 2 3 1  P.2d 428 (Ariz. 195 1 ); State Bd. of Ethics v. Green, 
566 So. 2d 623 (La. 1990); Guste v. Legislative Budget Comm., 347 So. 2d 160 (La. 1 977); J .F. 
Ahern Co. v. Wisconsin State Bldg. Comm'n, 336 N.W.2d 679 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). 
226. See, e.g. ,  Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 149 N.E.2d 273 (Ind. 1958); Alexander v. 
State, 441 So. 2d 1 329 (Miss. 1983); State ex rel Wallace v. Bone, 286 S . E.2d 79 (N.C. 1 982). 
227. See, e.g. ,  Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 1 987) (deriving strong sepa­
ration of powers principle from vesting of governmental powers in different organs of state govern­
ment and, specifically, noting "the inclusion of legislators and/or judges on an agency admm1stenng 
the laws is itself likely violative of the separation of powers doctrine .. ). The opinion in Sessom 
closely followed the formalist analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Bowsher v. Synar. 478 
U.S. 7 1 4 ( 1 986). 
228. See supra notes 1 1 5- 16, 1 1 8, and accompanying text. 
229. See supra notes 12 1 -22 and accompanying text. 
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sons. Such an analysis is compatible with both the text o f  most state constitu­
tions and the basic intentions of the architects of the American system of 
distribution of powers. It seems better able than its more conceptually-based 
competitors to preserve the dynamic balance between governors and legislatures 
in light of the great growth in size and power of state-level administrative agen­
cies. And, most importantly, it permits courts to make distinctions between po­
tentially useful and potentially dangerous governmental innovations. 
Such an approach would be contrary neither to the ideas of the original 
founders of the American polity, nor to the plain terms of express state constitu­
tional texts. The framers of the original American constitutions clearly were 
pragmatists rather than conceptual purists. That fact . is shown both by the 
range of constitutional structures they created and their willingness to change 
those structures if they did not work, and by their willingness to mix concep­
tually ditf erent types of power if by doing so they could achieve. practical bene­
fits, such as the increase in individual security to be derived from the opposition 
of power against power. 230 Nor would such a pragmatic approach be precluded 
by the terms of even the most absolute sounding state constitutional provision. 
While such clauses prohibit mixing of "legislative" and "executive" powers, 
these terms do not define themselves. As was discussed above, the power to 
appoint need not be considered an "executive" act.23 1 And the influence exer­
cised by legislators personally sitting as members of specialized boards or com­
missions need not be considered to rise to the level of legislative exercise of 
executive powers, at least in the absence of an overwhelming or coercive legisla­
tive influence on that body. 
Nor is a rigid definitional approach to separation of powers questions the 
only way to avoid the evils against which the doctrine was intended. Other 
provisions, such as an explicit allocation of the authority to make particular 
administrative appointments or a carefully articulated incompatibility clause, 
may well prevent real abuses without the need for analysis under more general 
a�loc�tio� of powers principles. Indeed, some sort of pragmatic approach to the 
dtstnbutton of powers may be required to vindicate the framers' desire to main­
tain a rough balance of influence between governors and legislators. Because 
much of the work administrators perform has often been considered most nearly 
analogous to traditional "executive" functions, the traditional solution, on both 
the federal and the state levels, has been to assign primary responsibility over the 
230. Various conclusions may perhaps be draw c. th 'fi · · · · . n irom e spec1 c ways m which constltul!ons have changed over tlme-;uch as the grad 1 b d · · · · . . . . . . . ua a an onment of most early constitutional prov1s1ons v�stmg exphc1t appointive authonty m state legislatures. See Gerhard Cas r An Essa in Se ara-
/ton of Powers · Some E I Vi · d · 
pe ' y 'P 
· .
. 
ary �rsions an Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2 1 1  2 16- 18  ( 1989). 
However, the overndmg fact 1s that they d 'd h d 
' 
. . . 
I c ange an that early constitution makers were not 
wedded to any ph1lusoph1cal nohon of separ f f . 
h' . 
a ion ° powers, but rather were willing to mix powers in 
vanous ways to ac 1eve pragmahc ends d t It h · · 
h Id d S 
' an ° a er t e mixture if experience indicated that thev 
s OU 0 so. ee generally THE FEDERALIST Nos 47 & 48 (J M . . 
. 
· k d 1 987) ( · 
· ames ad1son) (Michael L Chad-w1c e ., respec11vely surveying less than total se aration . . 
.
. 
revolutionary era and advoc f · d' . . P 
of powers m state const1tut1ons of 
• 
a mg JU 1c1ous mixture of powe t · .. h ,, upon each branch and thus achie . 1 . . 
rs o impose c eeks and balances 
ve prachca result of hm1ted government) 23 I .  See supra notes 136. 40 and accompanying text. 
. 
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administrative machinery to the executive branch and to phrase constitutional 
questions in terms of whether a particular effort by the legislature to exercise 
influence or control constitutes an impermissible interference with that primary 
executive authority. However, total control over administration cannot be as­
signed to governors or presidents without severely unbalancing the balance of 
power among the branches which the framers of our constitutions tried so hard 
to preserve. 
Moreover, a fact-based analysis of the Bennett type permits the court to 
make useful distinctions among various specific proposals for conferring admin­
istrative duties on legislators or legislative appointees. Some forms of executive­
legislative interaction in the administration of the laws clearly are "cooperative" 
and beneficial in nature. To return to the example that began this discussion, the 
presen ce of legislative appointees on the Louisiana Board of Ethics for Elected 
Officials seems to be more than merely innocuous. Rather, the presence of legis­
lative as well as executive appointees serves both to insure the Board's impartial­
ity and independence, and to strengthen the public's perception of that 
impartiality and independence--both of which are necessary for the Board to do 
its job. And, as the court in Bennett pointed out, there will be occasions when 
legislat ures will have relevant expertise that might be usefully lent to joint ad­
ministrative-executive endeavors.232 This is not to say, however, that all ar­
rangements giving administrative power to legislators or legislative appointees 
should be found acceptable. On the contrary, giving administrative tasks and 
duties to legislators or legislative appointees poses significant dangers. There is a 
quasi-delegation concern-the possibility of maintaining ongoing legislative in­
put in to the administration of a statute may reduce the incentive for the legisla­
ture to d raft statutes carefully, or may encourage them to pass the "hard 
questions" on to a separate and less publicly accountable "expert" body that the 
legislature can both control and, i f  expedient, disclaim. 233 Alternatively, to the 
extent that individual legislators take it upon themselves to direct some portion 
of the day-to-day affairs of administrative bodies, some decrease in efficiency and 
accountability may well occur.234 Such a combination of roles could result in 
the small-scale "tyranny" of effectively unfettered discretion on the part of the 
agency at issue. 235 In a few cases, such efforts to impose legislative control on 
the administrative process may even be so far reaching as to truly threaten the 
2 .12 .  State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 547 P.2d 786, 792- 93 (Kan. 1 9 76). 
2 J .1 . See quote cited Jupra note 95.  
2.\4. T h e  potential proh lems seem evident. A n y  requirement t hat a n  agency !ICCk approval nr 
ih actions from multiple masters will  potentially slow its activit ies and. where those m"ten di"ll· 
�fl'l", require n egot iations and compromises that could limit the speed and elfectiveness of its work. 
Morcovcr, if neither of the politically accountahk branches holds ulti mate authority over sut'h an 
adm ini�t rn t i vc organ. each can hlame t he other for any shortcomint1• in the admimstratwn of the 
Jaw, Ami where each branch accuses the other or interference, the po�•ihi l i ty t hat the c lC1:toratc <"•n 
rffn:t ivcly nssert its ult imate authority becomes even more remote. 
2 .1 � - If the same persons exercise effective control of both the dmft i n11 and the apphrat1on of 
rule,, t hen· can bc little effc.;tive opposition to arbitrary use of those power• R u les <·an l'IC' broadly 
dr.1flcd 111  the a"urnnce that they will only he used •ll•1mt those whom the drafler ,.-1'he• t hem u ...  1 
a;:.1 1 r 1 ' t .  and will nnl readily be chnnt1ed even if m isu� . 
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independence and initiative of the governor, and thus the system of checks and 
balances that the framers of all American constitutions clearly envisioned. 23
6 
Finally, and though less obvious probably most important, many such attempts 
to assert legislative influence over the administrative process represent an in­
crease in effective power not for the legislature as a whole, but for individual 
legislators-those who win posts on administrative bodies and, especially, those 
in the legislative leadership who have the power to appoint outsiders or col­
leagues to those committees. Such an increase in effective power over state-wide 
issues in the hands of a few individuals, each of whom is accountable to the 
electorate of only a small portion of the state, raises obvious problems of lack of 
electoral accountability. 237 
In any event, it is only by explicitly weighing each effort by the legislature 
to place administrative powers in the hands of its members or appointees against 
this range of concerns, that these issues may be directly addressed. Some form 
of Bennett-type analysis holds out at least the hope that the court will be able to 
distinguish between the useful and the pathological. The process of judging is 
not certain and it may therefore be appropriate for courts to err on the side of 
caution, perhaps by placing the burden of persuasion on the party seeking to 
justify a departure from strict conceptual distinctions among the different magis­
tracies. But however done, a pragmatic, fact-based approach cannot help but be 
better at distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate innovations than any purely 
definitional or conceptual analysis would be. 
Finally, it appears from this brief analysis of cases that the work of formu­
lating a pragmatic, state-based approach to these issues is far from accom­
plished. The various factors articulated by the courts-the "control" test of the 
Louisiana court in Green, the four-factor test employed by the Kansas courts in 
the Bennett/Parcel/ line of cases, or the fact-based attempt by the Kentucky 
court to distinguish between "cooperation" and "usurpation"-are all useful 
building blocks for analysis. However, more thought must be given to the task 
of refining the factors that should go into such an analysis, demonstrating how 
those f�ctors can be convincingly derived from the underlying purposes of the 
separation and checks and balances principle (both the purposes as they ap­
pear� to the founders and as they appear to us), and creating a structure for 
applymg these factors that is reasonably predictable in its outcomes. 
236. This may well have been the case in Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 
907 (Ky. 1984). The powers that the legi'sl t' Co · · · · . . a tve mm1ss1on purported to arrogate to itself m that case were truly sweepmg-mcluding not o I th k · 
· · 
. . n Y e power to ma e appomtments to many admm1stra· live agencies, but also the power to co fi · · · · · . . n rm executive appointments, to review and suspend admm1s-trauve regulations, and to control applications for federal "Block Grant" funds among others. 
Together, these may �ell have limited the powers of the Governor to the point �here she might 
cease to play an efl'echve role as a counterweight to th 1 · 1 . . e egts ature. 237. Penods dunng which powerf 1 Co · 
th � d 1 
u ngress1onal leaders exercised disproportionate influence over e 1c era government have not been ha Se 
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ppy ones. e, e.g. ' WOODROW WILSON, CONGRES· 
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